

TRANSLATION OF
SIDDHANTA BINDU

Being

**Madhusudana's Commentary on the Das'as'loki
of S'ri S'ankaracharya.**

By

P. M. Modi

With a Foreward

By

Rev. Dr. Zimmermann

**VOHRA PUBLISHERS & DISTRIBUTORS
ALLAHABAD—INDIA**

First Printed in 1929

First Reprint 1985

Published by O. P. Vohra for

VOHRA PUBLISHERS & DISTRIBUTORS

745, University Road, Allahabad—211002

Printed at : Narula Enterprises, Muirabad, Allahabad

FOREWORD.

It is a matter of satisfaction to every student of Sankrit Philosophy that the interpretation and translation of the *Siddhantabindu* of Madhusudana has fallen into such careful and competent hands as those of Prataprai M. Modi M. A. When as a Judge of the Sujna Gokulji Jhala Vedanta Prize Essay I went over the analysis and the rendering of text by Prof. Modi for the first time, I was very favourably impressed by the scholarly way in which the competitor for the Prize has handled the task. It was clear the interpreter and the translator stood above the text, not the text above him. Yet Prof. Modi like a true scholar, did not despise any help to be derived from other people's work, which he used independently for his own sound conclusions.

His own independence and critical method possibly made the translator feel at home with an independent mind like Madhusudana's. The very ashes of Sankaracharya could have risen in protest against such a bold compromise by one of his "followers" with his opponents, as Madhusudana attempted. For, though according to him the soul's material cause is still Brahman, and final bliss consists in the real nature of the soul being purged from its adventitious mundane forms, yet

that purification and preparation for bliss is achieved mainly by Bhakti, not by Jnana. This is rank heresy in the eyes of Sankaracharya; though the end may appear that of a Kevaladvaitin, as the mind (the Jivatman) is finally retransformed into its innate Brahman form. It was but natural that Madhusudana interpreted individual verses as well as the whole tendency of the Bhagvad Gita consistently with his view. To such an interpretation the text lent itself so readily that a mind of lesser acumen than his could not have failed to avail himself of the help this Prasthana offered. That in Indian philosophy, in modern times especially, there is hardly anything new under the sun, is illustrated by the fact that B. G. Tilak's interpretation of the Bhagvad Gita has partly been anticipated by the author of the Siddhantabindu.

Professor Modi's translation and interpretation shows a happy *entente cordiale* between East and West. The East gives the material to be worked upon according to critical Western methods. For the writer was wise enough to use all the help which *mss.*, a printed edition of the text, Sanskrit commentaries, sources from which the quotations were taken afforded for the literary, philological and philosophical inquiry into the text before him. The translation is presented in such an external

form as a thoughtful student would expect from a very careful editor. The Appendices squeeze everything out of the text worth having, and give critical and historical details connected with it. The monograph is a fine specimen of work done and promise for the future.

R. Zimmermann.

St. Xavier's Villa, Khandala

21st May 1929.

PREFACE.

This *Translation of Sidhanta Bindu* – a commentary on the Das'as'loki of S'ri S'ankaracharya, was selected out of several submitted to the University of Bombay for the *Sujna Gokulji Zulu Vedanta Prize* competition for the year 1921 and is now published with its permission. In order that the usefulness of this translation may increase I have contributed some additional materials bearing on the subject. In the introduction will be found, among other things, a detailed account as far as available of the life of Madhusudana Sarasvati about which so far very little seems to have been written. His ideas on 'Bhakti' have been discussed in Appendix II while other Appendices give a list of his works and names of Authors referred to by Madhusudana in his published works.

The text used for the Translation of Das'as'loki with commentary of Madhusudana is the one printed as Advaita Manjari Series No. 3 of Kumbhakonam. I have consulted "Ratnavali", the commentary published with the same text (Vide P. 82, P. 92, P. 203), as also the text of Siddhantabindu printed in Benares by Babu Govinddas Gupta in 1888 A. D., where one may find more appropriate and easier reading in some cases than in the Kumbhakonam text (Vide P. 106, P. 148, P. 211).

The different readings thus collected from various sources have been embodied in App. No. 1 (b).

‘Ratnavali’ has been taken advantage of to explain the exact sense of some difficult words and passages in the Text as will be seen from the foot-notes as also the body of the Translation. (*Vide* P. 141, P. 142 P. 199, Page 210 etc)

Wherever the literal translation of a piece appeared to be obscure or bearing a confused meaning because of the Sutra-like and complex style of the Text, explanatory notes have been added as foot-notes, or in the body of the Translation as the occasion required, (*Vide* Pages, 35, 57, 65, 85, 91, 197, 199, 203, 204, 210 etc.)

Sanskrit words, sentences &c. *ad verbatim* have been quoted where it was found that they would be useful and serve as important guides to understand more explicitly the translation, both as foot-notes and in Appendices (*Vide* Pages 197, 199, 142 etc.)

The number of the pages marked on various pages in the body of the Translation and Appendices correspond with those of the Kumbhakonam Text.

The sequence of the sentences of the text has been strictly adhered to except in a case or two where it has been changed with a view to maintain continuity of the chain of arguments (*Vide* pages 65 and 71).

Before "Siddhanta Bindu" the text proper commences, three pages have been separately allotted to the publication of 'Das'as'loki' on which it is a commentary and every verse of this latter is again reproduced in its proper place for the purpose of easy reference.

The text of the Siddhantabindu has been analysed and divided into topics in accordance with the generally accepted division of the tenets of the S'ankara Vedanta.

A brief marginal summary of the topics dealt with also appears on every page of the Translation.

Quotations in the Siddhanta Bindu have been traced as far as possible and are collected in the Appendix No. 1 (a). Some of these were not found in the original texts exactly in the same form as in the Siddhanta Bindu. Wherever this is the case, it is noted in the same appendix.

A list of the different books consulted in the preparation of the Introduction is given at the end of this preface.

In brief, every possible attempt has been made so that this book might serve the general reader and the student. The writer would, however, be glad to receive suggestions from readers so that they may be utilised in the next edition in case he is fortunate enough to undertake it.

I must take this opportunity of expressing my heartfelt thanks to Rev. Dr. Zimmermann, Professor of Sanskrit, St. Xavier's College, Bombay, who was pleased to contribute a very valuable 'Foreword' to this book. He keenly desired that the 'Translation' with Appendices as added by me should be published at an early date. This encouragement it was that made me bold to place this book before the public. This publication would, however, have been delayed but for the kindly help advanced to me towards its cost. Contributions have been received from the Bombay University and from the Bhavnagar Darbar. This latter help has been due to the courtesy of Sir Prabhashanker Pattani who is too well known for his interest, both in his official and private capacity, in education and literature to need any elaboration at my hands.

I must not here forget to mention Principal A. B. Dhruva M. A. L. L. B., Pro. Vice chancellor, Hindu University Benares, and Prof. V. M. Mehta M. A. L. L. B; D. P. I. Bhavnagar State, to both of whom I am deeply indebted for my knowledge of oriental and occidental Philosophy, which, in a great measure, enabled me to bring this difficult undertaking to a successful issue.

Bhavnagar
18th April 1929.

P. M. Modi. M. A. (B.H.U.)

Professor of Sanskrit
Samaldas College.

LIST OF BOOKS ETC. CONSULTED.

1. History of Indian Literature by Alberecht Weber.
2. Geschichte der indischen Litteratur von Dr. M. Winternitz
3. Annals of the Bhandakar Oriental Research Institut ,
Poona.
4. The Nijavarta (in vernacular) - a work of the religicus
sect of Vallabhacharya.
5. Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society X.
6. The Catalogus Catalogorum by Aufrecht Theodor.
7. Anandamandakini - published in the Kavyamala - Guecheha.
8. The Vedantakalpalatika - The Princess of Wales, Sarsvati
Bhavana Texts. No. 3, Benares.
9. Siddhantabindu with the commentary called Ratnavali -
Kumbhakonum Edition.
10. Mahimnastotra with Madhusudana's tika Nirnayassagara
Press Ed.
11. Harilila by Vopadeva with the commentary of Madhu
sudana Saravati - Calcutta Oriental Series No. 3
12. Samkshepasariraka of Sarvajna Muni with the commentary
of Madhusudana Saravati published by Babu Govinddas
Gupta Benares.
13. Mad'usudana's tika on the first verse of the Bhagvata
Purana published along with many other commentaries on
the whole Bhagavata by Nityasvarupa Brahmachar in,
Vrindavana.
14. Bhaktirasayana published by Nityasvarupa Brahmacharin,
at Calcutta.
15. Ishvarapratipattiprakasa, edited by T. Ganpati Sastri
Trivendrum.
- 16 17. Advaitasiddhi and Advaitaratnarakshana - Published
by the Nirnayassagar Press, Bombay.
18. Bhagavad Gita with Madhusudana's Gud'arthadipika and
S'ridhara's Subodhini-Anandas'rama Printing Press Poona.

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INTRODUCTION.

1. Madhusudana Sarasvati.



More than one author in the Sanskrit Literature bore the name of Madhusudana'. Aufrecht¹ mentions (a) Madhusudana Vachaspati (b) Madhusudana who was a Grammarian, (c) Madhusudana of Parthapura (d) Madhusudana Tirtha, (e) Madhusudana Maithila and (f) Madhusudana Sarasvati. We are here concerned with 'Madhusudana Sarasvati', the accepted author of the 'Siddhantabindu' and a prominent Sannyasin of Sankara Vedanta School.

Regarding the parentage of this Madhusudana we have hardly any more information than that given in ²Pandita Is'vara Chandra's Preface in Sanskrit to his edition of the Harilavyakhyā, a work of Madhusudana. The first ancestor from whom the history of the pedigree of our author can possibly be traced was Rama Misra. The father of our author was Purandaracharya or Pramodana Purandaracharya according to Ramajna Pandeya.³

In this introduction the question of the time of Madhusudana has been separately discussed and it is conclusively shown that he must have lived from about 1490 A. D. to about 1580 A. D.

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1. The Catalogus Catalogorum. Vol. I-III,
 2. Vide Mr. Diwanji's article on Madhusudana in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, Vol. VIII Part II, 1926-27.
 3. Page 6 of his introduction to the edition of the Vedanta-kalpalatika-The Princess of Wales Sarasvatibhavan Texts.

We cannot say with any degree of certainty where Madhusudana Sarasvati was born as he himself makes no mention about his birth place in any of his works but the generally accepted belief is that he was born at Kotalipada, a suburb of the Faridpur District in Eastern Bengal. From the mention of 'Nilachalanayaka' in the Vedantakalpalatika and the explanation of 'Balabhadra' as 'Bhattacharya' by Purushottama Sarasvati in his commentary on the 'Siddhantabindu', Ramajna Pandeya also infers that Madhusudana must be an inhabitant of Bengal.

As regards his residence, it has been recorded that in the latter part of his life, he went to reside at Haradvara. He also seems to have resided with his pupils in a hut on the bank of the Jamna at Allahabad.⁴ He appears to have travelled to Navadvipa, the Modern Nadia⁵ in the Burdwan District and also to Gujrat⁶. Justice Telang⁷ has pointed out that Madhusudana occupied the 'Sringeri Gadi' of Sri Narkacharya. One tradition associates him with Tulsidas,⁸ and another credits him with the initiation of large numbers of Kshatriyas and Vaishyas in to various Sannyasa orders at Benares.⁹ That he was

4. The Nijawana, a work of Vallabha's sect, Episode XXXVI.

5. नवद्वीपे समायाते मधसूदनवाक्येन ।

चक्रम्पे तर्कवागीशः कातगेऽसूद् गदाधरः ॥ P. 7-Introduction to the Vedantakalpalatika.

6. तन्तुनागे नागपाशः तातनीति रुर्नरादौ प्रसिद्धः । Madhusudana's Commentary on the Bh. Gl. VI 33.

7. Art. XX of Vol. X of No. XXVIII of J. B. R. A. S.

8. P. 1C. Introduction to the Vedantakalpalatika.

9. Prof. Faiquhar's art. on "the Organisation of the Sannyasis of the Vedanta" in J. B. R. A. S. July 1925.

familiar with the life of Benares can be seen from some passages in Advaitaratnarakshana,¹⁰ and Gudharthadipika.¹¹ This fact is supported by his remarks in 'Advaitasiddhi' that in some cases the name of a man ends in 'Prakasaka'¹². Even at this day, I am told, the names of men end in 'Prakasa' in and about Benares. Madhusudana had also taken his Sannyasa-diksha at Benares. In the Vedantakalpalatika, Madhusudana mentions Nilachalanatha (P. 65) or Nilachalanayaka (P. 6). This is identified with the revered Lord Jagannatha in the Virajākshetra, modern Jagannath Puri. As this seems to be one of the earliest works of Madhusudana Sarasvati and as he refers to Nilachalanatha with terms of fervent devotion, we may safely conclude that Madhusudana lived at Puri in his earlier life.

Madhusudana seems to have taken to Sannyasa very early in life. His name as a Brahmacharin was Kamalajanayana. He was given Sannyasa Diksha at Benares by Visvesvara, otherwise known as Visvesvarananda Sarasvati,¹³ who was himself the pupil of Sarvajna Visvesa. Thus Visvesvara was what is technically called the Asrama Guru of Madhusudana.

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10. वाराणस्यादिप्रदेशे ज्ञायमानाद्रेमरीचादिज्ञानवत् । P. 44, Advaitaratnarakshana, Nirayasagara, Edition.
 11. अतितीक्ष्णो मरीचादिः । अतिकृशः स्नेहशून्यः कद्रुकोदवादिः । अतिविदाही संतापको राक्षसादिः । The Gudharthadipika on the Bh. Gi. XVII. 9.
 12. यद्यपि प्रकाशकमवशात् त्वं नामकरणवशात् कस्मिंश्चित्पुरुषेऽप्यस्ति तथापि— P. 564 Parichehheda I, Advaitasiddhi, Nirayasagara Ed. 1917.
 13. This Visvesvar Sarasvati is said to be the author of (१) कश्चिन्मर्मसंग्रह (२), परमहंसपरिव्राजकसंग्रह (३) यतिचर्म-संग्रह (४) यतिचर्मसमुच्चय (५) पत्याचारसंग्रहीतयतिचर्मसंग्रहप्रयोगः । Aufrecht's G. C. Vol. I P. 587.

The colophon of the *Anandamandakini*, a work of Madhusudana, does not mention not conjoin the name of Visvesvara Sarasvati as his Guru, as is usual among the Sannyasi authors to mention their names in conjunction with their Gurus. In the *Vedantakalpalatika*, *Siddhantabindu*, and the commentary on the *MahimnaStotra*, however, the name of Madhusudana is given as the pupil of Visvesvara only, but in the other works of his he acknowledges Sri Rama and Madhava also as his Gurus. Just as Visvesvara was his *Asrama Guru*, Madhava seems to have been his *Vidyaguru* and Sri Rama was his *Parama Guru* i. e. the *Guru of Madhava*.¹⁴

It will not be out of place here to notice that Justice, Telang discusses whether this Madhava was identical with Vidyaranya Madhava, the well-known author of *Panchadasi* and *Bhasyas* on the *Vedas*. He is against this identification because he points out that there was an interval of about 86 years between Vidyaranya and Madhusudana from the fact that both are mentioned as having occupied the 'Sringeri Gadi' as Sankaracharya. Madhava preceding Madhusudana by so many years. There is, however, another source which enlightens us on this question. Ramajna Pandeya¹⁵ has stated that Ramesvara Bhatta (1514

14. The name of Madhava appears in almost all of Madhusudana's later works. From these facts we can come to a logical conclusion that the author's work, *Anandamandakini* was an earlier production. Then come *Vedantakalpalatika*, *Siddhantabindu* and the commentary on *MahimnaStotra*; while *Advaitasiddhi* and *Gudharthadipika* belong to a later period of his literary activity.

15. P. 8. Introduction to *Vedantakalpalatika*. Ramajna Pandeya has depended on Ind. Ant, 1912. 9. This Ramesvar Bhatta was the father of Narayana Bhatta whose son Kamalakara Bhatta composed his *Nirnayasindhu* in 1616 A. D. Aufrecht.

A. D.) had three well-known pupils, viz. (a) Ananta Bhatta (b) Damodar Sarasvati and (c) Madhava Sarasvati. According to him, the last of these is the Vidyaguru of Madhusudana. This identification is further confirmed by the fact that Rama mentioned by Madhusudana was his Parama Guru (the Guru of his Guru) i. e. the Vidyaguru of Madhava Sarasvati. ¹⁶ This Rama was no other than Ramesvar Bhatta himself. The Asrama Guru of this Madhava Sarasvati was the same as that of Madhusudana, viz Visvesvar Sarasvati. ¹⁷ In the introduction to his commentary on the Samkshepasariraka, ¹⁸ Madhusudana has stated that Visvaveda and Pratyagvishnu were the teachers of his own teachers. This Visvaveda seems to be the same as ' Sarvajpa ' Sarasvati who was the Guru of Visvesvar Sarasvati accordidg to Aufrecht, the ground for the identity of these two personages being the sameness of the etymological sense of the two names. .

Among the pupils of Madhusudana, Aufrecht mentions	(a) Purushottama Sarasvati, ¹⁹ the
His Pupils,	author of a commentary on the Siddhanta-bindu of Madhusudana, (b) ²⁰ Yunananda

16. So, Madhusudana's own brother Yadavananda who was also known as Madhava Sarasvati should not be supposed to be the Guru of Madhusudana.

' Rama ' is also mentoned as the Guru of Madhava Sarasvati by Aufrecht, P. 505, C. C. Vol. I.

17. P. 587 of Aufrecht's C. C. Vol. I.

18. The verse in question runs as follows:—

विशेषाद्विश्वेदेस्य प्रत्यग्विष्णोश्च गुरुदयोः ।

न्यायान्नं श्रद्धयास्तेषां गुरुणा तौ हि नो गुरुः ॥

19. P. 341 of Aufrecht's C. C. Vol. I.

Vidyavagisha²⁰ and (c) Govinda who wrote a commentary on the Mahavrata of the S'ankhayana S'rauta Sutra. Over and above these there were other pupils also e. g. Balabhadra, (for whom Madhusudana wrote his Siddhantabindu)²¹ and S'eshagovinda, the son of S'esa Pandita and Gurn of Bhattji Dikshita.²²

Madhusudana was a great Yogi. His commentary on the sixth Adhyaya of the Bhagvad Gita leaves His knowledge of Yoga. no doubt as to his practical knowledge of Yoga. His personal opinion, however was that Yoga was not indispensable for the realization of Moksha, the goal of Vedanta.²³

Madhusudana was both an author and a Commentator of a very high order. His Advaitasiddhi is an accepted masterpiece of Vedanta philosophy. Not only has it completely achieved its aim in refuting the view of the Madhvas, but it also explains the Brahmasutras, the S'rutis of the Upanishads and many of the verses of the Bhagvad Gita in a new light. Besides this important work, there are several other works which have earned him the reputation of a standard author of Vedanta philosophy. We refer to these works later on.

20. Aufrecht mentions three works written by him:—

- (a) भात्मतत्त्वविवेकदीपितिटीका ।
- (b) न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिविवेक ।
- (c) शब्दालोकाविवेक ।

21. See the verse at the end of the Siddhantabindu:—

“बहुयाचनया मयायमस्यो बलमद्रस्य कृते कृतो निबन्धः ।”

22. P. 10—Intro. to the Vedantakalpalatika.

23. Vide Madhusudana's Gudharthadipika on Bh. Gl. VI. 29.

As a Commentator he has distinguished himself by his critical study of the books on which he has written his commentaries, e. g. in the Harilila which is a synopsis of the Bhagavata Purana there are some references to that Purana which are not found in the text of that Purana which is now extant, Madhusudana has noticed these in his commentary on the Harilila. The question whether Bopadeva had the same recension of the Bhagavata ²⁴ as we have got to-day or not seems to have occurred to Madhusudana though he has solved it in an orthodox way.

His critical powers were considerably developed as his literary activities increased His critical scholarship. in later life and by the time he wrote his Advaitasiddhi and Gudharthadipika he had reached the zenith of his powers and become a great independent thinker. These works were his last. To illustrate briefly, in Advaitasiddhi Madhusudana has at various places differed from Sankaracharya in his interpretation of the Brahmasutras which he has quoted. He is the only exception from among the Acharyas of the Sankara School of Vedanta, to differ from Sankara in this manner. While explaining Brahmasutras II. 2-28-29, ²⁵ Madhusudana says

24. P. 52 of Harilila—Calcutta University ed.

25. These Sutras are नाभाव उपलब्धेः and वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् । Madhusudana's explanation of these is found in Advaitasiddhi, Paricheheda I, Sec. of भाग्योद्धारः Pp. 435-436 of the Nirnayasagara Ed.

As is well known, Sankara understood these Sutras as refuting the Idealistic School of Buddhism and drew out a sense from them, which gave reason to Sankara's opponents to believe that the Sutrakara was a Realist in his view of the creation. Madhusudana says that these aphorisms refute the Buddhist theory of Void. सतो ब्रह्मणो नाभावः न शून्यत्वं, उपलब्धेः

that these aphorisms need not be understood as refuting the Buddhistie Vijnanavada but as refuting the S'unyavada and in saying so, he anticipated Prof. Hermann Jacobi who also from quite independent researches has come to the same conclusion. His was the rare courage, considering the orthodox atmosphere in which he was living, to declare that S'ankara had to twist the meaning of the Sutras in order to explain them as supporting his own system of philosophy. And in saying so Madhusudana could indeed foresee the views on the subject expressed by scholars like Dr. Thibaut and Dr. Bhandarkar in our own days.

But in the Gudharthadipika he goes further and rejects the view of Sankara altogether whenever His Gudharthadipika, he found that it was not in harmony with the Bhaktimarga of the Gita. These points of difference have been treated in detail in Appendix III. at the end of this Translation.

सत्वेन प्रमाणात् प्रतीतेः ।.....नापि स्वप्नवैधर्म्योक्त्ययोगः, तस्याः
 “ विमतं निस्तत्त्वं तर्कयोग्यत्वात् मरुमरीचिकानलवत् ” इत्यनुमाने बाध्यत्व
 प्रमाणागम्यत्वदोषजन्यत्वाद्युपाधिप्रदर्शनपरत्वात् । ”

It may be noted that Madhusudana has given new interpretations of most of the Sutras. But inspite of this possibility of offering a new Sankarite exposition of these aphorisms, Madhusudana declares “ I praise not that Vyasa who could not well put together (lit. bind) the complete sense of the Vedanta even with all the aphorisms (lit. strings). I bow to Sri Sankaracharya and Sri Suresvaracharya who collected the whole meaning of the Vedanta even without the help of the aphorisms, (lit. strings). ”—Vide the concluding verses of the Siddhantabindu

न स्तौमि तं व्यासमशेषमर्थं	सम्यङ् न सूत्रैरपि यो ब्रह्म ।
विनापि तैः संश्रयिताश्चिदर्थं	तं सत्करं नौमि सुरेश्वरं च ॥

To Madhusudana, Bhakti is as good a means as Jnana for the attainment of Nirguna Brahma of Sankara and he attached to the Bhagavata Purana the same importance as the other three Prasthanas; and although he belonged to the Sankara School of Vedanta, as stated above, he differed from Sankara as regards the explanation of the Vedanta Sutras though he arrived at the same conclusion as Sankara as far as the main purport of those aphorisms is concerned. He even holds that Sankara's commentaries on Brahmasutras and Gita are not thoroughly consistent with the purport of these books. He thus differed from the orthodox view of the Sankarites. Moreover, unlike these latter, Madhusudana uses the terminology of the Bhagavata School for the exposition of the ideas of his own Sankara school as will be seen from the *Is'varapratipattiprakasa* and the *tika* on the first verse of the Bhagavata Purana.¹ There he uses the words Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Samkarshana and Vasudeva for the same ideas as are represented by the letters a, u, m and 'Om' in the Sankara Vedanta. These syllables are used in that School of Vedanta in the sense of Visva, Taijasa, Prajna, and the Turiya or the Witnessing Consciousness.

Prof. J. N. Farquhar² has recently brought to light a further fact according to which our author introduced reforms in the sub-orders of Sannyasins with the kind help of Akbar. We give below a full quotation from his article.

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1. Vide P. 9-*Isvarapratipattiprakasa*, Trivendrum Sanskrit Series, No. 73 and also the *tika* of Madhusudana on the first verse of the Bhagavata Purana published along with other *tikas* at Vrindavana by Nityasvarupa Brahmcharin.

2. P. 483 of J. R. A. S. July 1925.

" In the sixteenth century there were in North India thousands of Muslim *faqirs* one of whose practices, as good Muslims, was to attack and kill Sannyasis as representatives of Hinduism Madhusudana Sarasvati, who was a Sannyasi of the Sarasvati sub-order and lived in Benares in the middle of the century at last went to Akbar to see whether anything could be done for the protection of the ancient order to which he belonged. Raja Birbal was present at the interview and he suggested the way out of the difficulty. He advised Madhusudana to initiate large numbers of Non-Brahmins into the Sannyasis order and arm them for the protection of Brahman Sannyasins. The Emperor agreed that armed Sannyasins should be protected by their sacred character from the Government interference. Madhusudana, therefore, went and initiated large numbers of Kshatriyas and Vaisyas into seven of the sub-orders, Bharati, Vana, Aranya, Parvata, Sagara, Giri and Puri.

Clearly this is a piece of history which has been faithfully preserved by tradition. It fits perfectly with all that we know about the fighting times which followed and also with the facts of to-day. Further, our knowledge of Akbar's character and of all that he had already done for his Hindu subjects makes the tale perfectly credible. The date was probably about A. D. 1565. "

Elsewhere in this introduction, it has been stated that Madhusudana and Vallabha knew each other and perhaps they exchanged their views also. The possibility of this supposition which is based upon a tradition in the literature of the religious sect of Vallabha is further supported by the fact that Madhusudana is the first Acharya of Sankara Vedanta to use the word *Suddhadvaita* for *Mayavada* or *Kevaladvaita*, the well-known term by which Sankara's *Siddhanta* is gene-

rally known. At least in three places ³ in his commentary on the Sankshepas'ariraka, Madhusudana has made use of this term. In one of these, Madhusudana says that Prahmanandin's view was the same as that of Sankara, viz. "Suddhadvaita." It should be noted that neither Sarvajnamuni nor Prahmanandin (as quoted by Madhusudana) has used this expression. In three other places also ⁴ the word "Suddhadvaya" is used by Madhusudana.

As to how this term is applicable to the view of Sankara and inapplicable to that of any other Vedantin, we are told that in the Sankara Vedanta, impurity of Brahma (and Jiva) is due to illusion (or ignorance), but in the other Vedanta Schools, the purity of Brahma (and Jiva) is itself illusory (inasmuch as in these latter Brahman itself (undergoes change and) really becomes the essential cause of the world which is real, and in the Liberation the identity (Advaita) of the Suddha or Liberated Jiva with Brahma is not complete, Jiva remaining even then a *prakara* or an *amsa* of Brahman). ⁵

3. Vide Madhusudana's *tika* on Sankshepas'ariraka. II 51, II 62. and II 220. "इतिस्मिन् द्वाये विवर्तवादः दृष्टादमित्यतः स्वभक्तिज्ञातशुद्धाद्वैतसमन्वयोपपादकत्वात्" and "दुर्दाद्वैतवर्णातस्मिन् नानन्दी" ।

4. Ibid. II, 81 and 87.

5. Sankshepas'ariraka II. 197, "अस्मत्पक्षे शुद्धा द्वास्तवी चेत् शुष्मत्पक्षे दम्पिता दुःकृता विम्" । Madhusudana's *tika* on it runs as follows : —

अनुब्रूयान्वादे तत्कल्पिताऽदुःकेः सत्त्वात् तत्र द्वास्तव्येव तदभावात्पुनश्चिदावच्छेति न सर्वप्रकारशुद्धिस्तस्य सिध्यतीति शङ्कते । अस्मत्पक्षे इति । सिद्धान्तपक्षे इत्यर्थः । सर्वप्रपञ्चा विद्यान्तस्य दम्पितादुःके निश्चयवृत्त्यवस्थात् त्वत्पक्षेऽपि तादृशेष तस्य शुद्धिर्वाक्येति बाधार्ह 'दुष्करश्च' इति ।

Madhusudana refers in his books to about two hundred authors and works altogether. Only the *Prasthanabheda* which is Madhusudana's commentary on the ninth verse of the Mahimanstotra, makes mention of *ninety* authors and works on the various branches of Sanskrit Literature. More than forty works of the Sankara Vedanta School are referred to in the Advaitasiddhi. We have collected the names of these two hundred authors and works from the various books of Madhusudana, which are given in an alphabetical order in one of the appendices at the end of this translation. It will be found that this list contains some works which are perhaps lost to us for ever.

But the favourite authors of Madhusudana seem to have been (a) Suresvara, the author of Vartikas on Sankara's commentaries on the Upanishads, (b) Sarvajna Muni whose Samkshepasariraka has been commented upon by Madhusudana, (c) Sri Harsha, the author of KhandanaKhandakhadya and (d) Prakashatma Muni, the author of Vivarana. These works of these authors are constantly referred to by Madhusudana. Khandana-Khandakhadya is often quoted by him to answer the arguments of the Realists like Naiyayikas and the Madhvas. The other three works are made use of to explain the Vedanta Siddhanta.

II. Madhusudana's Special Contribution

TO

SANKARA VEDANTA.

As regards the special contribution of Madhusudana to the Sankara Vedanta, it may be noted that Madhusudana, a devotee of Krishna. inspite of his being a follower of Sankara's monism, he was an ardent devotee of Sri Krishna. To Madhusudana, this was neither self-contradictory nor surprising. He could show by a careful examination of the Bhagvata Purana that the metaphysics of Sankara and

the ethics of Vallabha can be combined together to form a religio-philosophical system. How Nirguna Brahma can be an object of Bhakti has been ably proved by Madhusudana in his Bhaktirasayana, with many quotations from the Bhagavata Purana, and in his Gudharthadipika on the Bhagvad Gita also. This clearly shows how Chaitanya and Vallabha exercised their Bhakti influence on the *jnanamarga* of Sankara.

Just as in the days of Kumarila Bhatta and Sankara the most important problem was the reconciliation of Karma and Jnana, so in the days of Madhusudana and Vallabha the greatest problem was that of Jnana and Bhakti.⁶ The question had already drawn the attention of Bopadeva, Vidyaranya⁷ and Sridhara but it was left for Madhusudana to solve it thoroughly and inculcate a new line of thought in the Sankara Vedanta.

Observations on the Path of Devotion are scattered all over the works of Madhusudana though they found special expression in his Bhaktirasayana and Gudharthadipika, as stated above. We have prepared a short resume of Bhaktimarga as conceived by Madhusudana, based upon these two works of his. This is annexed to this translation as one of the appendices. It will make sufficiently clear what Madhusudana exactly meant by the path of Disinterested Love of the Nirguna Brahma. We, therefore, here relate only some of the thoughts expressed by our author in his other works.

The views expressed by Madhusudana in his two works stated above have been maintained by him by means of quotations mostly from the Bhagvata Purana. Before

Bhagavata Purana: A
Prasthana

6. Bhakti here means "devotion to Krishna" in particular.

7. Vide Panchadasi X, 54-92.

Madhusudana, there were already two or three commentaries⁸ on the Bhagavata written from the stand-point of Sankara's doctrine. In propounding his own theory of *Nirguna Prema-bhakti* Madhusudana virtually accepted the Bhagavata Purana as the fourth Prasthanana.

In the *mangala* verse⁹ of his *tika* or the *Samkshepa-sariraka*, Madhusudana states that
 Incarnation of Nirguna " Brahma, the Real, the Knowledge, the
 Brahma. Infinite, the Non-dual Bliss, which the
 best of sages who had attained the religious rapture (*Samadhi*),
 came to know after having approached a Guru and which they
 directly comprehended in order to obtain Liberation from the
 bondage of the worldly existence—that same Brahma was
 incarnate, for the joy of all, at Vrindavana, on account of the
 religious austerity of Nanda. I offer my homage to that
 Brahma playing on the Divine Flute, with His face beautiful
 like the moon and the eyes handsome like lotus. " Again, while
 commenting on *Samkshepa-sariraka* I I, 265, ¹⁰ Madhusudana
 says that the view of Sarvajna Muni, viz. ' This whole
 world is born of the Son of Anakaḍundubhi', is based upon the
 fact that the Son of Anakaḍundubhi is the incarnation of the
 Nirguna Brahma. A similar view is expressed in the An-
 andaman-laxini¹¹ also. In the *Gudharthadipika* ¹² it is mentioned

8. Madhusudana refers to them in his commentary on the *Haridāśa*. One was called *Paramahan-priyā*. The other was written by *Paruṣhotama*, (if it was not the same as *Paramahansa-priyā*). The third to which Madhusudana constantly refers is that written by *S'ridhara*.

9. Vide Introduction to his com. on the *Samkshepa*, I. 1.

10. *Samkshepa-sariraka* III. 265:—

“ अमवदानकदुन्दुनिन्दनादमतिर्गुर्वयमं सकलं भगन् ” *Madhu-*
sudana's com.

“ तस्यैवावतारित्वप्रख्यापनायानकदुन्दुनिन्दनादित्युक्तम् ”

11. Verse 99.

12. *Gudharthadipika* on *Bh. Gi.*

" Those deluded men who cannot bear the miraculous greatness of Krishna though substantiated by proofs, go to perdition." Madhusudana also tells us that the Reverend one Himself partakes of the offerings offered to Him by His devotees, as he did in the case of Sridaman ¹³.

The belief that Krishna is the incarnation of Nirguna Brahma involves the admission that Nirguna Brahma is obtainable through Bhakti, because Krishna can be approached through Bhakti. This has been expressly told by Madhusudana in his Bhaktirasayra, ¹⁴ wherein he has established that *Bhaktiyoga* is an independent goal of human life and that it is sanctioned by Sastras. In the Gudharthadipika also, Bhakti is said to be the means of Immediate Liberation. ¹⁵ In this latter work, we are told that Devotion is not only a means to Karma and Jnana but also the result of both of these. ¹⁶ Madhusudana's commentary on Bhagvad Gita XVIII, 66, is specially noteworthy. Therein he has declared that the main purpose of Bhagvad Gita is to teach that Bhaktinistha is the means to Moksha.

The Bhaktirasayana propounds that Bhakti and Jnana both are means to Liberation, but both are not identical and differ as regards their nature, means, fruit, and adhikarins. ¹⁷ Some texts of the Upanishads and the Bhagavata Purana even lay down that Bhakti is superior to Jnana. Madhusudana accepted the truth of these texts, but held that the superiority of Devotion lay in the fact that Bhakti led to

13. Gudharthadipika on Bh. Gi. IX. 26.

14. Pages 6-7 of Bhaktirasayana.

15. Gudharth. on Bh. Gi. IX. 1, " क्लेशमन्तरेणैव साक्षान्मोक्ष-
प्राप्तये भगवत्तत्त्वस्य तद्भक्त्यै विस्तरेण ज्ञापनाय नवमोऽध्यायः
आरभ्यते । "

16. Gudharth. on Bh. Gi. XVIII. 66.

17. Pages 11-12.

the realization of Truth *more quickly* than Jnana, there being no difference in the conception of Absolution achieved through either. ¹⁸

Madhusudana admits the possibility of 'Suddhaprema-bhakti' the 'Pure Loving Devotion' being a means to *moksha*. This Devotion is disinterested (*nishkama*). It is illustrated by the example of the Gopis of Vraja. ¹⁹

The Divine Dance (Rasa) of Krishna and his associations with Radha are also described by our author in the *Anandamandakini*. ²⁰

Rhetoricians have differed regarding the exact number of Sentiments or Rasas, but all of them seem to be in concord that Bhakti is not a Rasa, but rather it is a *Rasābhāsa*.

Devotees or Acharyas of the Bhakti School have differed as to the part played by Lord Krishna in the process of manifestation of Devotion but they all are unanimous that Devotion is a Rasa or Sentiment. Madhusudana held that Lord Krishna is the *Alambana Vibhava*, the 'sustaining cause' giving rise to or developing the sentiment of Devotion, which not only deserves to be added to the list of Rasas given by the writers on poetics but also ought to be the chief Rasa, others merely holding a subordinate position. This view of our author should be distinguished from that of other writers like Vallabha who holds that Lord Krishna is Himself the Sentiment

18. "यस्ते आशिषः आशास्ते" इत्यादिना कलमनिच्छतो गुणलोभेनया भक्तिस्तस्यास्तु गंरीयस्त्वं यत्प्रतिपादितं तत्तत्त्ववाक्षात्कारे त्वरासंपादकं नतु मुक्तिरतन्मयाक्षेपकम् । *Advaitasiddhi—Paricheheda IV. P. 897.*

19. Vide *Gudharth. Bh. Gi. VII. 16.*

20. Vide Verses 77-79, 80, and 84 of *Anandamandakini*.

of Love and that what the Rhetoricians call by the name of Sringara Rasa is only an inferior form of that Sentiment of Divine Love which is the Divinity Itself. According to our author, the reflection of the Lord in (the mirror of) the molten mind of the Devotee is the *Shayibhava* (the permanent mood), which in due course becomes manifest as *Bhaktirasa*²¹.

Grace of the Lord is called by Madhusudana 'Pushti,' 'Anugraha' or 'Prasada'²². In the *Ve-cantakaipalatika*, our author states that the followers of the Anpanishada School are 'favoured' by the Lord²³. In the *Anandamandakini* he prays to the Lord to look upon him with His Graceful Glance, which is difficult to be obtained even by the Liberated²⁴.

This favour²⁵ is shown to those only who carry out the orders of the Lord, given in the Scriptures. Although He is full of compassion, He does not destroy the sins of the sinners for nothing. The Lordliness does not lie in "making the barley plants grow on stones." If it be argued that 'because He is the Omnipotent Lord, He is able even to grow barley plants on stones or to bestow His Grace upon the sinful,' Madhusudana replies, "He can do so if He wishes so, because His wishes are always fruitful. He is *Satyakama*. He does not, however, at all

21. This is fully explained by Madhusudana in the first chapter of his *Bhaktirasayana* which is published. The same topic is further discussed in the second and third chapters of the same book. I have been fortunate to get a manuscript of these through the kindness of Mahamahopadhyaya Hathibhai Sastri of Jamnagar. For a summary of the explanation given in the First chapter of *Bhaktirasayana*, see the Appendix. II.

22. Vide *Harilitavyakhya* P. 32.

23. 'अपनिषदास्तु भगवता नीलचक्रनायकेन नारायणेनानुगृहीताः.....।'

24. Verse 13.

25. Vide Madhusudana's *tika* on Bh. Gi. XVI. 19.

"आशयित्वेऽपि तानि (पापकर्माणि) न नाशयति, तन्नाशकमुप्योपचयाभावात् पुण्योपचयं न कारयति तेषामयोग्यत्वात् । नहीश्वरः पाषाणेषु यदाङ्गुष्ठं करोति....."

entertain such a wish as He is not pleased with those who transgress His orders and hate His devotees. It is here that Madhusudana differs from the other Vedantins who also believe in the Lord's Grace and the Path of Devotion. Some of them like Vallabha and others hold that the Devotee should by his own efforts attain what they call "*Svarupayogyata*" "the innate fitness for Liberation" but its mere attainment does not automatically entitle them to Liberation. The Lord's Grace is required for *moksha* over and above the innate fitness, and it depends solely upon the Lord's Will to bestow that.

According to Madhusudana, knowledge of Brahma is as much necessary for a devotee as it is for the follower of the Path of Knowledge, but his devotion helps him in securing the Prasāda of the Lord which the Jnanin can never hope to get. The Bhakta goes to *Hiranyagarbhaloka* after death and there he stays with *Hiranyagarbha*. The devotee as well as *Hiranyagarbha* have not to take *Sannyasa* and to undergo the painful process of approaching a Guru and carrying out *Sravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*, which are quite indispensable for the Jnanin. When the end of the *Yuga* draws near and the period of the sovereignty of *Hiranyagarbha* and the '*bhoga*' of the Devotees is over, the Sacred Texts reveal themselves both to these devotees and to *Hiranyagarbha* who understand them without the least difficulty, owing to their having secured the Grace of God.²⁶ After the knowledge is thus obtained, both of them merge into Brahman. Another²⁷ way in which the *Pushti* of the Lord helps the Devotee is that he is freed from the punishment for his sins, without undergoing religious austerities in the form

26. Vide *Gudharthdipika* on Bh. Gi. XII. 6, and XVIII. 56, 58, 52 and 63.

27. *Gudharthdipika* on Bh. Gi. XVIII. 66.

of expiations (*prayaschitta*), because he has already observed the *Bhagavata Dharma*s (i. e. the nine-fold Rules of Devotion) and because he has loved the Lord without expecting any return or reward as did the *Gopis*.

Thus it will be seen that according to Madhusudana the Bhakta does not achieve any thing higher than what the Jnanin does. In the Advaitasiddhi this has been fully proved. The author has also denied the theory of the utility of the Lord's Grace in exhausting the ' *Prarabdha* ' actions, because they are exhausted by themselves only after the Jiva has experienced their good or bad results. ²⁸

Madhusudana's ardent devotion for Lord Krishna was not in the least adversely affected by his believing at the same time that Brahma or the Lord who Himself assumed incarnations, did so by way of producing an illusion. So the incarnations were those of the Nirguna Brahma itself, but they were all *unreal*. Madhusudana severely criticises those who hold that Brahma is *eternal* and yet assumes *real* Avatars, by calling their viewpoints unreasonable and groundless. ²⁹

Madhusudana's devotion was never inconsistent with the Sankara Vedanta School. He fully accepted Sankara's conception of the Jagat, Jiva and Brahma.

A short essay or a resume on Bhaktimarga as conceived by Madhusudana, appears in this book as an Appendix. Therein some very important problems such as the ' Stages of Bhakti ', ' The definition of Bhakti ',

Other important Problems dealt with in Appendix. II

28. Advaitasiddhi Paricheheda IV. Pages 892-93. Nirnayasagara Edition.

29. His *tika* on Bh. Gi. IV. 6.

The Adhikarin of Bhakti', 'The development of Bhakti as a Sentiment', 'Illustrations of Bhaktas', etc., etc have been illustrated in detail from the stand-point of Madhusudana Sarvasvati.

There is one more question of importance to the students of Madhusudana. Did Madhusudana ever change his philosophical views? With a view to find out the exact answer to this question, we have elsewhere in this Introduction tried to fix the sequence in which Madhusudana wrote his works. and the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the thorough study of the Sastras which he had made before he began his literary career, confirmed him in his original views and called for no change. A glance at his works is sufficient to show that quotations in support of his views as stated above can be discovered from all his works earlier and later. The Gudharthadipika, which seems to have been completed after the Advaitasiddhi, was written with the same fervent devotion for Sri Krishna as inspired him to write his first literary production viz. the Anandamançakini. Moreover even the Advaitasiddhi which is recognised even now as the standard work on Sankara Vedanta, is replete with verses confirming author's loving devotion for his Lord.

Madhusudana uses the names Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Sankarshana and Vasudeva in the sense of Visva, Taijasa, Prajna and Sakshin in the Is'varapratipattiprakasa³⁰ and also in his *tika* on the first verse of the Bhagavata Purana. There has been no School of the Bhagavatas, which believed in these meanings of these terms. The Pancharatras regarded them as Akankara, Manas, Jiva, and Is'vara. This view is found in neither of the two works of our author mentioned above.

(30) Vide P P. 5-6 of Is'varapratipattiprakas'a.

The verses composed by Madhusudana and inserted at various places throughout all his works (Vide Appendix IV at the end of this Translation.) are full of his platonic love for the Lord.

III Time of Madhusudana Sarasvati.

Professor Lassen who followed Burnouf has assigned Madhusudana to the middle of the
K T. Telang's View. fourteenth century. But Mr. K. T. Telang who wrote a paper on this subject refuted that view on the strength of his information contained in Madhusudana's Gudharthadipika on the Bhagvad Gita. This paper gives a tradition purporting that Madhusudana Sarasvati was once in occupation of the place of the Sringeri Pontiff. From a complete list of the several occupants of the ' gadi ' together with their respective dates and from the inscriptional evidence giving the date of Vidyaranya, the author of Panchadasi and Jivanmuktiviveka from which Madhusudana quotes, he concludes " We may safely lay down the proposition that Madhusudana Sarasvati probably flourished about the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian era. "

Subsequent researches have only strengthened the above views of Justice Telang. Prof. M.
Prof. Winternitz's View. Winternitz agrees with him ²

According to Prof. J. N. Farquhar, ³ Madhusudana must

1. Art. XX, Vol. X, J. B. R. A. S., No XXVIII (Pp. 368-377).
2. P. 436 of Dr. Winternitz's Geschichte der indischen Litteratur. See also the foot-note on P. 125 of the same.
3. Vide his article on " The organisation of the Sannyasis of the Vedanta, " P. 483 of J. R. A. S. July 1925.

Prof. Farquhar's
View.

be put in the middle of the sixteenth century. As mentioned already elsewhere Madhusudana had an occasion to see Akbar about the year 1565 A. D., for the reformation which the former brought about in the sub-orders of the Sannyasins.

In the *Nijavarta* ⁴ a work of semi-historical character giving the main happenings in the life of Sri Vallabhacharya and written down from oral tradition in the days of Sri Gokulnathji, the grandson of Vallabha, it is stated in one place (Episode XXIX of *Nijavarta*) that once Sri Mahaprabhuji (i. e. Vallabha) went from Benares to Prayaga. There he stayed for seven days and performed the *Parayana* of the Bhagvata Purana. At Prayaga was then living a very learned Sannyasin named Madhusudana Sarasvati. He was a Mayavadi and yet he had a keen love for the devotion to Lord Krishna. He had written a commentary on the Gita. He recited the first *Mangala* verse thereof.⁵ On hearing this verse, the Acharya was very much pleased. Then Madhusudana Sarasvati showed his original work *Bhaktirasayana* the Elixir of devotion', to Vallabha. The latter had some discussion with Madhusudana Sarasvati on the topics of *Bhaktirasayana*. Thereafter Acharyaji left Prayaga for Vraja.

In Episode XXXVI of the *Nijavarta*, it is stated that once Vallabha was living in Devarsi, a village near Adel, on

4. I am indebted to Prof. M. G. Sastri of the Decern College for drawing my attention to this piece of evidence.

5. The verse in question is as follows:—

वंशीविमूषितकराक्षणीरदामात् पीताम्बरादरुणकिंफलाचरोष्ठात् ।
पूर्वेन्दु सुन्दरमुखारविन्दनेत्रात् कृष्णस्तरं किमपि तत्त्वमहं न जाने ॥

In the extant editions of *Gūḍharthadīpikā*, this verse is not the *Mangala* verse, but it is the first among the five verses with which that commentary ends.

the opposite bank of the confluence of the Ganges and the Jamna at Prayaga. There he invested his son Vitthalnath with the sacred thread and then sent him to study the various S'astras under Madhusudana Sarasvati. After that, Vallabha lived in the village Devarsi for 15 years. ⁶

According to the aforesaid Episode Vitthalnath was a contemporary of Akbar and Birbal and had often had discussions with them

It is clearly established by these Episodes that Vitthalnathji immediately after his Upanayana ceremony went for study to Madhusudana Sarasvati.

6. The event narrated in Episode XXIX seems to have taken place after the one described in Episode XXXVI of Nijavarta. Madhusudana wrote his Gudharthadipika in his later life as shown elsewhere. As the Episode XXIX notes only the *Mangala* verse, it appears that Madhusudana had at that time just begun to write the Gudharthadipika. Moreover, the verse in question is not found as the *Mangala* verse in the extant editions of the Gudharthadipika; but it appears at its end.

Again the statement in Episode XXXVI of the Nijavarta, that Vallabha lived for fifteen years in the village Devarsi after sending Vitthal for study to Madhusudana does not seem to be correct. Vitthal was born in A. D. 1516. If he was invested with the sacred thread when he was 8 years old and if Vallabha lived fifteen years after that, Vallabha must be held to have lived upto (1516+8+15.) 1539 A. D. This conflicts with the traditionally accepted view that Vallabha died in 1531 A. D. denoting that he lived only seven years after the Upanayana of Vitthal.

Thus the Nijavarta does not advance proper data as regards exact dates, but it goes to show that Vallabha and Madhusudana were contemporaries.

Now the date of Vitthalnathji's birth is Samvat 1572 i. e. A. D. 1516. Supposing his age at the time of his Upanayana to be 8 years, he went to Madhusudana for study in about A. D. 1524. Assuming that Madhusudana Sarasvati who could initiate Vitthal into the study of Sanskrit was at least twenty five at the time, he must have been born in 1499 A. D.

This fits in well with the other evidence as it makes Madhusudana Sarasvati 66 years old in 1565 when according to Prof. Fargnhar, he broke the orthodox tradition and initiated Kshatriyas and Vaisyas into the seven sub-orders of Sannyasins after consultation with Akbar. And Vallabha who lived from A. D. 1479 to A. D. 1531 would be senior, to Madhusudana by 20 years.

It will not be out of place here to consider whether Appayadikshita lived prior to Madhusudana or came after him

(1) Information regarding this point is found in the Preface to the Kumbhakonam Edition of Siddhanta'sasam-graha of Appayadikshita. Here the date of Appayadikshita is given as 1587-1660 A. D. In proof of the proficiency of Appa-

Pandit Balsarasvati's View. yadikshita we are told that " even Madhusudana Sarasvati in his Advaitasiddhi has extolled Appayadikshita "

and a line said to have been quoted from Advaitasiddhi is given by the Editor in that Preface.⁷ References to the works of Madhusudana including Advaitasiddhi have failed to trace the so-called quotation.

So one cannot be led to accept the view that Madhusudana was later than Appayadikshita.

7. Vide P. 1. of the English Introduction to the Kumbhakonam Edition of the Advaitasiddhi, Published in 1893.

So we are not ready to accept the view that Madhusudana is later than Appayadikshita.

(2) Moreover as pointed out above Madhusudana was contemporary of Vallabhaacharya who flourished during the reign of Krishna Rai⁸ (1509-1530) who honoured Vallabha by a Kanakabhisheka. Now Appayadikshita is known to have been patronised by Sri Venkatapati (1586-1614) and " was made to bathe in gold " by Chinna Bomma Nayaka, Viceroy of Velur during the reign of that king. Hence it follows that Appayadikshita cannot have preceded Madhusudana.

(3) Prof. P. V. Kane has settled the time of Appayadikshita between the latter half of the sixteenth and the first quarter of the seventeenth century⁹.

(4) Appayadikshita was by birth a Shaivadvaiti. He was later on converted to the Vedantic doctrine of Sankara by one Sadananda Kashmiraka who flourished about 1547 A. D. and is well-known as the author of Advaitabrahmasiddhi. This book was not known to Madhusudana. This proves that Madhusudana lived prior to this author and hence prior to Appayadikshita.¹⁰

(5) Again, S'eshagovinda, son of S'esha Pandita, the author of a commentary on Sankara's Sarvasiddhantarahasya was a pupil of Madhusudana Sarasvati.¹¹ This S'eshagovinda

Bhattoji Dikshita and Appaya Dikshita.

8. P. 154 Sources of Vijayanagar History.

9. P. CXXXI Introduction, Sahityadarpana with notes by P. V. Kane. (Second Edition).

10. For this information I am indebted to Mr. N. D. Mehta. Vide his English Translation of Advaitabrahmasiddhi, Introduction.

11. In the beginning of his commentary, S'eshagovinda alludes to Madhusudana as follows:--

यत्प्रसादाधीनसिद्धिरुपायवतुष्टयम् । सस्वत्यवतारं ते वन्दे श्रीमनुमदम् ॥

was a Guru of Bhattoji Dikshita, the Grammarian (A. D. 1630),¹² who studied the Uttarmimamsa from Appayadikshita. This also proves that S'eshagovinda and Appayadikshita¹³ were contemporaries and Madhusudana the Guru of S'eshagovinda was therefore at least the senior to Appayadikshita.

(6) Further Jagannatha (1620-1660 A. D.) the author of *Jagannatha and Appayadikshita* were contemporaries.¹⁴ Jagannatha flourished in reign of Shah Jehan. Madhusudana was a contemporary of Akbar. Therefore also, Madhusudana must be put prior to Appayadikshita.

(7) Harihara Shastri in his Sanskrit Preface to the Advaita-Manjari Series makes mention of a commentary by Madhusudana on the Siddhantalessa Samgraha. So also does Pandita Haridasa in the introduction to his Edition of the Harilila. The *Catalogus Catalogorum* of Aufrecht mentions the same but with a query and it is this last book only which seems to be the source of the information to the two Pandits as they give no proof for their statements. But the fact is that Aufrecht was not sure of the existence of such a work, and the other arguments given above go against the possibility of such a commentary by Madhusudana.

So Madhusudana flourished prior to Appayadikshita.¹⁵

12. See Pp. 46-48. Systems of Sanskrit Grammar by Prof. S. K. Belvelkar.

13. Sanskrit Introduction (P. 3) to the Kumbhakonam Edition of Siddhantalessa Samgraha.

14. P. V. Kane's Sahityadarpana-Introduction P. CXXXIII

15. Vide Mr. P. C. Diwanji's paper published in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona.

This fact regarding the comparative time of Madhusudana and Appayadikshita coupled with the evidence on the time of Madhusudana himself conclusively establishes that Madhusudana lived between about 1495 and 1585 A. D or 1490 and 1603 if he lived for 107 years according to the tradition recorded by Mr. Diwanji. This period fits in with and corroborates the fact that Madhusudana was a contemporary of Narayana Bhatta, Pratapaditya, Tulsidas and Nrisinhas'rama, as pointed out by Ramajna Pandeya.¹⁶

IV. Works of Madhusudana Sarasvati.

The following works of Madhusudana Sarasvati are His well known works known to us:-

- (1) Anandamandakini.
- (2) Vedantakalpalatika.
- (3) Siddhantabindu or Siddhantatattvabindu.
- (4) A commentary on the Mahimna Stotra.
- (5) A commentary on Harilila.
- (6) A commentary on Samkshepasiraka.
- (7) Bhaktirasayana, or Bhagavadbhaktirasayana as Aufrecht calls it.

16. Vide introduction to his Ed. of Vedantakalpalatika. Ramajna says that Gadadhara Bhattacharya the famous Naiyayika was also a contemporary of Madhusudana. But this should not mean that both of them were of the same age. According to T. Ganapati S'astri (in his Ed. of Is'varapratipattiprakas'a) Gadadhara was a fellow student of Gaudabrahmananda who wrote the commentary called Ohandrika on Madhusudana's Advaitasiddhi.

- (8) A commentary on the first verse of the Bhagavata Purana.
- (9) Is' varapratipattiprakasa.
- (10-11) Adavitasiddhi or Advitabrahmasiddhi (according to Aufrecht) and Gndharthadipika, a commentary on the Bhagavad Gita.
- (12) Advaitarainarakshana.

Besides the above works, the Catalogus Catalogorum and the Introduction to Harilila edited in
 His other works, the Calcutta Oriental Series. by Pandit Haridas ascribe to Madhusudana the authorship of the following eight works:--

- (1) Bhagavataprathamasthlokatrayatika.
- (2) Krishnakutuhalanataka.
- (3) Rajapratibodha.
- (4) A commentary on the S'andilya sutras.
- (5) Jatyadyastavikriti.
- (6) Atmabodhatika.
- (7) Siddhantasth'atika (?)
- (8) A commentary on Vedastuti or S'rutistuti.

Moreover Aufrecht alone mentions the following works as those of Madhusudana :—

His works mentioned only by Aufrecht:

- (9) Chitrarupavada or Chitrarupavichara.
- (10) Tarkasutrabhas'yatika.
- (11) Anyapades's'ataka.
- (12) Bhagavad Gita Tatparyakarika.
- (13) A commentary on Mahanataka.
- (14) Anyathakhyatikantakoddhara.

Triennial Catalogue of manuscripts, Madras,¹ Vol. II Pt,

I. Sanskrit collection of 1913-14 to 1915-16 mentions as a work of Madhusudana,

(1:) Tattvachintamanyalokakantakoddhara.

It has been already noted that there were many authors of the name of Madhusudana. Madhusudana Maithila is the author of Anyapades'as'ataka as Aufrecht (P. 4 of his Catalogus Catalogorum, book II) and Pro. Winternitz (P. 146) have pointed out. Dr. Winternitz says that the author of Mahanataka was not Madhusudana the great Vedantin.

No 14 of this list may be a chapter of No. 15 or it may be the same as the Section called Anyathakhyatibhanga (Sec. 57) in the first Paricheheda of Advaitasiddhi. No 9 seems to be a work giving an explanation of what is called Chitrarupa in the Siddhantabindu.²

'Prasthanabheda' is sometimes looked upon as an independent work of Madhusudana, but it is a part of the author's commentary on the verse 7 of Mahimna Stotra. Prof. Winternitz says that Prasthanabheda was translated by A. Weber, Paul Deussen and Max Muller.³

No. 5 is not to be regarded as the work of our author as is shown by Kshetreshachandra Chattopadhyaya,⁴

Regarding the published works of our author an attempt is made in the following pages to fix their probable sequence so that we can trace any change in his religio-philosophical views as he advanced in age. We

Sequence of the known works of Madhusudana.

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2. P. 181 of the Kumbhakonam Ed.
 3. P. 378 Prof. Winternitz's Geschichte der indischen Litteratur.
 4. Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute Vol, VIII. Part IV P. 42.

have already said that there was no such change. It may be said that the study of these works from this standpoint reveals our author's merits both as an original writer and as a commentator,

(1) Anandamandakini.

It is an original poem of 102 stanzas in praise of *Sri Krishna* describing him from top to toe (*Kes'udivadanta varnanam*) A similar stotra describing *Vishnu* from top to toe is written by Sankaracharya, who is said to have composed it at the desire of his own dying mother.¹ The difference in the themes selected by Sankara and Madhusudana for composing poems of the same type, is indicative of the change in the religious thought between A. D. 800 and 1500.

This poem is printed in the Kavyamala Series, 2nd Guchchha. The third *Padas* of stanzas 35 and 61 seem to have been lost.

This poem is an expression of the author's fervent devotion to *Sri Krishna*. Madhusudana describes the ornamental peacock-feather of *Krishna*, His hair and crown, eyes, cheeks, fore-head, Tilaka on the fore-head, eye-brows, eye-lashes, glance, face, nose, ear-sprouts, tongue, lower lip, teeth, smile, chin, utterances, betel leaf in the mouth, flute, arms, hands, fingers, redness of His palms, nails of His hands, His chest, the Gem *Kausubha*, waist, navel, three folds on the belly, the garland *Vaijayanti*, His yellow garments, girdle, thighs, feet, and auspicious marks on the feet. All these are described in successive order from the verse 4 to verse 62. Then

1, Vide Madhava's Sankaravijaya, Canto XIV. This stotra of Sankara is published as the first stotra in the 2nd Guchchha of Kavyamala.

begins a description of the exploits and achievements of Sri Krishna. In the latter half of the poem, Krishna is described with reference to Yashoda, Putana, Trinavarta, the Gopis, the old shepherds, the serpent Kaliya, the herd of cows, the mountain Govardhana, the quaffing of the forest conflagration, the playing with flute, His fight with various demons, His playing fraud with Brahma, His Rāsa (i. e. the Divine Dance of Krishna), Radha, the daughter of Bhanu, His being awakened in the morning by bards and His mother, His departure to the forest in the morning and His association with Narada, Akroora, and Baladeva. The verse 99 says that *Nirguna Brahma* is born as Sri Krishna, the son of Yashoda.

The last two verses give the title of the poem and mention the author. The colophon at the end given in the Kavyamala is noteworthy.²

(2) Vedantakalpalatika :—

This book has been edited as No. 3 in the Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Series, in Its Edition.

19:0. It has a useful introduction discussing the questions of the works of Madhusudana, his time and birth place. It consists of only one chapter called the Demonstration of Absolution and its Means. The following topics are discussed in this work :—

It Contains

- (1) Nature of Absolution.
- (2) Means of Absolution according to the School of the Anpanishadas.
- (3) Refutation of the nature of Absolution according to other schools.

2 इति श्रीमन्नन्दनन्दनपदद्वन्द्वसमुदयसखचन्द्रचन्द्रिकाचयदत्तचित्तचक्रोर श्री
मधुसूदनसरस्वतीविरचितानन्दमन्दाकिनी संपूर्ण ।

(4) Refutation of the means of absolution according to other Schools,

(5) Explanation of the Cessation of Ignorance.

(6) Detailed explanation of *Vrittis* (powers of a word) according to all Schools including those of Rhetoricians and Grammarians.

(7) Explanation of the Cessation of Ignorance (contd)

(8) Rise of direct Apprehension from word.

(9) Definition of Moksha and Conclusion.

Vedantakalpalatika is twice referred to in the author's commentary on the Mahimnastotra and five times in the Advaitasiddhi Madhusudana seems to have composed the work under consideration and the ³Siddhantabindu side by side, because ⁴the former refers to the latter and vice versa. So the Vedanta kalpalatika appears to be one of the earliest works of Madhusudana Sarasvati.

This book unlike his other works mentions ⁵only one out of the three Gurus of Madhusudana. Moreover the book is important as it contains a passage which is believed to throw light on the Bhaktimarga followed by Madhusudana.⁶

3. P. 84 of Vedanta refers to Siddhanta. pp. 181-182 The topic in both the places is the production of the various organs from the elements.

4. Siddhantabindu (Pp. 200 and 204) refers to the Vedantakalpalatika.

5) तथापि श्रीविश्वेश्वर चरणपङ्केरुह सुधासुधारभिः सिक्तो न कस्यपि रिक्तोऽस्मि भविता । Madhusudan's Intro, to Vedantakalpalatika.

6) औपनिषदास्तु मगवता नीलाचलनायकेन नारायणानुगृहीता निरतिशयानन्द बोधरूप आत्मैवानाद्यविद्यानिष्ठतुल्यलक्षितो मोक्ष इत्याचक्षते ।

(3) Siddhantabindu:

This is a commentary by Madhusudana Sarasvati on the Das'as'loki of Sri Sankaracharya. This Das'as'loki is also called Chidanandastavaraja or Chidanandadasasloki.⁸

This Dasasloki has been a very great favourite with the followers of Sankara Vedanta. Madhusudana is not the only man to comment on this work. Aufrecht has noticed four commentaries on it.⁹ Besides the one in question there were others by Ramchandra, Venkatacharya, and also one by some unknown author. This Siddhantabindu has been written by Madhusudana for his pupil Balabhadra as the author himself mentions the fact in his work.¹⁰ This work is also called Siddhantatattvabindu.

We have already concluded that the author wrote simultaneously the Vedantakalpalatika and Siddhantabindu. The latter must have been begun before Mahimnastotratika, which refers to the former. It also preceded the Is'varapratipattiprakas'a because the latter mentions a sixteen-fold division of the three conditions viz. the waking, the dreaming, and the deep-sleep ones, while the Siddhantabindu mentions only twelve divisions of these, yet the author does not ask the reader to refer to Is'-

7. Some other works also bear the title of Das'as'loki. Thus Aufrecht (P. 248 C. C.) notices one work containing the praise of Sarasvati attributed to Asvalayana, another a stotra from Nandikesvara Purna, a third on Dharma Shastra and a fourth by Nimbarka, all called Das'asloki.

8. P. 188 of Aufrecht's C. C.

9. Ibid.

10 बहुयाचनया मयाऽयमल्लो बलभद्रस्य कृते कृतो निबन्धः । concluding verses of the Siddhantabindu.

varapratipattiprakāśa for a detailed account of the same. The Advaitasiddhi¹¹ and the Gūḍharthadīpikā¹² very often refer to the work under consideration.

The style of Siddhantabindu is not lucid. The work implies far more than what it expresses; in some places we have to understand the purvapakṣa from without the text. e.g. Its sutralike style. Pp. 16-15. At other places. e. g. Pp. 65-67 the reader feels that he is reading sūtras. This was not done unconsciously by the author.

In the concluding verses of the book, he compares his short but significant essay with a gem which is small but of great value. The book performs a double function. Like Vedāntaparibhasa it refutes the views of other Schools and establishes that of the Vedānta School and like Siddhāntaleśasamgraha of Appayadīkṣita it collects the views of the various Āchāryas of the Sāṅkara Vedānta on various problems of that School without going into their details. Anybody who has studied both these types of works will at once say that Madhusūdana has wonderfully succeeded in his undertaking.

The Siddhāntatattvabindu of Madhusūdana was commented* upon by Puruṣhottama Sarasvatī a disciple of Madhusūdana, the commentary being called "Siddhāntatattvabindusāntipana," Aufrecht has noticed this on P. 341 of his Catalogus Catalogorum, Vol. I. The same authority also mentions two other commentaries on the same viz. 1 Siddhāntatattvabindutīkā called "Tattvaviveka" by Purāṇananda Sarasvatī and (2) another commentary on this very

11. Pp. 490 524, 53J, 546, 562, 579, 647, 866, of Advaitasiddhi Nirṇayasagara Ed. refer to Siddhantabindu.

12. Gūḍharthadīpikā Pp. 38, 42, 49, and 59.

* The com. will be shortly published in the Gaekwar O. S.

work of Madhusudana, known as Nyayaratnavali and composed by Brahmananda Sarasvati is printed along with the Kumbhakonam Edition.

(4) Mahimna Stotra tika ;—

This commentary of Madhusudana explains the stotra as praising S'iva and Visnu both. This has been printed and published by the Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay.

Madhusudana refers to the commentaries ¹³ on the Mahimnastotra by 'Ancient Acharyas' but does not name them. However, from Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum, Part II P. 88 we know that there were two commentaries on this stotra viz. one called Panjika written by Bopadeva and another by Sridharaswamin and that both these explained the poem as referring to Hari and Hara. These are most probably those referred to by Madhusudana.

Madhusudana was a devotee of Visnu and his fervent devotion made him believe that ¹⁴ Puspadanta himself had praised both S'iva and Visnu in the same poem. The various figures of speech in the verses are explained by Madhusudana. As the Brahmasutras are written in the Sutra style, it was easy for the Acharyas to explain them as favouring their own individual tenets. But the poem Mahimnastava is written in a long metre (S'ikharini) and as it

13 पूर्वार्चकृतव्याख्यासंग्रहः क्रियते मया and पराकान्तं चात्र सूत्रिभिरित्युपरस्यते । in the com. on verse 9.

14 अन्वक्ष्य गन्धर्वराजस्य महाकुशलत्वात् एकेनैव श्लोकेन यथाश्रुतिं बह्वीत्या च हरिशंकरयोः स्तुतिः तयोरभेदज्ञानायामिश्रिता । com. on the Mahimnastava.

concerns itself with mythological stories, it did not leave any doubt as to its meaning; and therefore Madhusudana who attempted a double interpretation of ¹⁵ it had often to lay himself open to the blame of twisting the words. However, it must be admitted that he handles the work before him with great skill.

Madhusudana's commentary on verse 7 is specially noteworthy. He has given a brief but complete list of works on the various branches of the Sanskrit Literature as he found them in his own days. It is so important that, as we have already noted, it was believed to be an independent work of Madhusudana called ¹⁶ Prasthanabheda. It mentioned certain works which cannot be found in these days.

This Commentary does not refer to Madhusudana's Gu-dharthadipika. In two places the contents are similar to those of Is'vara-pratipattiprakas'a and Siddhantabindu; and the topics¹⁷ of the former are discussed in detail in the latter. We therefore think that this commentary was written before Madhusudana completed his Siddhantabindu.

Madhusudana does not comment on verses 32-36, probably because these verses contain the words which are conventionally applicable only to S'iva. He does not take

15 "अर्वाचीने पदे" of verse 2 is explained as पदे तु कमलकम्बुकौमो-दकीरथाङ्गकमललयाकौस्तुभाद्युपलक्षिते नवजलधरश्यामधामानि श्रीविग्रहे वैकुण्ठवर्तिनि वेणुवादनादिविधिविद्वारपरायणे गोपकिशोरे वा वृन्दावनवर्तिनि कस्य मनो नापतति । " 'पुरमथन' is explained as पुरं (मन्दिरं) मथनं (क्षीरोदः गोकुलं वा) यस्य स पुरमथनः । " कैलासौ in verse 12 is explained as कैलि; कीडा सैव प्रयोजनमस्तेति कैलः । कैलोऽसिः खड्गो यस्य स कैलासिः, तस्याः सम्बुद्धौ ।

16. Vide Appendix V

17. i. e. In the commentary on verses 24 and 27.

notice of verses 37-43; so they seem to be later interpolations. According to Madhusudana the poem ended with verse 36.

(5) Harililavyakhya.

Madhusudana calls his commentary on Harilila of Bopadeva, *Vivarana*. This *Vivarana* is printed as No. 3 in the Calcutta Oriental Series. This publication has got an *Avaranika* by the editor who therein gives an account of the life and works of Madhusudana.

In this *Vivarana* Madhusudana sometimes refutes the views of his predecessors on the *Bhagavata Purana*.¹⁸ We know that he had with him two commentaries on the *Bhagavata Purana*,¹⁹ He has tried to reconcile the contradictory accounts of one and the same episode as found in different works like the *Mahabharata* and the *Bhagavata*.²⁰ The statements in *Harilila* which conflict with those in the *Bhagavata* are also explained.²¹ Madhusudana explains why the word *Shridama* is used by Vopadewa in place of *Sudama* the term used in the *Bhagavata*.²² Moreover this *Vivarana* also shows Madhusudana's views on the nature of *Bhakti*.

18. Vide P. 3. P. 4; and P. 4. and P. 8 of the Calcutta Edition.

19. Vide 'Madhusudana's special contribution to *Sankara Vedanta*' & in the foregoing part of this Introduction.

20. See the explanation of the curse of *Parikshit* on P. 10.

21. Vide P. 52. यद्यपि “ एकादश समास्तत्र गूढार्थः सबलोऽवसत् ” इति तृतीयस्कन्धोक्त्या गोकुले न एतावन्ति वर्षाणि स्थितिः तथापि तत्तदवस्थायोग्यस्य कार्यकर्तृत्वादेवमुच्यते ॥ See also P. 53

22. श्रीदामेति नाम मूलेऽप्रयुक्तमपि ” श्रीदामरङ्गमन्त्रार्थ भूम्यानीतेन्द्रवैभवमिति पद्मपुराणे सदस्रनाम्नि दृष्टेह प्रयुक्तम् ।

At the end of his commentary Madhusūdana has given a verse in which the works of Vopadeva are enumerated.

Madhusūdana does not refer to any of his works in this Vivarana.

(6) Samkshepas'arirakatika.

Samkshepas'ariraka is a summary in verse of S'ankara's

Brahmasutrabhashya, by Sarvajnatma-
The original work. Muni who lived under a king Manu-
kuladitya and who was a pupil of Sri

Deves'vara. Madhusūdana in the beginning of his commentary tells us that it is so called because it does not discuss the Conditioned Brahma which the Mumukshu need not know.²³

Madhusūdana calls his commentary on this work, Sarasa-

magraha which is understood to mean
Madhusūdana's com- Samkshepasarirakasarasamgraha, and
mentary on it. not Anyatikasarasamgraha although

Madhusūdana tells us that he accepted whatever was useful and rejected whatever was useless from his predecessors' commentaries on the work. He informs us that he particularly draws upon the explanation of Samkshepasariraka by Vis'vayāda and Pratyagvishnu whom he calls 'preceptors of his preceptor'²⁴

Samkshepas'ariraka is a brief but lucid statement of

S'ankara's commentary on the Brah-
Madhusūdana's Se- masutras. The verses have a charm
lection of it. and sweetness which are their own.

The author handles the subject with the same ease as S'ankara did. His command over the language and the Vedantic theory of S'ankara is simply wonderful. The book was specially a favourite to Madhusūdana. In the Siddhantabindu and the Advaitasiddhi he often quotes from it. As a follower of

23. Madhusūdana's com. on Verse I. 1 of Samkshepa.

24. See footnote no-13 in Part 1 of this Introduction.

S'ankara School of Vedanta Madhusudana had to express his views on the Brahmasutras. Other vedantins have done this by writing a commentary on Sankarabhashya. Madhusudana wanted to be as independent as possible in the expression of his views and selected Sankshepasariraka for the purpose. There is one more reason for this selection of Madhusudana. The author of Sankshepasariraka was sympathetic towards the Nirguna Bhaktimarga which Madhusudana followed.²⁵

Madhusudana has given a scholarly interpretation of the Sankshepasariraka. He gives us the various readings wherever he could find them out by comparing and collating the different recensions of the work extant in his days.²⁶ Madhusudana often reviews the explanation of the verses given by the commentators that preceded him.²⁷ He also points out the Sutras referred to by the original text. It must be particularly noted that often the Purvapaksha in Madhusudana's *tika* is not the one given by S'ankara but one that might be raised by

25 Thus Sam. III. 265 says that this whole world is a creation of Krishna the son of Anakadundubhi. In Sam. II. 190; Sarvajna Muni speaks of the Maya of S'ankara as Vaishnavi Shakti, the Power of Vishnu. The author discusses the question 'why should Rama who was Nirguna Brahma have become ignorant for some time in his life?' (Sam. II. 182). The answer is given that Parabrahma in the form of Rama had intentionally assumed ignorance for some time to act his part on the stage of the world. The very first verse of the first chapter of Sankshepasariraka offers a salutation to Nirguna Brahma called Murari.

26 Vide Madhusudana's commentary on Sam. I. 77. 470; II. 22. 80, 89; III. 355, etc.

27 Vide Madhusudana's *tika* on Sam. I. 1, 32, 56, 169. 174, etc

Ramannja or Vallabha "against S'ankara."²⁸ In a few cases Madhusudana has supplied us with the names of those whose views only are mentioned in the Samkshepasariraka. Two such names are Bhartrihariprapancha and Brahmanandi who is referred to only as Vakyakara by Sarvajna Muni. In Sam. III 221 a Bhashyakara is referred to and Madhusudana says that he is Dravidacharya

It may be noted that no reference to any work of Madhusudana is found in his tika on Samkshepasariraka.²⁹ However, the Sarasamgraha on Sam. I 42 155-157 and

28 Vide the tika on Sam. II. 80. 9; III, 315, 145, 215.

29. In his com' on Sam I, 1 Madhusudana says that "the fact of the possibility of Nirguna Brahma being approachable by the Bhaktimarga is explained in the Bhagavad-Gita VII. 16 " We are not told that this explanation is given in the author's tika on Bh. Gi. VII. 16. If we refer to the Gudharthadipika, we find that the explanation referred to in the com. on Sam I, 1. is probably the one given by Madhusudana in his Com on Bh. Gi. VII. 14 In Bh. Gi. VII. 16 there is no reference to the Bhakti of Nirguna or Saguna Brahma. Again on Sam. III. 110. Madhusudana says that "the statement that the Jnani is considered by Me to be My very self " Bh. Gi. VII. 18, is meant for the glorification of knowledge. If we refer to the Gudharthadipika, we find that Madhusudana understands the word Jnani as Jnanibhakta and the statement as correct in the literal sense. Owing to these differences between the interpretations of the verses of Bhagvad Gita in the commentary on the Sam. and the interpretations in the Gudharthadipika, we conclude that Madhusudana had not written the Gudharthadipika when he wrote the Sarasamgraha.

169 discusses the same topics as the Siddhantabindu on P 190 191 P. 35 and P- 113 of the Kumbhakonam Edition. In all these cases the treatment in the Siddhantabindu is less complete than the one in the Sarasamgraha.³⁰ Therefore we believe that the Sarasamgraha was written after the Siddhantabindu but before the Advaitasiddhi and Gudharthadipika.

(7) Bhaktirasayana.

This book is called Bhagavadbhaktirasayana by Anfrecht
 (*Catalogus Catalogorum*). The first
 Its Edition. Ullasa of this work was published in
 Calcutta in 1913 A. D. This edition has
 got also a commentary by Madhusudana himself.

In the commentary on the first Ullasa, Madhusudana
 refers to two of his own works viz. the
 Its Sequence! Siddhantabindu and the Vedantakalpa-
 latika.† The Bhagavataprathamasa'loka-
 tika and the Gudharthadipika* refer to this Bhaktirasayana.
 So we have placed the latter in priority to the former works,
 in considering sequence of their composition.

In the first Ullasa Madhusudana has described the defi-
 nition of Devotion, its means and its
 Its Contents stages (*Karika* 37). The ullasa is en-
 titled *Sadhanabhaktisamanyanirupana*.
 We have fully given in Appendix II Madhusudana's views on
 the Path of Devotion based on this work.

30. Sar. on Sam. I. 42 discusses the substratum of the objects
 of dream; I. 155-157 discusses the nature of the Indica-
 tive power of a word and the same on I. 169 discusses the
 indication in " That thou art. "

† Vide Bhakti I 19. P. 25 and I. 23. P. 27

* Vide Gudhartha on Bhagavad Gita XVII 66.

That the book as printed in the edition of Calcutta is incomplete is clear from the various references in the published Ullasa to the remaining unpublished parts of the work. In his commentary on Karika 5 of the first Ullasa, Madhusudana says 'the definitions and the varieties of Love, Anger, Fear, etc. which are the intense heaters of the lac of mind will be mentioned later on.' It is not stated whether they were to be mentioned in the immediately succeeding Ullasa. The description of different phases of the Permanent Attitude of Bhakti-rasa forming the stuff of mind, such as Love, Smile etc. is promised in the next Ullasa (Vide comm. on Karika 27). The definition of Rati as a particular trend which is the Permanent Expression of the Sentiment of Bhakti and which is itself the form of God impressed on the pliant mind, formed one of the topics of the rest of the book (Vide on p 66 of the comm. on Karika 36). At the end of the first Ullasa it is said that the Love for God which no longer endures the separation from God and which ends in the death of devotee (if separation continues) was illustrated in detail in the following Ullasa.

So the book had more Ullasas than one.*

Mahamahopadhyaya Hathithai S'astri of Jamnagar, Kathiawar, to whom I am greatly indebted for my study of the Sankara Vedanta, has generously given me the Manuscript of the second and third Ullasa of Bhaktirasayana which he got from Gaya. They respectively contain 71 and 30 Karikas.

* I am told just recently that the first three Ullasas of Madhusudana's Bhaktirasayana are published as the second 'flower' (Puspā) in the Achyuta-granthamala, Benares.

(8) Bhagavataprathamas'lokatika

The *Tika* on the first verse of the Bhagavata Purana is divided by Madhusudana himself into three parts. In the first part the Aupanishada interpretation is given and the second and the third parts respectively contain the Satvata- or Pauranika and the Kevala Bhakti explanations of the verse.

The Aupanishada interpretation which is that of the Jnanabhakti School is the one accepted by Madhusudana. He interpretes the verse as explaining (a) the term *tat* or Brahma, (b) the term *tvam* or the Jiva and (c) as summarising the Brahmasutras. In the course of his explanation Madhusudana gives an interpretation of the first four Sutras of the Vedanta aphorism. This interpretation is original and resembles that of Vallabha, ³¹

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31. In the course of this part of the tika, Madhusudana interpretes the words जन्माद्यस्य यतः with which the Bhagavata Purana begins. He says that जन्मादि is a तद्गुणैर्विश्रान्तबहुव्रीहि. It is Vallabha who considers a similar interpretation in his Anubhashya on Brahmasutra I. 1. 2.

अन्वयात् of the verse means that Brahma persists in all things in the world as the Being of these things. Vallabha interprets तत्समन्वयात् of the Brahmasutras as meaning that Brahma is the cause of the world because Brahma persists in the world as अस्ति, भाति, and प्रिय. Madhusudana in his interpretation of अन्वयात् of the Bhagavata Verse I says that it corresponds to तत् समन्वायत् in Br. Sn. I. 1-3.

The second part of the tika is important because it gives the distinction between the Satvata division of the Pancharatra School and the main School itself. The Satvatas of the days of Madhusudana seem to have held a theory very like the one of

S'ankara Vedanta. As a branch of the Pancharatras, the Satvatas used the terms Vasudeva Sankarshana, Aniruddha and Pradyumna but according to Madhusudana they applied these terms to what we know in the Sankara Vedanta as the Virat, Hiranyagarbha, Avyakrita and the Sakshin. So that all the four are Vasudevas, the difference in names being due to the Upadhi or adjuncts. The first three stand for the Limited Consciousness; the last one for the Unlimited Pure Consciousness. They rejected the general Pancharatra theory that these terms meant the Supreme Lord, the Soul, the Principle of *Iness* and the Mind respectively. We cannot find any work of the Satvata School stating the meanings of these terms as given by Madhusudana. Perhaps here we find an effort made by Madhusudana to reconcile the S'ankara Vedantins and the followers of the Pancharatra Samhita on the strength of the Nrisinhottaratanipani Upanishad.

The third interpretation viz. that of the Kevala Bhakti School explains the theory of the Sentiment of Devotion. It splits up *Janma dyasya yatah* as *Janma adyasya yatah*. "Adyasya" means 'of the first,' i. e. the permanent mood of Love called Prema. Krishna is the *alambana vibhava* of the sentiment of Bhakti and from him the permanent mood of Love is produced.

Although we do not find Madhusudana's commentary on the Bhagavata, except that on its first verse, that Madhusudana intended to write one is clearly expressed in the portion of his tika

The second Part, an important link in the history of the Satvata Bhagavata School.

Kevala Bhakti Interpretation.

The unavailable portion of Madhusudana's com: on Bhagavata.

available to us.³²

The only book of Madhusudana referred to in this *tika* is the Bhaktirasayana.³³

(9) Is'varapratipattipakas'a.

This small book of ten pages has been printed in the Tri-
vendrum Sanskrit series in 1921. As the
Its Edition. title of the work signifies, the author
here summarises the various theories
regarding the conception of God both in the orthodox and
the heterodox Schools. This book ends with the discussion of
the various forms of God according to the Brahmadāins. The
view of Bopadeva, the author of Muktafala and that given in
the S'ivatantra are said to coincide with each other, The view
in Nrisinhatapani Upanishad is explained in detail and recon-
ciled with the view of the Muktafalakara.

Is'varapratipattiprakas'a seems to be one of the later
works of Madhusudana. No work of
Its Sequence. our author is referred to by name in
this book. However the theories about
the nature of God given in Is'varapratipattiprakas'a form a
much bigger account of the same than that found in Siddhan-
tabindu Pp. 155-56, in which however no mention is
made by the author that for details Is'varapratipatti-
prakas'a should be referred to. The same is the case
with the account of the three conditions of the soul,

32. Madhusudana's *tika* on the first verse of the Bhaga-
vata Purana published at Vrindavana with other *tikas*
p. p. 1-2 “ इतरेषामपिरूपं वक्ष्यते ” and “ विस्तरेण चैतद्वक्ष्यते । ”
p. 3 अत्रापि कियान् वक्ष्यते ।

33; Ibid P. 31

viz. the Waking and others. The Siddhantabindu³⁴ makes a twelve-fold division of these, while the work in question mentions sixteen divisions by adding four divisions of the Turiyavastha. As regards the elaborate explanation of the syllables of the Pranava which we find in the Is'vara, it may be noted that the same subject is dealt with in other works of an author. We find it in the commentary on Mahimnastotra, stanza 27 and in the Siddhantabindu Pp. 203-4. In both these works we are further told by the author that the same topic is discussed in detail in his Vedantakalpalatika. The Bhagavataprathamasa'lokatika³⁵ invites the reader to refer to the Nrisinhatapani Upanishad for the explanation of Pranava. But in the present work the author fully explains the view on the subject given in that Upanishad; Therefore we may conclude that Is'vara pratipattiprakas'a is later than Siddhantabindu, Mahimnastotrika, Vedantakalpalatika and Bhagavataprathamasa'lokatika.

(10-11) Advaitasiddhi & Gudharthadipika:—

(a) Advaitasiddhi:—

This is an original work while Gudharthadipika is a commentary on the Bhagavad Gita. These two works make references to each other and therefore must have been written side by side by the author.

Besides referring to the Gudharthadipika, the Advaitasiddhi refers to the Siddhantabindu and the Vedantakalpalatika.³⁶ Therefore Advaitasiddhi must be put later than these two works.

34. Siddhantabindu Pp. 202-3.

35. P. 30 of the Vrindavana Ed. of the Bhagavata Purana.

36. (i) For the reference to the Gudharthadipika Vide P. 231 of Advaitasiddhi published in the Advaitamanjari series.

Advait siddhi was written by the author with the intention of refuting the Realistic Doctrines of the Naiyayikas³⁷ and the Madhvas. Madhusudana himself asks " What learned man will care to give a reply to what the wretched man of little intellect speaking of reality in what is really unreal prattles loudly by putting forth false refutations of a theory which is above all defects ? The lion does not indeed imitate the barking of the dog." The commentator Brahmananda says that the one who speaks of reality in what is really unreal is the follower of Madhva.³⁸

(ii) The references to the Siddhantabindu are found on Pp. 94, 117, 123, 141, 322, of Advaitasiddhi, Nirnaya-sagara Press.

(iii) Vedantakalpalatika is referred to on Pp. 109, 117 212, 322 Ibid.

37. Vide P. 2287 of the Triennial Catalogue of Manuscripts (A. D. 1913-14 to 1915-16) for the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Vol. II Part I, Sanskrit. C.

According to the introduction of the Nyayaratnakara, Vyasa-yati denounced the tenets of the Advaita Vedanta and established the Doctrines of the Dvaita Vedanta in his Nyayamrita. This work was in turn criticised by Madhusudana Sarasvati in his Advaitasiddhi which again was denounced by Ramacharya in his Tarangini. This last work was refuted by Brahmananda in his Gauda-Brahmanandiya. Vanamalimis'ra then took up the cudgels on behalf of the Dvaita School in his work Saurabha. The work Nyayamrita is intended to support this Saurabha and condemn the Brahmanandiya.

38. Vide the verse at the end of Advaitasiddhi, Paricheheda IV where the words " अतत्त्वे तत्त्ववादी " are explained by ब्रह्मानन्द as " सत्यवादी मिथ्याप्रपञ्चे तादात्म्येन सत्त्वप्रकारक वचनशीलः साध्वः।

Advaitasiddhi is Madhusudana's masterpiece. In this work the author has explained his personal experience of the Divine Bliss which was the result of the greatness of his preceptors, his own study of various sciences and his systematic meditation on them³⁹.

The Advaitasiddhi is divided into four Chapters called Parichehhedas, each of which is again sub-divided into minor sections. In the first Parichehheda the question of the world being illusory or real is discussed from sixty stand-points, one section being devoted to each of them.⁴⁰ This first chapter contains ' what is to be rejected ' and corresponds to the second chapter of the Brahma sutras. In the second Parichehheda called ' Atmanirupana ' the nature of Atman is discussed under 34 issues. This chapter containing " what is to be accepted " by the student of S'ankara Vedanta, may be compared with the first chapter of the Vedanta sutras. The third Parichehheda like the third chapter of Brahma sutras describes the means of Absolution and discusses the question whether Sravana or Jnana can be the object of Vidhi or not and whether S'abda or Word can lead to direct knowledge or not. The fourth Parichehheda concludes the book with the

39 गुरुणां माहात्म्यान्निजविविचविद्यापरिचयात्
 श्रुतेर्यन्मे सम्यङ्ननपरिनिष्पन्नमभवत् ।
 परब्रह्मानन्दस्फुरणमलिलानयंशमनं
 तदेतस्मिन् ग्रन्थे निखिलमातियस्तेन लिखितम् ।

Madhusudana's verse in his Advaitasiddhi.

40. The Nirayasaagara Ed. divides the first Parichehheda into sixty heads. The Kumbhakonam Ed. divides the same into 52 heads.

demonstration of the nature of Mukti repudiating the idea of liberation held by Bhakti Schools of Vedanta other than that of Madhusudana.

(b) *Gudharthadipika*—

As has been already stated, this work was begun along with the Advaitasiddhi. This commentary on the Gita refers to the author's Siddhantabindu, Bhaktirasayana and Advaitasiddhi.⁴¹ Therefore it is probably the last work of Madhusudana or earlier than one.

The aim of Madhusudana in writing this commentary on the Bhagavad Gita seems to be to give a philosophical explanation of the Bhaktimarga which he himself followed although he was a S'ankara Vedantin. Madhusudana believed the main teaching of the Bhagavad Gita to be that Nirguna Brahma could be attained through Loving Devotion to the Lord and in showing this he has contradicted the Gitabhashya of S'ri S'ankaracharya whose view of the nature of the Summum Bonum he fully accepted. Madhusudana's remarks on this very important subject collected from the Gudharthadipika are given in Appendix III at the end of this Translation.

Madhusudana follows S'ankara in holding that Bhagavad Gita does not teach Jnanakarnasamuchchaya⁴² as the means for Moksha. He also follows S'ankara in holding that

41. Siddhantabindu is referred to in Gudharthadipika on Bh. Gi. II. 13, 15, 18, 28 etc; Bhaktirasayana in the same on Bh. Gi. VII. 16 and XVII. 65. and 66; Advaitasiddhi in the same on Bh. Gi. II. 16, 18, V. 16.

42. Vide Pp. 5, 70, 95, 107, 126, 159, 468, etc., etc. of the

Arjuna was a Madhyama Adhikarin. ⁴³ But he goes further and holds that Arjuna could not become a Sannyasin not because he was not fit but because he was a Kshatriya and the Kshatriyas are not allowed by the S'astras to take Sannyasa. In the Gudharthadipika on Bhagavad Gita XVIII. 6 Madhusudana seems to have expressed his own view of the Path of Karma. One who does not know the Atman nor has his mind purified must perform his duties, whether he be a Brahmana, Kshatriya or Vaishya. But when the mind is purified, one attains to the Perfection in the form of freedom from actions by renunciation. That renunciation is allowed to Brahmanas only and not to Kshatriyas or Vaishyas is told by the Lord in Bhagavad Gita III, 20 :—"Janaka and others attained to Perfection by Action alone." The verse 56 of Adhyaya XVIII is interpreted by Madhusudana to mean that a Brahmana whose mind is purified and who is fully devoted to Lord may take Sannyasa because he is allowed to do so or may not take it; yet he will be liberated from Samsara through the Grace of the Lord. A Kshatriya or Vaishya however, whose mind is purified and who is devoted to the Lord must go on performing the actions even after *Ohittas'uddhi*. He will get absolution through the Grace of the Lord along with Hiranyagarbha. In his commentary on the Bhagavad Gita, XVII. 63 Madhusudana says that the Brahmana whose mind is purified and who takes to the Path of knowledge *must take* Sannyasa and then he will get knowledge and consequently Moksha. But Kshatriyas and Vaishyas who are not entitled to Sannyasa, should go on performing their duties even

commentary on Gita by Madhusudana printed in the Anandashrama Series.

43. Pp. 110, 115, 504, etc. Ibid.

44. Pp. 504, 505, Ibid.

after the purification of mind and they will get Salvation in the same life either because they had obtained the Perfection of renunciation in their previous birth, or because they do not require that Perfection at all just as Hiranyagarbha who gets Moksha without any renunciation, or they will get liberation in the next life after being born as a Brahmana and taking Sannyasa. Thus it will be seen that Madhusudana like S'ankara

Life of Action indispensable for all but the Brahmana.

does not believe that the performance of actions leads a man to a higher stage than that of the Purification of mind. But he differs from S'ankara in holding

that the Bhakta-Brahmana *may not take* Sannyasa and that the Jnani-or Bhakta-Kshatriya or-Vaishya *must not take* Sannyasa at all; he will get Moksha even without renouncing the world formally. So that, so far as the Kshatriyas and Vaishyas are concerned Madhusudana thinks that according to Bhagavad Gita the Life of Action is compulsory for them. Their *Karmas* are like the *karmas* of a *Jivanmukta*. The active life lived by them is for the fulfilment of the order of the Lord as laid down in the S'astras or for presenting an example to the ordinary people who require to be guided. On the verse XVIII, 66, Madhusudana expressly mentions that the verse does not stand for absolute necessity of Sannyasa prior to the attainment of Moksha although S'ankara held the latter view. In giving

Madhusudana and Tilak

these interpretations Madhusudana presupposed to a certain extent the arguments advanced by the late Lokamanya

Tilak in his Gita Rahasya.

Madhusudana fully accepts the *Jnanamarga* of S'ankara.

Jnansmarga of Gita.

But he says that the *Kevala-Jnani*, the *Jnanibhakta* and the *Kevalabhakta* can all get the same Highest Brahman by

their own individual paths, because all the three are Nishka-

ma, purged of all desires.⁴⁵

Madhusudana fully explains the Yoga teaching of the Gita by quoting the Yoga Sūtras and expounding their sense so as to supplement the undeveloped thoughts of the Yogamarga of Gita. The Gudharthadīpikā on the 4th., 5th., 6th., and 7th. chapters of the Gita abounds in the explanation of the most of the Yoga sūtras. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is Madhusudana's tika on the Bhagavad Gita V. 2., VI, 15, 32, 35. Madhusudana himself seems to have been a Yogi. He explains how some verses of the Gita may be interpreted in the light of Yoga philosophy and also that of Vedānta.⁴⁶ Madhusudana's authorities in Yoga are the Yoga sūtras, Yogabhāṣya, Vasiṣṭharamayana and Gaṇḍapada's work on Yoga.⁴⁷

Madhusudana tells us why S'āṅkara who is traditionally known to have been a great Yogi did not fully explain the Yoga references in the Gita. There are two means for the cessation of the function of mind (Chittalaya); Yoga and Jnana. The former is necessary for the followers of Patañjala Yoga who believe in the reality of the world, the latter is necessary for the followers of the Upanishads as explained by S'āṅkara who believes in the illusory character of the world. Therefore S'āṅkara nowhere stated that the knowers

45. Vide commentary on Bh. Gi. VII. 16.

46. Vide Gudharthadīpikā on Bh. Gi V. 22.

47. These references are as follows:—

References to Yoga sūtras Pp. 146, 180, 198, 218. References to Yogabhāṣya Pp. 152, 200, 226. References to Vasiṣṭha. Pp. 182, 218, 221, 215. References to Gaṇḍapada, Pp 205, 210.

of Brahma stand in need of Yoga. ⁴⁸

As regards the Sankhya of the Bhagavad Gita, Madhusudana
Sankhya of Gita. has often explained the term as meaning
the philosophy of the Upanishads. He
also explains some verses of the Gita
according to both the Sankhya and the Vedanta Darshanas. ⁴⁹

The Bhagavad Gita is generally believed to have very
few variants. But Madhusudana has
Variants in Gita. noticed not less than fourteen different
readings. Most of these do not, however,
change the sense of the whole verse. ⁵⁰

In writing his commentary on the Gita, Madhusudana
consulted many other commentaries
Madhusudana and Sankara on the Teaching of the Gita. and criticised their views wherever he
materially differed from them. Parti-
cularly he kept the S'ankarabhasya
on the Gita always before him. He refers to it about thirty
times in his Gudharthadipika. He also mentions Sridhara's
commentary on the Gita by name. Madhusudana holds S'ankara
in such high esteem that he has compared himself with *Gunja*
and S'ankara with gold which although in the pans may weigh
equal yet widely differ in worth and quality. However, his aim
in writing the Gudharthadipika was to explain the inner meaning
intended by Lord Krishna and not the one as S'ankara read in
the Gita. ⁵² Thus there are occasions in the Gudharthadipika

48. Vide Gudh. on Bh. Gi. VI. 29.

49. Vide Bh. Gi. XIII. 5, XIV. 1-4, and XVIII. 13.

50. Vide Gudh. on Bh. Gi. I. 8, 46; VI. 9; VIII. 16; IX. 81; XI.
8, 17, 28, 37; XII. 20; XIII. 20; XIV. 23, 25; XV. 5; XVIII. 25.

51. Vide Gudh. on Bh. Gi. VI. 14.

52. माध्यकारमसारदर्शिना ग्रन्थमात्रमिह योज्यते मया ।

आसयो भगवतः प्रकाश्यते केवलं स्ववचसो विशुद्धये ॥

Madhusudana's com. on Bh. Gi.

where Madhusudana boldly differs from S'ankara. These and other important points of difference between these two great thinkers of the same School of philosophy have been explained separately in an Appendix at the end of this Translation.

(12) Advaitaratnaraks'ana:—

This seems to be the last original work of Madhusudana Sarasvati. We here mark the change in the style. The use of abusive words is peculiar only to this work. It seems that Madhusudana had to answer the unjust attacks of some contemporary young Naiyayika, in his old age, even after he had written his masterpiece the Advaitasiddhi wherein he refuted the views of the followers of Madhva.⁵³ This reply is recorded in the Advaitaratnarakshana which consists of twenty different topics.

This work refers to Advaitasiddhi, Vedantakalpalatika and Siddhantabindu.⁵⁴ No available work of Madhusudana refers to the Advaitaratnarakshana, so we find we are not wrong in concluding that this is the last of his works.

53. निर्मिल्य प्रतिपक्षान्द्वितायेयो दृष्टार्थिकर्मन्यान् ।

अद्वैततत्त्वगत्वं रक्षयितुमयमुद्यमः क्षमः स्यान्नः ॥

There are many other references to the 'Tarkika' in the work.

54. References to Advaitasiddhi: Pp. 24, 26, 28, 37, 44, Nirnaya-sagar Ed. where the work in question is printed along with Advaitasiddhi. Reference to Vedantakalpalatika, P. 44, Ibid Reference to Siddhantabindu, is implied in the following words of Advaitaratnarakshana—

तदुक्तमाचार्यैः—“ तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्ये तु लक्षणा भागलक्षणा ” इति ।

प्रपञ्चितस्त्वयमर्थो विस्तरेणन्यत्र । ‘ अन्यत्र ’ means “in the Siddhantabindu.”

THE
TRANSLATION
OF
DAS'AS'LOKI
BY
S'RI S'ANKARACHĀRYA

VERSE I.

Neither the Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, *Kham* (the Ether or Vacuum), an organ, nor even their aggregate (am I), because all these objects are variable. Therefore, I am one, the remainder, auspicious, absolute (Atman) proved to be the same in the deep-sleep condition (as in the waking and dreaming ones.)

VERSE II.

Neither castes, nor religious practices and duties of castes and stages of life, nor steady abstraction of mind, contemplation, Yoga, and the rest, belong to me, because the wrong supposition of *I-ness* and *my-ness* based upon the non-Atman is destroyed. Therefore, I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute.

VERSE III.

“Neither the mother, nor the father, nor the gods, nor the worlds, nor the Vedas, nor the sacrificial per-

formances, nor the sacred place (is real) " say the S'ruti texts. " (Nor there is void) because the nature of complete void is denied in the deep-sleep condition, because in the deep-sleep condition, the Jiva becomes (of the nature of Brahman which is) beyond hunger etc., and the secondless. Therefore I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute".

VERSE IV.

Neither the Sankhya, nor the Pas'upata, nor the Pancharatra, nor the Jaina, nor even the Mimansa and other doctrines (can be maintained), as (the Cause of the world) is of unsullied nature because such is the distinctive direct apprehension. Therefore I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute.

VERSE V.

Brahman has no upper or lower, no inner or outer, and no middle or slanting (part). It has no eastern or western direction. Its nature is one and unbroken, because it is ether-pervading. Therefore, I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute.

VERSE VI.

It is neither white, nor black, nor red, nor yellow, nor thin, nor thick, nor short, nor long. And it is not an object of thought, because it is of the form of Light. Therefore, I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute.

VERSE VII.

Neither the preceptor, nor the sacred scripture, nor the pupil, nor the precept, nor you, nor I, nor even this visible world (is real). The knowledge of one's own nature does not admit of any doubt. Therefore I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute.

VERSE VIII.

I have neither the waking, nor the dreaming, nor even the deep-sleep condition. I am neither the Vis'va, nor the Taijasa, nor the Prajna, because all the three are effects of Ignorance. I am the fourth. Therefore I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute.

VERSE IX.

The whole world, which is (by its nature) other than that (Witnessing Consciousness), is illusory, because He is also unlimited, because the word ' Bonum ' is applied to Him, because His essence is self-proved, and because He has no substratum but Himself. Therefore I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute.

VERSE X.

Brahman is not one (=first). How then, can it be second ? It is neither alone, nor not-alone. It is neither void nor non-void. All this.....because it is devoid of the duality. How can I describe it ? It is demonstrated by all the Vedanta texts.

**THE
TRANSLATION
OF
SIDDHĀNTABINDU**

**BY
MADHUSUDANA SARASWATĪ.**

VERSE I.

Having saluted *Vis'ves'vara who is a new incarnation of S'ri S'ankaracharya and Salutation to Vis'ves'vara, Madhusudana's teacher, who is the preceptor of all, I shall make a little effort for the instruction of those who have not the energy to study the whole body of teaching on the Vedanta.

The revered S'ri S'ankara desirous of helping directly or indirectly all human beings in (the study of) this philosophy composed 'A Collection of Ten Verses' (दशश्लोकी) in order to impart briefly the knowledge of Atman whose nature is ‡ eternal purity, knowledge and liberation, by way of distinguishing Him from the things that are Non-Atman. (P. 4.)

* This is a reference to the teacher of Madhusudan Muni.

‡ These attributes are non-eternal in the Jiva. The commentator explains the word is eternal, pure, enlightened, liberated, and self-existent.

I. Demonstration of self.

Query :—Every human being, in his cognition†
 ‘I am’ has got the knowledge of
 the Self who is referred to by the
 word ‘I’ (अहम्) as distinguished
 from the things which are not the Self and which are
 referred to by the word ‘this’ (इदम्) and (inspite of
 his having this knowledge of the Self which, you say,
 gives final bliss) he experiences misery. In this way
 the demonstration of the essential nature of the Self is
 unprofitable because such a demonstration does not teach
 anything unknown and serves no purpose.

Demonstration :—You are wrong, because (1)
 the body, the organs, and the mind
 are referred to by the word ‘I’ by
 way of illusion inasmuch as they have the peculiar
 nature of being illuminated by the Self, (2) and thus
 the Self, though pure by nature, comes to be referred to
 as being miserable, etc, (3) and that reference as well
 as its fundamental cause (Nescience) comes to a ces-
 sation by the realization of the identity of the Self
 with Brahman, taught in this S’astra. Therefore the
 demonstration of the essential nature of the Self is not
 fruitless because it reveals the unknown and also it has
 got an object which it fulfils. (P. 9).

II. Main Apothems and Subsidiary Statements.

And only the principal propositions like ‘ That thou
 art’ (Chh. Up. 9,8,7), ‘I am Brahman’ (Br. Up. 1,4,10)
 and the like can furnish the authentic knowledge of that

† Cf. Cogito ergo sum, (I think, therefore, I exist) of
 Descartes.

essential nature of the Self. And because a proposition

The revelation of the S'astra through the main apothems and subsidiary statements, reveals its sense only through the elucidation of the concepts (the knowledge of the meanings of its words) and also because in

the present case such interpretations of the terms 'That' and 'Thou' as would be in harmony with the complete sense of the present proposition, are not demonstrated anywhere else, these interpretations have to be known through this S'astra alone. The case here is similar to the case of the meanings of the words * Yupa and Ahavaniya. (P. 11).

* यूप means a smooth post or stake to which the sacrificial victim is fastened, any sacrificial post, (usually made of bamboos or khadira wood) - Monier Williams. आहवनीय means a consecrated fire taken from the house-holder's perpetual fire and prepared for receiving oblations; the eastern of the three fires burning at a sacrifice - Monier Williams.

The रत्नावली explains the reference to यूप and आहवनीय as follows :—(1) We want to know the sense of the term यूप in the main sentence 'He fastens the victim to Yupa'. For this purpose we look to the (minor) sentence 'He should fashion the Yupa (out of wood),' which lays down the rite of consecration in the form of fashioning the log of wood etc. And then we conclude that Yupa expresses a log of wood characterised by consecration brought about by the ceremony of fashioning it. (2) We want to know the sense of the term आहवनीय, in the (main) sentence, 'He offers oblations into the 'आहवनीय fire'. For this purpose we look to the sentences:—'A Brahmana should place the fires on the sacrificial fire-place, in the vernal season', and 'He places (on the altar) the गार्हपत्य fire at night and the आहवनीय one by day'. And we conclude that the term 'आहवनीय' expresses the fire which is secured by (the ceremony of) placing it (on the sacrificial ground) by day in the vernal season.

Therefore, the Vedic texts referring to the creation etc, viz. 'That, verily, whence beings here are born, that by which when born they live, that into which on deceasing they enter—that be desirous of understanding, that is Brahman' (Tai. Up. 3-1-1) give us the presentative (*expressed*) sense of the term 'That', while others like, 'He who knows Brahman as the real, as knowledge, as the infinite,' (Tai. Up. 2-1-1) give us its representative (*indicated*) sense. In a like manner, the Vedic texts that refer to the waking, dreaming, and deep-sleep conditions of the Jiva, (P. 12), like "as a great fish goes along both banks of the river, both the hither and the further, just so this person goes along both these conditions, the condition of sleeping and the condition of waking (Br. Up. 4, 3, 18.)" declare to us the presentative (*expressed*) sense of the word 'thou' while others, like "The person here who among the senses is made of knowledge, who is the light in the heart," (Br. Up. 4. 3. 7). "You could not see the seer of the seeing" (Br. Up. 3. 4. 2) point out its representative (*indicated*) sense.

Thus when it is found that the primary interpretations of the terms in the principal sentences like "That thou art" and others, cannot be properly construed, it is in the fitness of things that we have, by resorting to a secondary sense, the reminiscence of the pure Jiva and Brahman which have already been experienced (known) from the subordinate sentences. (P. 14.)

We assert the comprehension of the absolute consciousness, as taking place in the deep-sleep condition.*

Although the expressed sense of the terms *Satya*, *Jnana*, *Ananta* is consciousness characterised by limitation, yet their purport is Pure Consciousness, because they are used with the intention of making known the secondless Brahman; therefore in that sentence (Brahman is the real, knowledge and the infinite) only, the impression of the mind is awakened with reference to that part only (of the whole significance of the terms). The author of the Nyayachintamani and others by the usage of the words *akas'a* and other similar words, wish to convey the reminiscence the object of which is something unconditioned. § The power of the significance

* Q. We cannot have the comprehension of the Pure Jiva and Brahman.

D. We can have that comprehension because such a comprehension of the Witnessing Consciousness, which is Unconditioned, is admitted by us as taking place in the deep-sleep condition.

§ Q.—You say that 'the subordinate sentences give the knowledge of the unconditioned Jiva and Brahman; and this knowledge, in its turn, is useful for understanding the principal sentences.' We, therefore say that the major sentence is not the means of right knowledge; because the minor one itself is not a means of the knowledge of Pure Consciousness, as the words *Satya*, *Jnana*, etc. of the minor sentences have the power of expressing Consciousness as characterised by limitations (उपाधि).

T.—No doubt, the expressive power of these terms is what you think it to be (P. 16); but (you must note that) these words have been made use of with the intention of making

of a word is subordinate to the purpose (with which the word is used).

Therefore, the perception of a right notion and of the person having a right notion, in the comprehension of the sense of the apothems, is refuted. This refutation is also supported by the fact that the absorption of thought in which nothing is known (*a-samprajñata samadhi*) is established by the S'ruti and Smriti texts.*

known the Secondless Brahman and thus their purpose being Pure Consciousness, in this sentence only, the mental impression is awakened only in association with that part (out of the whole-significance of *satya* etc. which is सत्यत्वं + वत् the possessive termination). (That, words are used with a purpose is proved by the fact that some people, like the author of Mani, who defines आकाश as अष्टद्रव्यान्यद्द्रव्यम् and not as शब्दगुणं द्रव्यम्, intend to convey the mental impression of something free from all conditions, even from such words as आकाश etc. And the power of a word depends upon the intention of the speaker)

* By establishing that the Unconditioned Brahman is made known by the principal sentence and by the fact that both revealed texts (like 'When all the five organs of sense along with the mind stop working and when the intellect is motionless, they say it is the highest aim achieved,' Katha Up 6/10.) and traditional scriptures (like 'Where the mind controlled by the practice of Yoga, stops working, where the Yogi sees the Self by means of the Self and delights in the Self.....' Bhagvat Gita, 6/20), prove the existence of a kind of perfect absorption of thought in which nothing limited is known, it is intended to refute the theory of Prabhakara, that emphasises the knowledge of the distinct entities of the perception of a right notion (*pramiti*) and the person having that right notion (*pramatri*), when the sense of the principal sentence is comprehended. (P. 18).

The aim will not have been achieved only by the knowledge of the sense of the terms 'That' and 'Thou', because of the invisibility (of the Is'vara) and the separateness (of the Jiva from the Is'vara.) §

There is no tautology in the apothems because the identity of the expressed meanings of these terms is only chimerical.*

§ Q.—You say that the terms of the minor sentence, *Satyam Jnanam*, etc. awaken the mental impression only in association with the Unconditioned Brahman. This we grant. We object that, in that case, because you hold that the major sentence also reveals the Unconditioned Brahman, the latter sentence is a supplementary repetition of the former. And this leads to tautology in the S'ruti.

D.—No. Because the apprehension of only the two categories, Jiva and Brahman (or meanings indicated by the terms 'That' and 'Thou')—which alone can be known from the subordinate sentences—does not help to achieve the final beatitude...because that apprehension is characterised by the two notions of (1) the invisibility of Brahman and (2) the mutual separateness of Brahman and Jiva. (P. 22.)

* Q.—If the major sentence is not itself a supplementary repetition of the minor one, we want to point out that the former has in itself the defect of expression called 'Tautology' because 'That' means 'Pure Brahman' and 'Thou' also denotes the same, so the sentence means 'Pure Brahman' is 'Pure Brahman.'

D.—No. There is no 'Tautology', because tautology requires the identity of the expressed meanings and the identity of the expressed meanings of 'That' and 'Thou' in the sentence is only chimerical (अवभास), i. e. there is no identity of the expressed meanings. (P. 23.)

The sense is harmonious because the indicated meanings of these terms are the same.*
 Harmony of Apothems.

The unconditioned nature of the reminiscence brought about by the terms—which (reminiscence) is agreeable to the unconditioned sense of the sentence is not inconsistent, just as the apprehension (*anubhava*). When the apprehension of the sense of a sentence is conditioned, the means thereof is the presentation of a conditioned sense of the terms of the sentence. In the present topic, the apprehension of the sense of the sentence is unconditioned, because that only being right, is able to destroy Ignorance. ‡

Q—If the meanings of the two terms 'Thou' and 'That' are not at all similar, (they cannot be connected with each other and therefore) there is incompatibility of sense in the principal sentence as a whole.

D.—No, the major sentence has got one harmonious sense as a whole because the indicated meanings of these terms are the same. (P. 30.)

‡ Q—We find fault with the representative sense of these terms. The terms, 'That' and 'Thou,' remind us, as you have already said, of the Pure Jiva and Brahman which have been already comprehended from the subordinate sentences. Two facts have been established:—(1) That Pure Jiva and Brahman can be comprehended and (2) that they can be comprehended from the terms of the subordinate sentences. Now our objection is that these words cannot remind us of the Unconditioned One.

D.—The back-ground of the reminiscence awakened by these terms is One that is Unconditioned because that reminiscence is the cause (literally 'is favourable to') of the sense of the sentence

Hence the indication resorted to in the interpretation of the *Mahavakya* is not unaccount-

No impossibility of indication therein. able because of the absence of a characteristic determining the Indicated.* The expressed or the Indicated sense is only

as a whole which envisages something unconditioned. (The cause and effect must be of the same nature.) This nature of the object of remembrance awakened by these terms is not impossible or unreal just as the apprehension of Atman in the deep-sleep condition. The presentation of a conditioned object as the sense of the terms is the cause when the object of the sense of the whole sentence is also conditioned. In the sentence under discussion, the object of the sense of the whole sentence is an Unconditioned One (P. 32), because such a sense only is right knowledge, and is able to put an end to Ignorance; and therefore the object of the sense of the term should also be an Unconditioned One.

* Q.—If you say that the objects of the remembrance, caused by resorting to the representative sense of the terms 'That' and 'Thou' are Unconditioned Jiva and Brahman, we say that there can be no resorting to indicated sense in the major sentence because, take the ordinary example of "there is a hut on the Ganges"; we have to resort to indicated sense of the word 'the Ganges'. The indicated object (लक्ष्य) of "the Ganges" is the bank of the Ganges. (लक्ष्यत्व) i. e. the particular characteristic that resides in the indicated object (that is, the bank) is bank-ness (जीरत्व), therefore तिरत्व is the differentia (अवच्छेदक) of लक्ष्य. We say that in 'There is a hut on the Ganges', the word 'the Ganges' is to be understood in its indicated sense, because we know the special nature of this indicated sense (लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक). Thus resort to indicated sense is possible only if we know लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक. In "That thou art", you say that the indicated object of 'That' and 'Thou' is something without any characteristic or condition. We object that there can be no indicated sense at all in the major sentence because we do not know the लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक of Pure Jiva and Brahman which are

the means for the presentation of such meanings of the terms in a sentence, as are agreeable to the sense of the whole sentence in question.

III. Detailed Discussion of Self.

Query :—You say that the subsidiary Vedanta texts present the meaning of the words of the primary ones, (2) and thus the *sense* of the latter is apprehended, and (3) the authoritativeness of *this* apprehended sense is self-proved, and (4) therefore when this sense is apprehended, it can be demonstrated that Ignorance and its effects (the world, etc.) cease to exist. In that case, we object that the discussion which you are going to start, is of no use.

Determination :—What you say is true (in the case of one whose mind has been thoroughly purified), because the Vedanta texts the validity of which is self-

the indicated objects (लक्ष्य) and are known as having no लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक.

D.—The presentation of such meanings of the words in a sentence, as would give rise to the apprehension of the sense of that whole sentence (and not the presentation of लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक), is the only aim of resorting to the indicated sense. This condition is fulfilled in the major sentence where we have the apprehension of the sense of the sentence, that is something unconditioned; therefore we understand that remembrance brought about by the meaning of the words must also be unconditioned. Thus the fallacy that 'the indicated sense can not be resorted to in the major sentence', does not hold good. (P. 35).

proved do give rise to realization of the Unconditioned Atman (P. 55). However, that realization is not able to destroy the Ignorance of those whose mind is not purified, because this realization is obstructed by the vacillation caused by the mutually conflicting opinions among the followers of different doctrines. But when this vacillation ceases through ratiocination, Ignorance also disappears invariably. Thus it is that a marshalling of the *pros* and *cons* is adopted for the sake of refuting the conflicting opinions of the different doctrinaires, which are the root-causes of vacillation.

(a) *Various Theories as regards Self.*

In this discussion, first we point out the mutually conflicting theories with regard to 'Thou' explained. the sense of the term 'Thou', because, although the object meant by the term 'That' being the topic of the gist of the S'astra deserves respect, yet the object meant by the term 'Thou' being the participant of the final emancipation, the resultant of S'astra, is worthy of still greater respect.

(1) The materialists the followers of Charvaka, hold that the sense of the term **Materialistic interpretation of "Thou",** 'Thou', is the four elements (the Dehatmavada. Earth, the Water, the Fire, and the Wind), § as transformed into the body. *

§ And not the aggregate of these elements.

* Because of the cognition that ' I, who am fat, have the knowledge of various things '.

(2) Some (followers of the same school) hold that
Pratindriyasmavada. it is 'each of the organs, the eye
and others'. ¶

(3) Others think that it is all the organs of sense
taken collectively. * (P. 56.)
Indriyasamuhatma-
vada.

(4) Some believe that it is the 'mind'. †
Mana atmavada.

(5) Others say that it is the 'vital air'. ‡
Pranatmavada.

(6) Some followers of Sugata, (called Buddhist
View of Buddhistic Idealists) hold that it is the § 'mo-
mentary knowledge'.

¶ The body is not the knower but the eye and other
organs are the knower because we have the cognitions 'I see',
'I hear' etc.

* Because the cognitions are, 'I see' 'I hear' etc.

† Because 'mind' is the means of determinate knowledge,
while other organs produce only the indeterminate knowledge of
the nature of 'This is something',

‡ Because in the case of Yogis, the mind is dissolved, yet
they continue to live because of the vital air.

§ Everything is momentary. Knower cannot be proved to
be anything but 'knowledge'. The knowledge caused by the
organs of sense like that of seeing etc. is called Pravritti Vijnana (प्रवृत्ति विज्ञान), is six-fold and should be distinguished from
the knowledge which may, for the purpose of this distinction,
be called Alaya Vijnana (आलय विज्ञान) because each of the
Pravritti Vijnanas disappears after creating its impression and
this impression has its residence (आलय) in the Aham (अहम्).

(7) The followers of Buddha called **Madhyamikas** hold that it is a 'vacuum' * or
 View of Buddhist Nihilists. 'void' (P. 57).

(8) The **Digambaras** or **Ahartas** believe that **Atman** is different from the body, the organs, etc. and is of the size of the body. †
 View of Jainas.

(9) The **Vais'eshikas**, **Naiyayikas** and the followers of **Prabhakara** (one of the two **Acharyas** of the **Mimansa** school) hold that **Atman** is an ‡agent
 View of Vais'eshikas, Naiyayikas, and Prabhakara-mimansakas.

This **Aham** or '**Alaya Vijnana**' is also momentary and the **Alaya Vijnana** of the first moment disappears after giving rise to the **Alaya Vijnana** of the second moment, and this latter, after giving rise to the **Alaya Vijnana** of the third moment and so on. It need not be objected that 'If **Atman** is momentary, nobody should strive for enjoyments which are to take place in future (while really speaking everybody tries for them)', because as long as the thought that **Atman** is momentary is not fully formed, this striving will continue, because of the impression—that **Aham** is immortal—firmly left on the mind by previous births the beginning of which cannot be traced. But when the idea that **Atman** is momentary is formed fully, there would be no striving and this is the absolution of the **Atman** according to the theory of the Buddhists.

* Because **Vijnana** itself is an illusion.

† When **Atman** gives up a big body and enters a small one, he is decreased (in size) but not destroyed, because transformation of a thing is not its destruction.

‡ Because he being subject to pleasure and pain, must be the doer of, or abstainer from, actions that are prescribed or prohibited.

(कर्ता) and therefore an experiencer (भोक्ता) too ; he is without consciousness (जडः)§ by nature, and is omnipresent (विष्णुः). ¶

(10) Others, i. e. the followers of Kumarila Bhatta, the other Acharya of the Mimansa school, say that Atman is an agent, an experiencer, is omnipresent, but he is of the nature of.* both matter and spirit (जडोबोधात्मकः) (P. 59).

(11) The followers of the Sankhya and of Yoga schools (established, according to tradition, by Kapila and Patanjali) believe that Atman is the enjoyer only (and not agent) and is of the nature of consciousness only (and not of spirit and matter both).

(12) Those who base their belief on the Upanishads (i. e. the followers of the Vedanta, viz. the S'ankara Vedanta school of

§ Because in the cognition ' I know ' i. e. ' I have knowledge', 'I' is the residence of knowledge and not knowledge itself.

¶ Because if his size were atomic he will not be the residence of the pleasure and pain in the different parts of the body taking place at one and the same time ; and if his size were a middle one, he will be one consisting of parts (सादृश्य), and in that case he will be subject to destruction because whatever consists of parts is subject to destruction.

* Because such a cognition as ' I know myself ' shows that (1) myself i. e. the Atman is the object of knowledge, i. e. Atman is matter, and that (2) ' I ' is the knower also i. e. Atman is spirit.

Philosophy) hold that Atman comes to be regarded as an Agent on account of Ignorance, but in reality it is without any characteristic, or absolute and is (not that he has, but he himself is) the Supreme Bliss and Knowledge.

(b) *Verse I and its Explanation.*

The knowing Self who is generally demonstrated by the entity 'I', becomes the object of doubt on account of the different views of the different theorists. Under such circumstances, in order to decide the particular basis of the cognition 'I', the revered Acharya says :—

“Neither the Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, Kham (the Ether or Vacuum), an organ, nor even their aggregate (am I), because all those objects are variable. Therefore, I am one, the remainder, auspicious, absolute (Atman) proved to be the same in the deep-sleep condition as in the waking and dreaming ones.” (P. 60).

<p>Explanation of Verse I.</p>	<p>'I'—the basis of the cognition 'I'. One—without a second. 'The remainder'—that which cannot be disproved after all duality has been denied and disproved. 'Auspicious'—one who Himself is Supreme Bliss and Knowledge, because He alone is 'auspicious'. 'Absolute'—destitute of any characteristics.</p>
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<p>Vedanta view asserted.</p>	<p>Thus the sense is that only the doctrine of the followers of the Upanishads, viz., the basis of the cognition 'I' is only the One that is without a</p>
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second, which cannot be disproved by means of right knowledge and which is itself Supreme Bliss and Knowledge, is to be preferred.

(c) *Refutation of Theories.*

To prove this (doctrine of the Upanishads), the Acharya is going to refute the doctrines of the other theorists, and therein he first refutes that theory which regards the body as the Atman, in the words 'Neither Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, *Kham* (the ether or the vacuum)' (P. 61). The term 'I' is to be connected with all negations. 'I am not what is (known as) Earth', and 'Earth is not what I am'. In this way, one is to understand the absence of mutual identity. Although the Theorist (that, is Charvaka) does not believe that each one of the elements Earth etc. is the Atman, as he admits of only the aggregation of these as Atman; yet the aggregation admitted in his school cannot be explained because (1) he does not believe in the collocation* (*अवयविन्*) as an entity independent of its constituents, (2) the Charvaka does not accept such relations as 'conjunction' and others, because if he accepts them, he has to admit a fifth element (viz. the Ether), but he believes only in four elements, and (3) because of the want of one who would bring about the combination—in

* The independence of the Avayavin must be admitted if that Avayavin is distinct from its constituents, otherwise the Avayavin and its constituents would be identical and there will be no meaning of admitting an Avayavin at all.

his theory. (P. 62). Having this thought in his mind, the Acharya, denying each element the nature of Atman, refutes the theory that the body is the Atman. Two explanations can be offered for '*na Kham*' :—(1) Although in the philosophy of Charvaka who believes only in four elements as the final categories, the Ether is not (a part of) the material cause of the body, because the Ether, according to him, is nothing but the absence of covering, is eternal and is not an existing substance; yet in the Vedanta philosophy, the Ether is an existing thing, because it is a material cause of the body etc. Therefore the Ether may be associated with the nature of Atman (by one who takes the body to be Atman); for this reason, it is expressly denied to be Atman, (2) Or, we should understand that the refutation of the 'Dehatmavada' ends just with 'nor Wind', and that '*na Kham*' is the refutation of the theory that Atman is 'a void,' because the word '*Kham*' can express 'a void.'

(Nor) the organ'—each of the organs is denied to be Atman. (P. 63).
 Refutation of Prati-
 ndriyatmavada.

(Nor) even their aggregate '—Their i. e. 'of the elements' or of the organs'.
 Refutation of ind-
 riya samuhatmavada.

Therefore, the sense is that (1) the elements taken collectively and assuming the form of the body, the Whole (i. e. Avayavin) and (2) the organs also taken collectively are not the Atman. At first each of the elements has been rejected, without admitting (the

possibility of) a combination of them; and now their combination has been denied, after having admitted such a combination. This is the difference between the first refutation and the second one.

By the refutation of elements, the vital airs and the mind which are the effects of elements, are refuted to be Atman.

Refutation of Mana
atmavada and Pra-
natmavadas.

The rejection of the mind implies that of the 'momentary knowledge,' which is a particular condition of mind, and also that of anything, which is said to be the agent, experiencer etc., because (1) in Vedanta the mind—the inner organ only—is admitted as the substratum of cognition, desire, pleasure, etc., because of the following S'ruti text:—"Desire, imagination, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, meditation, fear—all this is truly the mind," (Br. Up. 1. 5. 3). Thus the various objects in the theories of the various schools, beginning with the body of the Charvakas and ending with that which is said to be only the enjoyer (भोक्ता), by the Sankhyas, have been asserted to be not the Atman. (P. 64).

(d) *Grounds of Refutation.*

The reasons for this assertion are now stated

Reasons of this re-
futation.

1. Perishability of all Objects mentioned in Theories.

Because all those objects are 'variable' i. e. they are not invariably attended with the same conditions; it means that 'they are perishable.'

* The body, the organs, etc. are not the Atman, because (1) Atman is not limited by space, time, and thing-in-general; while the pot etc. (including the body, organs etc.) are limited by these; therefore the pot etc. are not Atman; (2) Atman is not a counterentity of negation; the body etc. are counter-entities of negation; therefore the body, the organs, etc. are not Atman.

Proof that Atman is not a counter-entity of negation.

Proof thereof.

* This para is the translation of the following sentences of the text :—

तेन तेऽमी नात्मानः । Text P. 71; (1) आत्मनो देशकालपरिच्छिन्नत्वाद्... अनात्मत्वाद् । Text page 65; (2) आत्मा नाभावप्रतियोगी । अभावप्रतियोगिनश्च देहेन्द्रियादयः । तेन तेऽमीनात्मानः । PP. 70-71.

¶ 'That existing thing (भावपदार्थ) by which a particular notion of अभाव (negation) is explained, is called the counter-entity (प्रतियोगी) of that negation (अभाव). Thus वट is the प्रतियोगी of वटाभाव. See page 197, Tarka Sangraha (Section XXXIX of B. S. S. अभाव प्रतियोगी counter-entity of negation. Negation is four-fold:— (1) Antecedent (प्रागभाव), (2) Consequent (ध्वंसाभाव) (3) Absolute (अत्यन्ताभाव) and (4) Reciprocal (अन्योन्याभाव). (1) means non-production, (2) means destruction, (3) "Absolute negation exists always and in all places except where the thing itself is." (4) Reciprocal negation is the denial of one thing being any other, such as a jar not being a piece of cloth." See page 100 of Tarka Sangraha, B. S. S.

1-2. Atman has neither Antecedent negation nor

Atman no counter-
entity of privation
antecedent or conse-
quent.

consequent, because these negations
cannot be * apprehended (P. 65).

(1) Non-Atman cannot apprehend
the negation because, it is unconcious,

(2) Another Atman cannot be the perciever because,
one that is different from the Atman is not Atman at
all (i.e. Atman is one and one only). Although Atman
is one, the accepted truism (that Chaitra feels pleasure
when Maitra feels pain) can be explained by admit-
ting, as we do, the plurality of inner organs (or minds)
which are the substrata of pleasure and pain. (P. 66).

(3) The same Atman itself cannot apprehend its own
negation (either antecedent or consequent), because
such an apprehension involves an inconsistency, viz, when
the thing to be perceived (i. e. the non-production or
destruction of the Atman) exists, the perciever (i. e.
the Atman) does not exist, and when the perciever
exists, the thing to be perceived does not exist. §

Even if we suppose that Atman is subject to nega-
tion, antecedent and consequent, and that such a negation

* The apprehender can be supposed to be either (1) non-
Atman, or (2) another Atman (supposing that there is a plurality
of Atmans, because, otherwise, we can not explain the fact that
one Atman (e. g. Chaitra) is happy, while, at the same time
another Atman (e. g. Maitra) is suffering, or (3) the same
Atman itself.

§ Cf.—Berkeleyan *Esse is percipi* ', (Nothing of which we
have any knowledge could exist *per se*...that is to say, it
could not exist if it were unperceived or unapprehended by
mind. In other words there was no realm of substance that
was at the same time material).

can be perceived ; that supposition would occasion two undesirable conclusions, viz, (1), " what we do in the present life will pass unrewarded (कृतनाश)† and (2) the pleasures and pains which we experience in our present life are either results without any cause or results of actions done by another Atman (अकृताभ्यागम.)§ (But as these conclusions cannot be allowed, the supposition that Atman is subject to negation of these two kinds is not justified.)

3. There is no possibility of Atman having absolute negation, because Atman being Being
 Atman, no counter- entity of absolute is persistent everywhere. (P. 67).
 privation.

4. The reciprocal negation does not obtain in the
 Atman, no counter- case of Atman. (That negation is
 entity of reciprocal to be proved between Atman and
 negation. Non-Atman=diversity=duality. "Du-
 ality" is illusory, (Atman is real)). The existence of
 diversity can be demonstrated only if diversity is
 (understood as) a superimposed identity with the Be-
 ing which is the substratum. The case is similar to
 the case where silver is perceived in the place where
 there is really an oyster-shell. The existence of the
 silver is phenomenal and that of the shell may be said
 to be numenal. The reciprocal non-existence can be

† Because the Atman of this life will not continue in the next life, as Atman is (supposed to be) subject to consequent negation.

§ Because we had no previous existence, Atman being sub-
 ject to antecedent negation.

asserted only between two things of the same nature of existence, e. g. between the pot and the piece of cloth. But no such negation can be asserted between the silver and the shell ; so also between the duality and Brahman. So Brahman is not the counter-entity of reciprocal negation.

Thus, Brahman is not the counter-entity of any one of the four kinds of negation. (P. 70).

Conclusion :—The body, organs, etc. are indescribable having been imagined by Avidya (Ignorance or Nescience) which is beginningless and indescribable, in Atman which however is without duality and which is of the nature of and is designated as, self-illuminated knowledge.

2. Atman, Witness of all Conditions.

2. Second reason.

Query (rising from the first reason) :—

“ You believe that Atman is knowledge. Now, there is no knowledge in the deep-sleep condition, because the person getting up from sound sleep remembers that ‘ he was quite stupefied, and knew nothing in the sound sleep,’ therefore Atman is perishable.” (P. 72).

Determination :—“ Atman is proved to be the same in the deep-sleep condition
 Existence of Atman- knowledge in deep- sleep condition. (as in the waking and dreaming ones). The sense is that Atman is the witness of the deep-sleep condition, and therefore there is no non-existence of Atman in that condition.

- (1) The recollection that 'I was stupefied' can not be explained if there were not then the 'I' to experience the stupefaction.
- (2) Although the perceiver, the means of perception, the perception, and the object of perception, are not invariably the same in all the three conditions ; yet the One who witnesses the presence and absence of these four is invariably present in all those three conditions. (P. 73).

Query (from a follower of Prabhakara) :—(Atman of the nature of knowledge does not exist in the deep-sleep condition, because it is not required then at all.) Whatever is the *substratum of perception is the perceiver. The same is also the Agent and the experiencer. He is like a lamp, able to illuminate both himself and also other things. He does not require a knower just as a pot requires. (I was stupefied and knew nothing is a perception. Its substratum is the perceiver.) (P. 74.)

Determination :—No. (1) Your perceiver is subject to change. It is nothing but the inner organ. 'I slept soundly and knew nothing' is a modification of mind. Your perceiver as such cannot be witness of its own modification (just as a ball of clay cannot perceive the pot, its transformation). (2) Whatever is

* This substratum is said to be the agent and the experiencer. Therefore, he is subject to change (विकारिन्), so this perceiver is nothing but the mind of the *Siddhantin*.

changing is 'a thing to be perceived.' Your perceiver is a thing to be perceived and as such it can not be the witness, because a thing to be perceived can not be a witness. (3) One that is one and invariable can only be the witness.

Query :—One that is *ekah* (1. alone, 2. one), *Kuta-*
sthak (1. deceitful, 2. changeless),
 Witnessing Conscio-
 usness evidenced by and *nirdharmakah* (1. devoid of
 Word. religion; 2. attributeless) will not
 be accepted as a *Sakshin* (1. a witness in a law-court;
 2. the witnessing consciousness) because he is *apprama-*
nikah (1. unreliable; 2. not sanctioned by the evidential
 texts like S'ruti).

Determination :—No. The Vedanta texts, the most authentic evidence, mentions a *Sakshin* exactly of our description in the following words :—"After Him, as He shines, doth everything shine, (illumined) with His light this whole world shines" (Katha Up. 5. 15., S've. Up. 6. 14, Mu. Up. 2. 2. 10); 'You could not see the seer of seeing' (Br. Up. 3. 4. 2); "He is the unseen Seer,.....Other than He there is no seer....." (Br. Up. 3. 7. 23).

Query :—It is a great magical trick (P. 77) that the most authentic evidence should set aside the minds, which are the substrata of प्रमा (1. right knowledge, 2. perception) and which are अकूटस्थ (1. not fraudulent; 2. changing) and should put forth as the *Sakshin* (1. witness in a law-court; 2. Witnessing consciousness) of all, one who is कूटस्थ (1. fraudulent, 2. changeless),

and अग्रमाश्रय (1. substratum of wrong knowledge, 2. not substratum of perception).

Determination :—Well, it is no doubt a jugglery, but it is the effect of Ignorance, just as a dream.

IV. Mind, Substratum of Perception.

Query :—If you are going to have a *Sukshin* of your description, say that the mind is not the substratum of perception, because being an object to be perceived (and not the perceiver) it is unconscious like a pot.

Determination :—No. (1). Mind is not like a pot, but it is *transparent* like a mirror, and therefore, it catches the reflection of the Brahman-Consciousness, or (2) the identity with Brahman-consciousness is falsely attributed to the mind, (and in either of these two ways the mind becomes the substratum of perception.) (P. 78).

(a) *Reflection of Brahman in Mind.*

1. Reasoning.

Query :—Admitting that mind is transparent, there is no possibility of a reflection of Brahman, which is formless and **impartite*.

* Page 79 of the text. The other main query viz., 'The false attribution of the identity with Atman can not be proved' begins on page 85 of the text.

Determination :—The causes of errors due to reflection are of wonderful nature. Reflection of the formless, the form. When the crystal is the mirror, and when the *form* of the China rose (*japa*) is to be reflected, the reflection does take place, even though the form of the flower (according to the objector, Naiyayika) is itself *formless*.

Even in the case of sound which is impartite, we find a reflection called the 'echo' (P. 79). The reflection of the *sound* and that of the *form* of the rose cannot be proved to be different from the reflection of the face in the mirror, which is admitted by you also as a reflection.

Query :—Even in that case, we make a rule that the reflection is possible in the case of only those things that can be perceived by an organ: because sound is perceived by the ear, it can be reflected, and the form of the *japa* flower can be perceived by the eye, therefore it can be reflected; but Brahman-Consciousness cannot be reflected because it is not perceived by any organ.

Determination :—You cannot make such a general rule, because that rule is not invariable. There are cases in which things that cannot be perceived by any organ are reflected. Thus the ether which cannot be perceived by any organ, because it is cognizable by the *Sakshin* only, is seen reflected in water. If we do not recognise the reflection of *akas'a* in water, we cannot explain why we have the apprehension of profound depth in knee-deep water. (P. 80).

Counter-Query.—We grant the reflection of *akas'a* in water but we assert that the *akas'a* is *cognizable by the eye* because its reflection in water is cognizable by the eye—the general rule being that a thing can be perceived by the same organ with which the reflection of the thing is perceived. If *akas'a* were not cognizable by the eye, but by the *Sakshin*, then the reflection of *akas'a* should be perceived even by a blind man, (because the *Sakshin* is required for its perception and not the eye.)

Determination (of counter-query) :—

Akas'a is cognisable by the *Sakshin* and therefore, its reflection is also cognisable by *Sakshin*, but the blind man cannot perceive the reflection because a reflection cannot be perceived without perceiving at the same time the thing or the mirror in which the reflection resides ; so the eye is required to perceive the * *residence* of the reflection of *akas'a* (viz., the water).

The same is the explanation of the presence or absence of the eye in the erroneous perception, ' The sky is blue. ' In this case, the *akas'a* is reflected in *the akas'a accompanied by light*. (P. 81). So, though the *akas'a* (one part of the residence) can be perceived only by the *Sakshin*, yet the eye is required for perceiving the light (the other part of the residence).

Conclusion.—Thus your rule—' If a thing is to have a reflection, the thing must have a form (or the thing

* The residence of the reflection of the *akas'a* consists of two parts, water and the *akas'a in the water* ; out of these two, *akas'a* is cognizable by the *Sakshin* but the other part, water can be perceived by the eye.

must be cognizable by an organ (viz., the eye)—is not invariably true ; but the general rule would be that—*if the reflection of a thing is to be perceived by the eye, the thing also should be cognizable by the eye (or the thing should have a form), or that if the reflection of a thing is to be perceived by an organ, the thing also should be cognizable by the organ.*

2. Testimony of Word.

Howev^{er} if the sanction of S'ruti is required for the reflection of the Atman, we can refer to the following :—

(1) S'ruti ; ' He became corresponding in form to every form. This is to be looked upon as a form of Him, (Br. Up. 2. 5. 19 ; Katha Up. 5. 9. 10). ' Maya, by appearance (i. e. reflection) causes (the distinction between) the Jiva and Is'vara ' (Nrisinhotta. Up. 4. 9.) (P. 82).

(2) Smriti ; " He appears as having one form and also as having many forms, just like the moon reflected in water ", (Brahma Bindu Up. 12).

(3) The S'rutis that mention the *entrance* of the Atman into the body or mind, should be assumed *to suggest the reflection* of the Atman ; ' He entered in here, even to the finger-nail-tips,.....as a razor would be hidden in the razor-case, or fire in faggot ', (Br. Up. 1. 4. 7). ' So cleaving asunder this very hair-part (i. e. the crown), by

that door He entered', (Ait. Up. 3. 12). " Having created it, into it, indeed He entered" (Tai. Up 2. 6. 1). (P. 84).

(4) Aphorisms of Vyasa in the Vedanta Sutra :—

Vedanta Sutra. ' And (the individual soul is) an appearance (reflection) only,' (Ve. Su. II. 3. 50) ; ' For this very reason (there are applied to Brahman) comparisons such as that of the images of the sun and the like '. (Ve. Su. III. 2. 18).

3. Nature of Reflection.

Different theories as to the nature of the reflection :—

(1) Those who believe that the reflection of Atman is real are called Reflection-Theorists.
Reflection-theory.

(2) Those who hold that the reflection of Atman is illusory are called Appearance-theorists. (Vide page 113 of the Sanskrit Text.)
Appearance-theory.

But as both these theories are not at variance with regard to the existence of the reflection itself, the discussion as to the nature of that existence is irrelevant.

The fact that this reflection is something different from the unconscious matter (अज्ञ) is established by the S'ruti and is proved by direct apprehension.

4. Conclusion.

Thus we prove that the inner organ becomes the receptacle of perception by its false identification with the reflection of Brahman in it.

(b) *False Identification of Atman and Mind.***I. Queries : Impossibility of Adhyasa.**

The false identification of the non-Atman (i. e. Ignorance and its effects, mind etc.) and Atman can not be proved. (And therefore, mind cannot be the substratum of perception). To explain the same ; Is the nature of non-Atman falsely attributed to Atman, or that of Atman to non-Atman ?

The first case is not possible. Atman is the substratum of the illusory non-Atman, **Impossibility of superimposing non-Atman on Atman.** in this case; but *Atman cannot become that *adhishtana* because (1) Atman has nothing in common with non-Atman and nothing that would distinguish it from non-Atman (because Atman is absolute); (2) Atman is ever shining (and therefore it is ever perceived), and (3) Atman has got no similarity etc. with non-Atman (P. 85).

The second case is also equally impossible.

* A thing becomes an *Adhishtana* only (1) if the thing has something in common with the thing superimposed (*adhyasta*), and also something which would distinguish it from the latter. Thus in the error "This is silver" the oyster-shell, the *adhishtana*, has the cognition 'this' (इदमेव) in common with the silver, the *adhyasta*, and also the cognition 'shell' (शुक्लत्वम्) which would distinguish it from the silver; (2) if the thing is covered (आवृत) and therefore not perceived at the time of the error, e. g. the shell when not perceived gives rise to the error of silver; and (3) if it has some similarity with the *adhyasta*: e. g. 'the whiteness' common to both the shell and silver.

(1) In this case the *adhishtana* is non-Atman.

Impossibility of superimposing Atman on non-Atman. An *adhishtana* must always be (comparatively) real (if the shell had been as unreal as silver, it could not have been an *adhishtana* of silver); but non-Atman is not a reality at all. And if, in spite of this, you will make non-Atman the substratum (and Atman, the *adhya*—and remember that the *adhya* is always unreal—), then this will result in the theory of void. [(Three reasons can be given for the illusory nature of non-Atman :—(1) If non-Atman is real, it will never cease to exist and this will lead to the impossibility of getting absolution, because any thing which is real is never seen destroyed or being destroyed by knowledge and knowledge is the only means of absolution): (2) S'ruti-texts also show the cessation of the worldly existence, through knowledge and thereby suggest the illusory nature of non-Atman (P. 86) :—(“The knot of the heart is loosened, all doubts are out off and all deeds of this Jiva are exhausted, when Brahman than whom (what was once believed to be) the higher is the lower,” (Mu. Up. 2. 2. 8). “Only having known Him, the Jiva goes beyond death. There is no other way to go beyond death” (S've. Up. 6. 15.) “He who knows Atman crosses over sorrow,” (Chh. Up. 7. 1. 3). Other S'ruti texts lay down the same directly :—“On the contrary, my dear, in the beginning this world was just Being, one only, without a second,” (Chh. Up. 6. 2. 1); ‘Aught else than Him (lit. than this) is wretched,’ (Br. Up. 3. 4. 2); ‘There is here no diversity’ (Br. Up. 4. 4. 19). : ‘Hence, now, there is the teaching “Not

this ! for there is nothing higher than this, that He is thus,' (Br. Up. 2. 3. 6). (3) Inference also can prove the illusory nature of non-Atman thus :—Non-Atman is illusory; because it is an object to be perceived (दृश्य), like the silver in the oyster-shell (P. 88).]

(2) The second case also occasions the faults like *petitio principii* (आत्मश्रय) and other faults, in the following way :— *When first non-Atman is proved to exist as falsely superimposed on Atman, then only on it (i. e. on non-Atman), the Atman will be superimposed. And Atman can have a defect, similarity etc., only after the superimposition of non-Atman; and on that Atman can the non-Atman be superimposed, (and thus the non-Atman can be proved to exist).

The existence of Ignorance cannot be proved :—

* In simple language what is meant is as follows :—

Atman is falsely superimposed on non-Atman. (अनात्मनि आत्मश्रयः). Therefore non-Atman is the substratum. Therefore non-Atman must pre-exist the Atman (must be the prius, because *adhishthana* always pre-exist the *adhyasta*, the thing superimposed).

Now the process in Vedanta, by which non-Atman itself comes into existence is the following :—Non-Atman has no real existence. Its existence is illusory; it is by illusion that non-Atman is perceived in Atman or, in other words, non-Atman is falsely superimposed on Atman. But before this superimposition can take place, Atman must become capable of being an *adhishthana* i. e. Atman must get (सादृश्यादिदोष); these defects Atman can get only after being identified with non-Atman. See Appenlix I

The above discussion refutes the proposition that
 "the mutual false indentification of
 Atman and non-Atman is the effect
 of *Avidya* and is therefore, beyond
 the range of doubt" (P. 90). This proposition is not
 to be accepted also because the existence of *Avidya* in
 Atman can not be explained for two reasons :—(1)
 Because Atman is self-luminous ; (2) Moreover we ask
 — Is *Avidya* illusory or real ? (It cannot be proved
 to be either, and therefore it has no existence at all).
 If it is illusory, (then what is the cause that led to its
 appearance ?). If *Avidya* itself is the cause of its ap-
 pearance, then this gives rise to the faults like *atmas'-*
raya etc. If it is real, (what is real can not be de-
 stroyed and therefore), *Avidya* will not be destroyed,
 and thus there will be the fault of ' non-release ' (no
 cessation of the wordly existence).

If all is based upon illusion or false attribution (of
 the Atman and non-Atman), then
 you can not decide whether a par-
 ticular cognition is erroneous or valid.

You admit only one final category viz, Atman and
 say that Atman is all things, viz.
 the means of knowledge, object of
 knowledge, knowledge itself and
 also the knower. This theory is
 inconsistent. If you persist in saying
 that it is not inconsistent, then it is the same view
 as that of the Buddhistic Idealists (that every thing is
 momentary knowledge).

2. Determination : Possibility of Adhyasa.

1. Major Error of Atman being an Agent.

“I am a man, an agent, an experienter,” is a cognition self-proved to all men (P. 91.)
Impossibility of this being a remembrance. This experience is not of the nature of calling a past event to mind, because in this experience the knowledge is not remote and it is based upon non-distinction between ‘I’ and ‘man, etc.’ (i. e. between the subject and the predicate).

This cognition is not also right apprehension, because it is inconsistent with the S'ruti text and reasoning. The following S'rutis point out that Atman is no agent, no experienter, and is itself the Supreme Bliss and Brahman :—‘The person here who among the senses is made of knowledge, who is the light in the heart’ (Br. Up. 4. 3. 7) : ‘This self is Brahman’ (Br. Up. 2. 5. 19) (P.

(a) S'ruti. 92.). ‘He who knows Brahman as the real, as knowledge, as the infinite..... (Tai. U̇p. 2. 1. 1). ‘Brahman is knowledge and Bliss’ (Br. Up. 3. 9. 28). ‘That is the Atman, free from evil, ageless, deathless.....’ (Chh. Up. 8. 1. 5). ‘Tell me the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self (Atman), who is within all’ (Br. Up. 3. 5. 1). ‘He is your Soul, which is in all things,’ (Br. Up. 3. 5. 1). ‘He who passes beyond hunger and thirst, beyond sorrow and delusion, beyond old age and death.....’ (Br. Up. 3. 5. 1). ‘Whatever he sees there (i. e. in the condition of deep-sleep), he is not

followed by it, for this person is without attachments,' (Br. Up. 4. 3. 15). The following is the reasoning :—

(b) Reasoning.

(1) (What is the relation between "I" and ' being an agent etc' in the

sentence " I am a man etc. " ? It may be said that

1. No relation possible between Atman and *kartritva*. ' being an agent,' is a transformation of ' I ' the Atman, or it is Atman itself, or it is an attribute of

Atman. The Vedantin says that *kartritva* can be neither of these three.) In the first case, Atman will be * subject to change and therefore ' limited ' (by space, time and thing-in-general) and consequently He will be non-Atman. In the second case, ' I am a man, an agent, etc. ' means that ' I or Atman is the perceiver and *kartritva* is perceived by him, so the relation between I and *kartritva* is that of a perceiver and object of perception. Now, if *kartritva* is Atman itself...as the objector says, then this relation of a perceiver and an object of preception which is evident in the sentence will not be explained (because it can be explained when the subject and the object are two different entities), (P. 94) but there is an inconsistency here (according to the supposed hypothesis), the perceiver perceives himself i.e. the same person is subject and object both. In the third case Atman cannot be connected with anything like *kartritva* by the relation of possessor of attributes and the attribute (धर्म-धर्मिभाव). That relation is possible between two things that are connected by the relation of identity or some

* It has been proved (PP. 18-19) that whatever is subject to change is non-Atman.

other † relation. (These relations of identity and non-identity must be in relation with Atman, otherwise they cannot connect any attribute with Atman. Then this new relation must be related with Atman by some other relation. Thus there would be an infinite number of such relations, before we can establish the relation between the two things (Atman and *kartritva* in the present instance) as that of the *dharmin* and *dharma*. This is the fault called *anavastha* (अनावस्था). Therefore, Atman can have no *dharma*. Thus Atman is attributeless or conditionless (*nirdharma*). (2) Atman is imperishable (and one). (It has been established on pages 17-18 that Atman is knowledge itself).

2. Atman, the Im- If Atman is perishable, knowledge
perishable, the one, is perishable. If knowledge is pe-
(and knowledge). rishable, then (1) various (individual)
knowledges (e. g. knowledge of a pot, knowledge of a
piece of cloth), (2) mutual distinction among them,
(3) the antecedent and consequent non-existence of those
knowledges, (4) the genus, knowledge-ness (*jñanatva*),
and (5) the relation called 'inseparable inherence' (समवाय)
by which the genus will be connected with the indivi-
dual, will have to be admitted. And this admission
involves the fault of complexity (making a thing use-
lessly cumbrous (P. 94). On the contrary if (1) you
admit that knowledge is one, then there is the advantage
of simplicity (making the matter brief or easy.) (And
the admission of 'oneness' of knowledge means the

† I. e. The (*dharma* or) attribute would be either an In-
separable or a Separable Proprium (of the *dharmin*) Vide P. 332
of 'Logic Deductive and Inductive' by Carveth Read.

admission of the indestructibility of knowledge). (2). Cognition of the difference between the knowledge of a pot and the knowledge of a piece of cloth is based upon the difference between the limitations (उपाधि) of knowledge viz. the pot and the piece of cloth. In itself knowledge is one and the same e. g. knowledge (of a pot), knowledge (of a piece of cloth), etc. (3) The cognitions of the production and destruction of knowledge are to be explained by the fact that the production and destruction pertain to the connection with objects which must take place before knowledge arises (P. 95). (4-5) (The genus, viz. *potness* (घटत्व) and the *samayaya* relation between a pot and *potness* can be explained with reference to a pot) because the cognition that one pot is different from another arises of its own accord, i. e. without a reference to any (external) limitation (P. 96) and there exists no objection to that perception. (If it be said that 'because pots are many, the knowledges of pots are many then we reply that in that case) a plurality of *aka'sas*, *kalas* and directions also will have to be admitted.*

(3) If the *kartritva* (attributed to Atman) were real,

there will be no freedom of Atman

3. *Kartritva* of Atman, unreal.

from the cycle of births; (because

whatever is real will not be des-

troyed by knowledge, so *kartritva* of Atman will not be

* Because the ether of one pot will be different from that of another, the two pots being different from each other, or as the रत्नावली says, 'because the ether of a pot is not the ether pervading a piece of cloth.'

destroyed and consequently worldly existence will continue for ever). ¶

(4). If the imperishable and unconditioned Atman is not admitted to be self-luminous, the whole world would have to be taken as blind.

(4). Atman, the self-luminous.

(5). Atman as the object of the Highest Love is itself Bliss, (P. 97.) Thus the reasoning leads us to conclude that Atman is Conditionless, Imperishable, Self-luminous Bliss.

(5). Atman the Highest Bliss.

Conclusion —So, ' I am a man, an agent, an experiencer etc.' is neither remembrance nor right apprehension. Therefore it must be an erroneous cognition.

II. Cause of this Error: Avidya.

We must try to imagine a proper cause of this error.

This cause, if inferred, can be established to exist as falsely supposed in the secondless Atman (just as silver is falsely supposed where there is a pearl-shell ; and this can be established by the proof which mentions (the *dharmin* i. e.) him in whom this (Ignorance) dwells as an attribute. This proof is the cognition of the *Sakshin*, viz, ' I do not know (Atman). ' ' I ' is the *dharmin* of Ignorance

¶ It was said above that the *kartriva* is not a modification of Atman, or Atman itself, nor an attribute of Atman. Here it is said that *kartriva* is unreal. The रत्नावली says that the *kartriva* here is the one spoken of Atman in S'ruti-texts like (Br. Up. 4-3-10). 'He is indeed an agent.' That *kartriva* also is said to be illusory here.

(नजानामि). So the attribute 'Ignorance' is the cause of the error, 'I am a man, an agent, an experiencer.'

III. Nature of Avidya.

This ignorance is 'such as cannot be explained,' for the following three reasons :—

- (1) Ignorance cannot be of the nature of privation or negation of knowledge. (a)

Avidya, no privation of knowledge. Knowledge is already established to be imperishable and we have already said that there is no possibility of the negation of knowledge. (b) There will be * self-contradiction by

* In the cognition, 'I do not know Atman' 'I' is the *dharmin* and Ignorance (i. e. privation of knowledge आत्माज्ञान i. e. आत्मज्ञानाभाव) is the *pratiyogin* (just as in the cognition 'on the floor there is no pot,' floor (भूतल) is the *dharmin* and absence of a pot घटाभाव is the *pratiyogin*). (The *dharman* here are आत्माज्ञानवत्त्व=आत्मज्ञानाभाववत्त्व and घटाभाववत्त्व respectively.) We ask :—'Before the privations (अभावा of knowledge of Atman and of pot are perceived to reside in 'I' and 'floor', are the *dharmins* 'I' and 'floor', and the *pratiyogins* 'knowledge' (आत्मज्ञान) and the pot (घट) of these privations known or not known?' (1) If the first case is granted, then there is a self-contradiction, because if knowledge=Atman is already known, then there is no possibility of its absence. Although if a pot is known, then there is the possibility of its absence being known, yet the case is different with the knowledge of Knowledge (i. e. Atman) and its absence, because the S'rutis say, that as soon as the Atman=Knowledge is known, the Ignorance can no longer exist. (2) The second alternative also, if granted, involves an inconsistency, because if 'I' and 'knowledge' are unknown, how can you know 'absence of knowledge' (=Ignorance of Atman), because it is impossible to know 'absence of a pot' if one does not know the floor and the pot?

the admission of the knowledge or ignorance of the *dharmin* (धर्मिन) and *pratiyogin* (प्रतियोगिन्) if Ignorance is said to be 'privation of knowledge', so this Ignorance is not 'privation of knowledge' (P. 98).

(2). 'Ignorance' cannot be of the nature of an error, doubt, or a series of the Avidya, no error, doubt, or impression impressions on mind of an error or of either.

doubt (a) Ignorance cannot be an error etc. either past or future, because these cannot be known as existent at present, while in the cognition

'I do not know Atman' this Ignorance is known as existing at present, and also because the past and future error; etc. cannot obstruct any thing at present, while the Ignorance in question obstructs or conceals Atman at present. (b) *Ajnana* cannot be error etc. existing at present, because this Ignorance at present is the essential cause of a present error viz., 'I am a man, an agent, an experiencer.' Atman or mind is not the essential cause of this error, because Atman is changeless (while a cause must undergo change in order that the effect may be produced.) (P. 99), and mind is the product of this Ignorance.

(3). This Ignorance is said to be a power (शक्ति) of God, having modes, in the following Avidya a power of God. ing S'rutis (P. 100) :—' Those who have followed after meditation and abstraction, saw the self power of God hidden in His own qualities' (S'Ve. Up. 1. 3) : ' One should know that Nature (प्रकृति) is illusion (माया), and that the Mighty Lord is the illusion-maker (मायिन्), ; (S'Ve. Up. 4. 10) ;

'Indra by his magic powers (मायाभिः) goes about in many forms' (Br. Up, 2, 5. 19); 'for truly they (i.e. all creatures) are carried astray by what is false (अमृतं)' (Chh. Up, 8.3.2); 'They are covered with mist (नीहार); and finally there is cessation of every illusion (विश्रमाणा)' (S've. Up. 1.10). In the above mentioned S'rutis, this power is designated as, 'Maya, Avidya, Anrita, and Nihara, and it is said to disappear by the knowledge of Atman.

CONCLUSION.—Thus we can reconcile the reasoning which says that Ignorance is not 'privation of knowledge' or 'an error etc.' and the S'ruti which says that Ignorance has modes and is destroyed by knowledge, by saying that ignorance is indescribable (अनिवेचनीय). It is the Ignorance which is the cause of the mutual false ascription of Ignorance with its effects and Atman.

The arguments said to be disproving the existence of Ignorance can be refuted by admitting that Ignorance or its effects is beginningless and therefore without any surging up in time. Nor can it be said that the usufruct of knowledge (ज्ञप्ति) of that Ignorance involves the *atmas'raya* and other blemishes, because that knowledge is the self-luminous Atman itself (P. 101).

IV. Process of Adhyasa.

(1). Thus, (first of all there is the mutual false superimposition of Atman and Ignorance). Then the individualizing principle is falsely superimposed on Atman adventitiously wrapped up

Congruent super-imposition of Ignorance on Atman.

by the false superimposition of Ignorance on Him. On Atman characterised by the *Adhyasa* of the ego (अहंकार) there is the false superimposition of the attributes of the ego, viz., desire, formative will, etc., and also of the attributes belonging to the organs, viz., one-eyedness, deafness, impotency, etc. But the organs themselves are not subject to perception and therefore they cannot be falsely superimposed on the perceptible *dharmin*. On Atman characterised by those attributes, the gross body is falsely superimposed; this *Adhyasa* takes place only through the *Adhyasa* of one who has got the gross body as an attribute and assumes the form 'I am a man' (P. 102); but it cannot take place by itself and cannot assume the form 'I am the body', because there is no such experiential certitude. And on Atman characterised by the *Adhyasa* of the gross body, are superimposed the fatness, etc., and on him thus characterised, are superimposed the attributes of prosperity and adversity of the external persons (and things) such as the son, wife and others.* (P. 103).

(2). In a similar way, can be explained the false ascription of Atman to all, beginning with the *ahankara* and ending with the gross body, but this ascription is due to the mutual contact. §

* See Appendix No. 3.

§ This ascription is relational (संसर्गाध्यास) as opposed to the superimposition of Ignorance on Atman which is a congruent ascription (स्वरूपाध्यास).

(3). And the difference in the degree of attachment is due to the difference in the degree of the intervening screen of *Adhyasa*. The *Varttikamrita* (Br. Up. Bh. Va, 1. 4. 1031) says :—The son is dearer than wealth, the body is dearer than the son, in the same way an organ is dearer than the body, the *prana* is dearer than even the organs, and Atman is by far dearer than even the *prana*. The *prana* means the inner organ (P. 104). And the fact that the organs are dearer in comparison with the body is established by our common experience, because we see that we close our eyes etc., at the fall of a weapon or a shower of rain, etc.

(3). Thus from this mutual false superimposition, there results the *Adhyasa* which has the form of a knot (i. e. an inseparable accident) of knowledge and Ignorance (P. 105). If we would accept the superimposition of only one of these two on the other (and not their mutual superimposition), then this would mean that the other should not be perceived at all, because in an error only what is falsely superimposed can be perceived; and a simultaneous superimposition of the two must be admitted as we do in the case where one has the erroneous perception: 'Here are tin and silver'; a perception which has two things together falsely perceived in one substratum viz., the shell (P. 106).

Necessity and possibility of mutual *adhyasa* of Atman and non-Atman.

Possibility of simultaneous *Adhyasa* of two things.

(4). And as there remains the Atman who is the terminus of the denial of all diversity, there can not arise the occasion of the Vedanta view being regarded as no other than the theory of void. No possibility of equivalence of Vedanta to Buddhistic Nihilism. The Atman must survive because the appearance of the Illusion is caused by a co-mixture of the Real and the Unreal.

(5). Each of the successive superimpositions in the series of the egoistic principle and others is dependent upon each of the preceding ones. This change of illusions is† without a beginning in the sense in which the series of seeds and trees is beginningless (P. 110). The mutual superimposition of Ignorance and Atman is the only one superimposition which should be properly called * beginningless.

V Definitions of *Adhyasa*.

Query :—If the *Adhyasa* of Ignorance is without a beginning at all, you contradict the words of S'ri S'ankaracharya who says “ a superimposition or illusion is the perception of a thing, once perceived elsewhere, occurring in another thing and having the form of remembrance (Ve. Su. S'a.Bh Introduction) ” and

† i. e. This change lasts from the time of its production upto the time of the Universal Destruction, as the रत्नावली explains.

* i. e. 'Never born' or 'never produced' as the same authority says.

thereby points out that an illusion is caused by impressions of a past experience in as much as an illusion is a remembrance, as whatever is caused (by impressions or otherwise) is not beginningless.

DETERMINATION:—No. These words of the Acharya are written with special reference to the superimposition of the effect (i. e. the *Adhyasa* of the *ahan-kara* and the rest that follow). The proper definition of an *Adhyasa* is only this much, viz., ‘ the perception of one thing in another thing ’ because that short definition is applicable to both the superimpositions—the one which is the cause i.e. the *Adhyasa* of Atman and Ignorance and the other which is the effect i. e. the *Adhyasa* of the Atman characterised by the *Adhyasa* of Ignorance and the egoistic principle. Or rather, there are the words in the commentary of S’ri S’ankaracharya, viz., ‘ having mixed the Truth and the Untruth ’ and on the basis of these words our apodeictic definition is only this, viz., ‘ Illusion is the appearance of the commingling of Reality and Unreality (P. 111)’. Thereby, the definition will not be inapplicable to the *Adhyasa* (of Ignorance itself) which is the cause of all other *Adhyasa*. And as the *Adhyasa* which is the effect, is said to be beginningless, being of the nature of an infinite series like that of seeds and trees, there is no room for any fault like *atmas’raya* or *anavastha*.

V. Harmony of Jiva and Is’vara.

When the *adhyasa* is thus proved, the definite reconciliation of the Jiva, Is’vara, etc. and of perception, object of perception etc. can be brought about in one Atman.

Possibility of manifoldness of One consciousness.

(a). *Various theories.*

(1). The revered author of the Varttika says that Atman having Ignorance as an adjunct and thinking himself identical with Ignorance, is not able to distinguish between himself and his likeness (in the Ignorance) and is therefore called 'the Inner Ruler,' 'the Witness', and 'the cause of the world'. Atman having *Buddhi* as an adjunct and thinking himself identical with *Buddhi* is unable to distinguish between himself and his likeness (in *Buddhi*) and is, therefore, called 'Jiva, an agent, an experiencer, a perceiver'. And as there is one *Buddhi* per body and the *Buddhis* are diverse, the likenesses of the Atman in the *Buddhis* are diverse; and therefore the Consciousness which cannot be distinguished from the likenesses, appears, as if it were, diverse. Thus there is a plurality of Jivas (P. 112). But as Ignorance is always one and the same, the likeness of Atman in Ignorance is also one and the same, and there is no possibility of the Witnessing Consciousness appearing manifold, (because that Consciousness is not distinguished from the likeness which is always one). This is the doctrine in detail of the author of Varttika. According to this theory, there is only the exclusive implication in the terms, ' That ' and ' Thou ' (in ' That Thou art '), because the expressed sense viz., ' the adjunct (either Ignorance or *Buddhi*) with the likeness (of Atman in it) is completely (to be) given up (in interpreting the sentence ' That thou art '). (It cannot be argued that ' the likeness and the adjunct both are unconscious and therefore they cannot form the conscious Jiva and Is'vara ')

because likeness being a likeness of Consciousness is neither unconscious nor conscious and therefore it is indescribable. (Thus this one objection to the exclusive implication is refuted). The Sankshepas'ariraka (I. 169) also supports the same argument in the following words :— ' In the theory in which the term for 'Is'vara i.e. ' That ' has the expressed sense of Ignorance with the likeness, the word for the first person pronoun i.e. ' thou ' would expressly mean *Buddhi* (or *Ahankara*); and in that view, the Implication (resorted to for the interpretation of ' That thou art ') will be exclusive. The resort to this indication cannot be objected to, by saying that ' As likeness in *Bhuddhi* is bound ' (i.e. undergoes transmigration.) and as the Pure Consciousness is the one who enjoys liberation (from transmigration), the bondage and freedom do not belong to the same person and as the effort to get freedom from transmigration is an effort to kill oneself, no body would make such an effort'. This objection can be refuted because the Pure Consciousness itself is admitted as bound through its likeness. The revered author of the Varttika has well said :—This only is our bondage that *Atman* appears as transmigrating. Therefore, ' bondage ' is due to the likeness of the Pure Consciousness and the cessation of that likeness is absolution. Thus there is no inconsistency.

(2). The view of the Commentator S'ri S'ankara.

The Consciousness not distinguished from the likeness is also (to be included in) the expressed sense of the terms ' That ' and ' Thou '. Then, in the indication

View of Sri' S'ankara
(Theory of Likeness.)

resorted to for the interpretation of the sentence, 'That thou art', a part of the expressed sense (viz., the Consciousness not distinguished from the likeness) will have to be retained and so according to this view, the indication will be exclusive and inclusive (P. 113). Thus there would be no flaw in this doctrine. This very view is known as the 'Theory of* Likeness' (Vide P. 85).

(3). The author of the Vivarana holds the following view :—Consciousness with Ignorance as an adjunct, which is reflected (in Ignorance) is *Is'vara*. Consciousness reflected in Ignorance limited by the inner organ and its impressions is *Jiva*.

(4). The author of the Sankshepas'ariraka believes that Consciousness reflected in Ignorance (and thinking itself identical with Ignorance, and not distinguished from its reflection) is *Is'vara*; and the same reflected in *Buddhi* (and thinking itself identical with *Buddhi* and not distinguished from the reflection) is *Jiva*. The reflected Consciousness with Ignorance as an adjunct is Pure Consciousness.

* The distinction between the views of the Varttikakara and the Bhashyakara is as follows :—(a) The former does not make any difference between विम्बभूत (or आभासकारणीभूत) चैतन्य and शुद्धचैतन्य (i. e. between the reflected consciousness and the Pure Consciousness) while S'ankara does; (b) According to S'ankara we have not the necessity of believing that the Likeness (आभास) is जडाजडविरक्षण the consciousness being included in the expressed use of the terms 'That' and 'Thou'.

In the views (3) and (4), as there is a diversity of *Buddhis*, there is also a diversity of *Jivas*. As the reflection is real (it can never be destroyed; and although the falsely thought identity with *Buddhi* would disappear in the liberated condition, yet *Buddhi* would persist because its cause Ignorance would remain as an adjunct to Pure Consciousness) the *indication* will be exclusive and inclusive (P. 114).

This very doctrine is known as the '*Theory of Reflection*'.

(5). The view of the revered Vachaspati is as follows:-

View of Vachas- Consciousness which is the object
pati Misra. (Theory of Ignorance is *Is'vara* and the
of Limitation). same which is the residence of the
Ignorance is *Jiva* (as is evident in the cognition 'I do not know *Atman*'). In this view Ignorances are many, therefore the *Jivas* are many, and each *Jiva* has his own world (P. 115). The fact that *Jiva* has for his adjunct his own Ignorance makes him the essential cause of the world; yet that an object in the world is recognised as the same by all *Jivas* is due to the fact that the worlds of all the *Jivas* are similar (P. 116). Some S'ruti texts say that '*Is'vara* is the cause of the world; because *Is'vara* may be secondarily called the cause of the world as He is the substratum of the Ignorance of the *Jiva* together with the world'. This same view is called the '*Theory of Limitation*'.

(6). The Theory of Phenomenal Idealism (*Drish-
tisrishti Vada*).

Phenomenal Idealism
(Theory of single
Jiva, pre-eminently
the Vedanta view).

- (a) The Consciousness which is reflected and has for its adjunct Ignorance, is *Is'vara*; the Consciousness which is the reflection in Ignorance is the *Jiva* (P. 117).

Or

- (b) The Pure Consciousness not having Ignorance as its adjunct is *Is'vara* and the same having Ignorance for its adjunct is the *Jiva*.

Either of these theories is pre-eminently the Vedant view. It is called the 'Theory of Single Jiva' or *Drishtisrishti Vada* i. e. the theory of Phenomenal Idealism in which the world (the created) is existing with perception and if perception ends, the world must end. And according to this view, *Jiva* only is the essential as well as the efficient cause of the world, owing to the potency of his Ignorance. All objects of perception last till the time of the perception. As there are many bodies there is an erroneous notion that there are many *Jivas*, (while in reality there is only one *Jiva*). This only *Jiva* gets absolution when there ensues the self-realization through constant (devotion to) hearing, meditating, etc. carried to perfection by the help of the teacher, the sacred text etc. brought into existence by himself. And the texts which mention the liberation of *S'ukadeva* and others furnish merely illustrations and explanations. And in the apothem 'That thou art' the term 'That' presents the consciousness without any adjunct by resort to the exclusive and inclusive implication, as do the terms *satyam*, *anantam* etc. in the sub-

sidary statements. This and other minor differences of views should be the subject of study of the student himself.

(b) *Validity of these Theories questioned and ascertained.*

QUERY :—You say that ‘ There is no possibility of difference of opinion with regard to a (real) thing We ask ‘ how can the mutually conflicting views just put forth by you, be taken as authentic ? ’ Please therefore, point out which out of these views should be rejected and which should be accepted (P. 118).

DETERMINATION :—Who says that ‘ a variety of views is impossible in case of a real thing ? ’ We see a divergence of views held with reference to one and the same thing, it is designated a pillar by one, a man by another and a demon by a third.

QUERY :—That difference of view (may be allowed because it) does not concern the truth and is due to the intelligence of a human being. But the difference of views you have pointed out (can not be allowed because it) concerns the relation of the *Jiva*, *Is'vara* etc. which is the topic of the sacred Scripture.

DETERMINATION :—Indeed, you possess very keen intellect. The primary aim of the Sacred Texts is the elucidation of the secondless *Atman*, for the following reasons : (1) The secondless *Atman* alone is the final goal and it cannot be realized through any other reliable source. But the conjectures of the division of *Jiva* *Is'vara*, etc. are the results of the intellect of man : (and as such they should not be necessarily mentioned

in the Scriptures) yet they are stated by the S'astras by way of explanation as they are useful in knowing the Truth ; (2) because of the maxim which states that ' in the presence of one that is the main purpose, its auxiliary is of no consequence ; and (3) it is possible that S'ruti may mention as a thing of secondary importance what is established by the error (the empirical world)

Digression based on Duality as regards Monism.

(The fact that the knowledge of the secondless Brahman is the means of the *summum bonum* of man, and that the object of only that knowledge is a thing only revealed by the S'astras and not realized through any other source, leads us to conclude that) there is no possibility of the sublation of the Monism of the Vedanta by the duality that is perceived in the phenomenal world, because it can be proved that in the case of the apprehension of the external objects like a pot etc. which (apprehension) assumes the form ' There is a pot ' etc. that aspect of it which refers to only * ' being ' (*natura naturans*) is valid because it is unknown, (while the other aspect of the apprehension which pertains to the pot itself (*natura naturata*) is invalid because it is not unknown). To explain the same :—As a rule, the subject and object of knowledge must be the same as those of ignorance (P. 119). (' I do not know the pot ' is the notion of ignorance, ' I know the pot ' is the notion of knowledge.)

* The 'pot' is 'Consciousness limited by pot' (वडावच्छिन्न चैतन्य) and the being is, in the Vedanta view, Being of the Consciousness.

(The Vedic text 'Atman is to be seen', says that Atman is unknown or that Ignorance has Atman for its object and that by knowing Him, absolution will be attained.) We do not admit the non-Atman as the object of Ignorance because there is no authoritative text for that, nor is our purpose (attainment of absolution) served by such an admission. (Thus, in the sentence 'There is a jar', we have explained that that aspect which refers to Being is valid, because that Being is Brahman.) The empirical notion, 'I do not know the jar,' which refers Ignorance to the non-Atman, can be explained by referring that notion to the Ignorance that has for its object the Atman conditioned by the non-Atman (viz. the jar) (P. 122).

(2) A means of knowledge is a true one only if it makes known something which is unknown (P. 123). If you do not restrict the definition of a true means of knowledge to this much, even remembrance — which makes known what was once known — will have to be admitted as a true means of knowledge.*

* We have proved above in (1) that in the cognition, 'There is a jar,' the idea of being is unknown and that the jar is not the object of ignorance; the second point proves that only the unknown aspect of that cognition is valid. Thus the direct apprehension e. g. there is a jar, is not opposed to the Monism of the Vedanta because the direct apprehension is not itself wholly correct, and that aspect of it which is fundamentally correct is not opposed to the theory of the Absolute One.

The view of Madhusudan stands midway between the theory of तत्त्वज्ञानिकार who believes that 'direct perception can apprehend only Pure Being' and that of संक्षेपज्ञानिकार who says that "the

Validity Continued.

Thus, whenever, there is found such a conflict of views in the Vedantas, its reconciliation also will be of this nature. The revered author of the Vartika has also said the same on this point : — ‘ By whatever process in the Vedanta text one realizes the Inner Self that same should be accepted as par excellence and there is no limit to the number of such processes. (Br. Up. Bh. Va. 1. 4. 402). And the Acharyas have frequently declared that whatever is inconsistent with Brahman, which is the sole subject of expounding by the Sacred Text should be rejected. Therefore the above mentioned difference of views is of small significance.

CONCLUSION :—In spite of the fact that Atman is One, the definite order of Is'vara, Jiva, etc. is well explained, because Jiva as overpowered by his limitation has got transmigration (P. 129) while Is'vara as the master of his adjunct has got omniscience etc.

VI. Systematization of Preception, Object of Preception, Etc.

(a) INTRODUCTION : AVIDYA AND ITS VARIED ASPECTS.

Query :—Well, the settled divisions of Jiva and Is'vara may be explained by means, of Ignorance, but how will you explain the classification of ‘a means of knowledge’, an object of knowledge’, etc., and the nature of the

प्रत्यक्ष of the empirical world is no *pramana* at all because the definition of a *pramana* is, ‘a true means of revealing something unknown’ (अज्ञातबोधकं हि प्रमाणम्)-

process of knowledge, that 'at a particular time a particular man knows a particular thing'?

Determination :—Nescience is an object to be perceived,
(and not the perceiver itself), it

Two capacities of Avidya is also unconscious and perishable ; as such Nescience is limited.

However, it covers the all-pervasive Consciousness, because Nescience is beyond human thought, being itself indescribable, and because it has got two capacities viz, the veiling capacity (*avarana*) and the creating capacity (*vikshepa*). The limited Ignorance conceals the all-pervasive Atman (P. 130) as the

Concealment of Atman by Avidya. small finger taken near the eye, is able to cover the large Solar orb.

In this latter instance, it cannot be maintained that 'the eye is covered by the finger and not the solar orb,' because if the eye is covered, then the eye should not be able to see the finger, which it does see. (Moreover, that the limited Ignorance covers the all-pervading Atman is a fact, also because the Avidya has got a power of putting forth (*विक्षेप*) an illusion in the form of the phenomenal world, and this power it cannot exert unless Ignorance first conceals Brahman, the substratum of that illusion;) it is a general rule that no illusion can be put forth unless the substratum is covered beforehand. Now, after concealing Atman, Ignorance transforms it-

Self-transformation of Avidya. self into the whole world because Ignorance is urged to do so by the actions of the Jivas, which in their

turn are dependent on the impressions on the memory effected during the former births of the Jivas. Before

this self-transformation takes place, the Avidya which on account of its being transparent has already got in it the reflection of Consciousness, becomes identified with Consciousness by reason of that very reflection; therefore also the transformation in the form of the effects of Ignorance is indirectly identified with (or is interwoven with) Consciousness by reason of the reflection.

Reflection of Consciousness in Avidya and its effects.

(b) *SYSTEMATIZATION NECESSARY FOR JIVA NOT FOR IS'VARA.*

This division is necessary (to be explained) with reference to the Individual Consciousness (जीवचैतन्य) but not in the case of the Cosmic Consciousness. Because Consciousness, like a lamp illuminates without any external help all that comes in contact

Knowledge of Cosmic Consciousness unlimited, that of Individual Consciousness limited.

with it; Cosmic Consciousness which is the essential cause of the world, ever illuminates the whole world without the help of any external means of knowledge, and therefore it is omniscient. Thus that Consciousness does not require the division of the means of knowledge, object of knowledge etc. But that division is indispensable in the

No possibility of any admixture of knowers, objects of Knowledge, etc.

case of the Individual Soul, because he is limited by *Buddhi* (= the inner organ) and as such he is himself limited. Therefore, at a particular time, only that particular thing with which a particular inner organ comes into contact is directly cognised by the particular Jiva limited by that particular inner

organ, because that inner organ is possessed of the capability of manifesting Consciousness. Thus there is no possibility of any admixture (of knowers, objects of knowledge etc.) (P. 131.)

(c) *PROCESS OF PERCEPTION.*

1. **Nature of Inner Organ.**

There is an illusory form, an unreal modification (विवर्त) of Ignorance, a transformation of the five subtle elements with the Light (सत्त्व) form of Ignorance predominant. It is called the inner organ.

2. **Parts of Inner Organ.**

It stands in the middle of the body and pervades the whole body. It is pellucid (so that it can catch the reflection of a thing) like mirror. When the cognizable things like a pot etc., are to be cognized, this inner organ comes out of the body through an outer organ like the eye and pervading the whole of the object assumes the form of that particular object, just as the molten copper does. (The extending to the object (the

Contraction and extension of Inner organ efferent current) and the assumption of the forms of the various objects, on the part of the inner organ are possible because) it is like the light of the sun, capable of immediate contraction and extension (P. 132.) Because the unreal transformation (विवर्त) of Ignorance is composed of parts, it extends at the time of assuming the form of the object of perception, from the interior of the body to the external object and stands undivided between the body and the external object like the eye itself.

3. Names of these Parts.

Now, that part of the inner organ which is in the body is called the Ego and also the agent; *Aham*; the agent. that part of it, which extends like a stick between the body and the object of knowledge is given the name of 'a cognition' (or the knowledge) by means of a modification of the inner organ i.e. the efferent current and also the action; lastly *Vrittijnana*, the action. the third part of the inner organ which pervades the object of knowledge is called " the capability of the * manifestation of the object," which really brings about the *conai-*
Abhivyakti-yogyatva: tion of the object of knowledge in
Special fitness of that object. The inner organ con-
manifestation. sisting of the three parts described above is very pellucid and therefore Consciousness is made manifest in it (as reflection).

4. Names of consciousness distinguished by these Parts.

Now, this manifested Consciousness is really *one*, yet owing to the distinction of the parts of the manifesting inner organ, it is given three designations (P. 133). The aspect of consciousness limited by the part of the inner organ called the agent (*kartri*) is named *Pramatri*, the perceiver. by the part of the inner organ called the agent (*kartri*) is named *pramatri*, the perceiver; that limited by the part called

* अमिव्यक्ति 'manifestation of the object' is explained as आवरण-निवृत्ति i. e. the cessation of covering of the object. The object a pot, is nothing but Atman conditioned by the object (वटावच्छिन्न-चैतन्य). The object is not manifest till the covering is removed.

<i>Pramana</i> , means of Perception.	'action' (<i>kriya</i>), receives the appellation of <i>pramana</i> , the means of perception; the aspect of consciousness limited by the third part of the inner organ is called <i>pramiti</i> , perception itself. The Cosmic Consciousness which persists in the object (i. e. which is the substratum of the object) is called <i>prameya</i> , the object to be perceived, as long as it is not perceived; and the same is called <i>phala</i> , the result of the whole process, when it is perceived (P. 134)
<i>Pramiti</i> , perception.	
<i>Prameya</i> , object of perception.	
<i>Phala</i> , result of the process.	

(d) *INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE MODIFICATION OF INNER ORGAN.*

1. Instrumentality in general.

Now, in those two theories, viz. (1) the one which regards the Jiva as limited by the inner organ and (2) the other in which the Jiva is omnipresent but unconcerned and a reflection (of consciousness) in Avidya ; the modification of the inner organ taking place during the process of perception, performs a two-fold function, viz. (1) it connects the subject-consciousness with the object-consciousness (P. 135.) and (2) it also removes the covering pervading the object consciousness. But the third theory according to which (P. 136.) Jiva is omnipresent, limited by Avidya and covered (by it), regards Jiva as the essential cause of the world and as

such *ever connected* with all things in the world; therefore, in that theory the *vrithi* aims at only removing the veil (from the object-consciousness).

2. Instrumentality in particular.

QUERY :—When the *vrithi* serves the purpose of connecting the subject with the possibility of knowledge of these four ordinary objects (like a pot) i. e. without *vrithi*. even in that theory which does not regard the Jiva to be the essential cause of the world, the Jiva can have the cognition of the Divine Consciousness, the oyster-shell-silver, the religious merit and sin, and pleasure and pain without the help of the *vrithi* because these four are already, by their very nature, connected with the inner organ (which is in its turn connected with the Jiva, as being the substratum of the reflection of Consciousness or as being the limiting adjunct of the Jiva) (P. 137).

I. Meaning of Perception.

DETERMINATION :—The subject consciousness must become identical with or must assume the same shape as, the object-consciousness, before he can perceive it. Perception—union of subject-consciousness with object-consciousness. This means that the object gets प्रमातृ-चेतन्यप्रतिबिम्बवत्ता i. e. receives (or becomes the substratum of) the reflection of the subject-consciousness.

II. Conditions of Perception.

The *prameya* can become that substratum if it is both transparent स्वच्छ and at the same time uncovered अनादृत.

स्वच्छत्व may be explained as चित्प्रतिबिम्बयोग्यत्व i. e. the innate capability of a *prameya* to become the substratum of the reflection of Consciousness. This capability (चित्प्रतिबिम्बयोग्यत्व) should be distinguished from चित्प्रतिबिम्बवत्त्व, the former exists e. g. in ब्रह्मचैतन्य, but not in घटपटादि which gets चित्प्रतिबिम्बवत्त्व (i. e. which receives the reflection of Consciousness) through the *vritti* of the inner organ. This capability (योग्यत्व) may be due to three reasons; (1) if the *prameya* is an effect of the five subtle elements, with the form of *sattva* predominating, e. g. the inner organ; (2) or if the *prameya* is an effect of the inner organ which is itself transparent, e. g. 'pleasure and pain' or (3) if the *prameya* is the object of a modification of mind, viz. the temporary cognition that the *prameya* is capable of being the substratum of the reflection of Consciousness, the Divine Consciousness.*

A *prameya* is said to be uncovered, if it is not the object of ignorance† (by its very nature of ignorance i. e. independently of any external help viz. that of a *vritti*). A thing is 'uncovered' if it not the object of ignorance either innate or superimposed. § (The objects of innate ignorance

* This explanation of transparency and that of uncoveredness which follows are taken from the रत्नावली. The Sanskrit expressions of the three kinds of transparency are the following :—

(1) सत्त्वांशधिकभूतपरिणामत्व e. g. in मनस्.

(2) (स्वच्छ) मनःपरिणामत्व e. g. in सुखदुःख.

(3) (जीव) चैतन्यप्रतिबिम्बयोग्यापातज्ञानरूपवृत्तिविषयत्व e. g. ब्रह्मचैतन्य.

† अनावृतत्व means आरोपितानारोपितप्रकारद्रव्याज्ञानाविषयत्व or (what is the same) साक्षिमात्रभास्यत्व.

§ अनावृतत्व is अज्ञानाविषयत्व.

are the pot, the piece of cloth, etc. and the object of superimposed ignorance is the Divine Consciousness (ब्रह्मचैतन्य). Therefore, these, the pot, the piece of cloth, and the Divine Consciousness are covered). Or, in other words, the uncovered *prameya* is known to the *Sakshin*, the witnessing consciousness only. Now, this uncoveredness is of two kinds: (1) the Uncoveredness of a *prameya* which is known to the Witness Consciousness through a modification of *Ignorance, e. g. that of the shell-silver which is not transparent, yet known to the Witnessing Consciousness through the modification of Ignorance (having the mode of *Sattva* predominant); (2) and the uncoveredness of an object known to the †Witnessing Consciousness of its own accord, e. g. 'pleasure and pain', which are ever known to the *Shakshin*.

QUERY :—The shell-silver exists only during the time of its perception, and therefore it is transparent.

DETERMINATION :—Silverness exists in silver both phenomenal and seeming. The Shell-silver, not transparent. essential cause of this silverness is the Ignorance with the mode of Dark (*tamas*) predominating or, in other words, the apparent silver is a transformation of Ignorance with the *tamas* predominant. Now, transparency can belong only to mind, pleasure and pain, etc., which are transformations of the five elements with Light (*satv*) predominating; therefore there can be no transparency in the seeming silver.

*अविद्याद्वयासाक्षिमात्रमास्तत्वेन अनादृतत्वम्.

†अनादृतत्व means स्वतः साक्षिमात्रमास्तत्त्व.

QUERY :— Divine Consciousness is uncovered, because of its omniscience due to its self-illuminating nature which cannot be denied.

DETERMINATION :—We admit that Brahman is omniscient because it illuminates all things connected with it (P. 142), (and thus there is no innate ignorance covering Brahman and so far it is uncovered). Yet Brahman is the object of the ignorance which limits the Jiva. To explain the same, in the cognition 'I do not know Brahman', 'I' i. e. the Jiva, is the residence of ignorance and Brahman is the object of that ignorance. So Brahman is covered from the standpoint of the Jiva, therefore while explaining the *vrittijnana* of Brahman, we have to admit that Brahman is covered, because the *vrittijnana* takes place while the Jiva is still limited by his ignorance.

III. Consequence of non-fulfilment of both or either of these conditions, especially in four particular cases.

If an object is not both transparent and uncovered (i. e. (1) if it is both not-transparent and covered, (2) if it is not-transparent (and yet uncovered) and (3) if it is covered (and yet transparent), it has to seek help from the *Vritti* (modification of the inner organ) before it can be perceived. And the fact that a particular object of perception is itself connected with the inner organ does not necessarily mean that the object is both transparent and uncovered, and under these circumstances it requires to be helped by the *Vritti* in order that it may be perceived.

Thus (1) the divine Consciousness (ब्रह्मचैतन्य) which is connected with the inner organ because it is omnipresent and which is transparent, will require the assistance of the *Vritti* of the inner organ in as much as the Divine Consciousness is covered, and then the *pramatri*-consciousness i. e. the Jiva will become identical with the Divine Consciousness (which is the object here).

(2) The seeming silver that is perceived in an oyster-shell is *uncovered*, but it is *not transparent*; therefore the *Vritti* is necessary for its perception, but in this case the *Vritti* required is the *Vritti* of Ignorance, predominated by the form of Light (सत्त्व) because of the special nature of the *prameya* here. (Ignorance is the cause and the inner organ is its effect. In the perception of the *direct effects* of Ignorance e. g. the rope-serpent, the shell-silver etc., the *Vritti* of Ignorance itself is required; and in the perception of the *indirect effects* of Ignorance e. g. the pot, the piece of cloth, etc. the *Vritti* of the inner organ is required.) It is the Witnessing Consciousness that perceives the shell-silver through the *Vritti* of Ignorance (and the Witnessing Consciousness and the Individual Consciousness are ultimately the same.) (P. 140.)

(3) Religious merit and sin are just like a pot, a piece of cloth, etc. They are neither transparent nor uncovered. They are the effects of sacrificial performances, etc. And the effects of *dharma-dharmau* are ' pleasure and pain ' which are connected

with the innér organ ; and therefore *dharmadharmau* and ,
and their cause *Yagadikriya* are also connected with the
inner organ, because they are like the pot.

(4) Pleasure and pain are modes of the inner
organ and are perceived by the
Case of pleasure and pain. *Sakshin* (who is ultimately identical with the *Jiva*) without any
help of the *Vritti*, because they are both transparent
and uncovered.

IV Conclusion.

The fact that a *prameya* is connected with the
inner organ does not necessarily
Former statement established. mean that it can be perceived without the help of the inner organ.

Therefore, we re-assert our first statement (Vide PP. 136-137) that in the theory according to which Brahman is the essential cause of the Universe (i. e. when *Jiva* is not naturally connected with the world), the *Vritti* of the inner organ invariably performs two functions viz, (1) it connects the subject-Consciousness with the Object-Consciousness and (2) it removes the covering from the Object-Consciousness, but in the theory which regards *Jiva* as the essential cause of the world, and thus already connected with that world; the *Vritti* performs only one function viz. that of uncovering the Object-Consciousness.

3. One of the two Uses of *Vritti*-Removal of Covering.

QUERIES:—(1) If, as you say, one perception e. g. that of a pot, removes the covering of Ignorance from

the object of perception; then we say that the absolution of all the Jivas must be immediate (after one perception), because you believe that Ignorance is one (and that Ignorance is removed in the course of the perception of one single object). (2) And if you say that there is a plurality of Jivas, we point out that at least one Jiva should attain absolution as soon as one object of perception is perceived by him, because one Jiva is limited by one ignorance.

1. Removal of Covering conveying its Suppression.

Just as by the efficacy of potent incantation the covering power (i. e. the extinguishing quality) of a gem is overpowered, similarly by the presence of a *Vritti* the covering power of Ignorance is overpowered, i. e. it remains latent and is not destroyed. To explain the same, *Ignorance accompanied by the (antecedent) negation of a Vritti of the inner organ, to be produced by a means of perception (e. g. the eye)*, is able to produce the experience that 'a particular thing does not exist and is not therefore perceived'; although really it does exist and can be perceived; and on that account, that (Ignorance) is called 'covering'. But when that *Vritti* is produced, the above-mentioned limitation (or distinguishing feature) of the Ignorance is absent and therefore Ignorance, though existing, is, as if it were, non-existent and therefore it is not powerful to produce its effect (viz, the covering of the object) and thus that Ignorance is said to have been overpowered (and not destroyed).

Ability of one Ignorance to explain this removal.

Sense of being overpowered conveyed by removal.

COUNTER-QUERY :—“In that case, when the knowledge of Brahman arises, the Removal of Ignorance from Brahman. Ignorance will be overpowered and not destroyed, just as in the case of the knowledge of a pot; and therefore the Jiva will never obtain absolution” (P. 144).

DETERMINATION :—We admit the cessation or destruction of Ignorance as consequent on the perception of the significance of such apothems as ‘That thou art’ and others (P. 145). This admission is based upon

the following reasons :—(1) A perception can lead to the cessation of Ignorance if there is the nature of right apprehension (प्रमत्त्व) in the object (विषय) of that perception, and the nature of right apprehension (प्रमत्त्व) is found only in that object which cannot be denied (at all times); now, the sense of the *Mahavakya* is such that the object of its knowledge (viz. identity of the Jiva and Brahman) is beyond all denial, and therefore only its perception has the nature of right apprehension. (2) The (objects of) direct perception etc. are subject to denial and therefore direct perception is erroneous, yet it is supposed to be a means of knowledge in as much as it serves the practical purpose. (3) The inability to find out another similar case whereby the perception of a particular object, Ignorance will be destroyed, cannot be put forth as an objection (to this admission), (a) because that the perception of Brahman destroys Ignorance is a fact of one’s experience and (b) also because there is no other explanation of the cessation of Ignorance

than this; and this *absence of explaining a thing otherwise* अन्यथाऽनुपपत्ति is itself a means of knowledge, which is the most authentic of all means of knowledge. This is said in the following verse. "If a fact is proved by the absence of any other explanation, that absence crushes all doubts and objections based upon the impossibility of finding out a parallel illustration. That absence itself is the most powerful among all means of Knowledge".

II Removal of Covering conveying its destruction.

DETERMINATION:—The manifold states of covering Ignorance e. g. the one covering a jar etc., are effects of the one Primal Ignorance. We admit the theory that there are as many ignorances of the nature of the antecedent non-existences of Knowledge as there are Knowledges themselves. Thus when one perception is produced, only one ignorance is destroyed, and there is no objection to the belief that the covering of a pot etc. is destroyed by its perception.*

4. Double significance of Covering and its Removal.

QUERY:—Are, the Inference and the remaining means of knowledge able to remove the covering of an object or knowledge or not? (a) If inference has got that power, then (1) the erro-

Queries based upon non-distinction of covering.

* Distinction between the mundane ignorance and the primal one is follows :—

Mundane Ignorance	Primal Ignorance
(1) Many	(1) One
(2) negative; absence of knowledge	(2) positive or indescribable
(3) to be destroyed by the knowledge of pot etc.	(3) to be destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman

neous perception (साक्षात्काशिन) e. g. that of 'yellowness' of a conch-shell and that which occurs when any misdirection takes place, ought to be removed by the inferential knowledge of the *whiteness* of the conch-shell, etc., because an error is caused by the ignorance of the substratum (e. g. the error of the yellowness is due to the ignorance of whiteness which is the substratum on which yellowness is superimposed), and it would cease with the cessation of the ignorance of the substratum (i. e. by the inferential knowledge of whiteness, in the present cases) (P 146); but this is never the case; (2) if the inferential knowledge of Brahman based upon reasonings be supposed to bring about the cessation of Ignorance, then the necessity of 'hearing' and 'contemplating' for the purpose of the direct perception of Brahman, (laid down in the sacred texts) will be fruitless. (b) If inference has not got that power, then the dealings (based upon the inferred presence) of fire (on the mountain) would not be justified, because the covering, which obstructs such dealings, still exists.

(Thus it may be said that inference etc. can neither put an end to, nor can allow to exist, the covering.)

DETERMINATION:—Covering or obstruction is of two kinds :—(1) one, the cause of the cognition that a thing *does not exist* and residing in the Consciousness conditioned by the inner organ; and (2) the other, the cause of the cognition that a thing (about the existence of which there is no doubt)

Two-foldness of Covering, its two forms and two places.

is not perceived and residing in the Brahman Consciousness conditioned by the object of perception. (We say that covering is two fold) because we experience that

Proof thereof. covering refers to both the Jiva and the object, e. g. in the cognition ' I do not know a pot '.

Out of these two, the former ceases to exist by some valid knowledge only, either direct or indirect, because no cognition of the nature of 'there is no fire' arises, when once the existence of the fire is known even by inferential knowledge. But the latter (covering) is removed only after the perception of the object. The general rule is that " Knowledge (i. e. inference or perception) resides both in the knower (i. e. the inner organ) and the object of knowledge, and is of the nature of 'A certain object exists' and 'A certain object is perceived' (i. e. of the nature of inference and perception), and it destroys the ignorance similarly situated. The indirect knowledge of an object takes place in the absence of the connection of an organ with the object of the knowledge, and therefore resides in the inner organ only (P. 147); but only the direct knowledge is the result of the operation of that connection and therefore resides in both the object and the inner organ. The author of the *Panchadashi* (7-45) has said:— " The indirect knowledge puts an end to (the ignorance which is) the cause of that process of the inner organ, which is accompanied by the *non-existence* (of a thing), while the direct knowledge removes

(the one which is) the cause of that process which is characterised by the *non-perception* (of a thing).”

CONCLUSION:— In the case of an indirect knowledge like the inferential one, only the obstacle of the non-existence is removed, and therefore in that case the dealings are restricted to the existence of an object; and when the obstacle of non-perception is removed (by direct knowledge i. e. by perception), the erroneous perception (साक्षाद्परिग्रह) together with its cause viz, ignorance, disappears (P. 148).

5 Digression as regards Adhyasa.

To conclude the determination of the queries mentioned on P. 91; the Unconditioned Atman has been mutually and falsely identified with Ignorance and its effects, the inner organ; and consequently one can explain his false identification with the attributes of the inner organ viz, that of being an agent, an experiencer etc.

(A counter-query (against adhyasa)

QUERY:— You have said that the properties of the inner organ are falsely attributed to the *Atman.

Impossibility of
Adhyasa, Karitva
not being two-fold,
phenomenal and
seeming.

Now, as you are a believer in the theory that ‘wherever there is an illusion, the illusory thing is *in-describable*,’ therefore in the case of the illusion, “ Atman is an agent etc.” the properties of the inner organ viz,

* i. e. There is. अन्यत्र (आत्मनि) अन्य (=अन्तःकरण) धर्माध्यासः।

Kartritva etc., which are falsely superimposed on Atman, appear as indescribable in Atman, the substratum. Pursuant to your opinion, the knowledge of *Kartritva* etc. must be two-fold, practical or phenomenal in the inner organ and illusory or seeming in Atman, just as silverness is perceived practically existing in the silver and illusorily in the oyster-shell.

DETERMINATION : There cannot be two-fold knowledge (of the existence) of *Kartritva* etc., for either of the two reasons :—(1) The false identity always perceived during the wordly existence of Atman and the inner organ, makes it impossible to distinguish between the metallic silver, and the seeming silver. (2) or, not only that the properties of the inner organ are falsely attributed to Atman, but even the inner organ itself) with all its properties is superimposed on Atman, and thus there are no two things (as we have in the case of illusion of silver,) viz, the metallic silver with its properties and the pearl-shell, where the *whiteness* of the metallic silver is *practically existing* while the *whiteness* of the apparent silver in its substratum the shell, is *existing only during the time of its perception* (P. 149).

Thus it can be clearly maintained that the one Atman comes to be connected with different limitations (उपधि s)

General Conclusion. and therefore the invariable division of the perceiver etc., can be explained.

Hence there is no possibility of the Vedanta doctrine being considered to be the same as the Buddhistic one; nor is there any inconsistency in the Vedanta theory

itself. Other divisions also will be explained in the following pages.

To conclude the explanation of the verse :—Because
 Conclusion of the verse. Atman who is Consciousness (or knowledge) is invariably found in the deep-sleep condition (as also in the waking and dreaming ones), while the body, the organs, etc., are not so found; and (2) because the latter are objects of knowledge (and not knowledge itself); the views of the various theorists, who look upon the body, the organs, etc., as Atman are erroneous; therefore it is established that the doctrine based upon the *Upanishads* is the only valid one.

VII. VALIDITY OF RITUALISTIC-SACRED TEXTS

(a) *Demonstration of Validity during Adhyasa,*

QUERY:— You believe that Atman is attributeless and that the dealings based upon the perceiver, object of perception, etc., are really founded upon a mutual false super-imposition of the Atman and non-Atman.

Theory of Adhyasa invalidating ritualistic texts.

It follows, therefore, that the sacred texts, 'A Brahmin should perform a बृहस्पति sacrifice' etc., have no validity, because no activity can be explained as existing in Atman who is neither an agent nor an experiencer.

(2) And if the sacred text are not valid, how can the existence of Brahman even be established ? Because Brahman can be known only from the sacred texts, as is said in the aphorism of Badarayana, " The source of

the knowledge (of Brahman) is the sacred "texts" (Br. Su. I. i. 3).

(3) Thus in order to keep up the validity of the Vedas, you must admit the reality of the dealings based upon the perceiver, the object of perception, etc.

DETERMINATION:— The invalidity of the sacred texts which is pointed out, can occur, either (1) before

the knowledge of the Truth is attained, or (2) after its attainment.

Validity of ritualistic texts essential during adhyasa.

The first case is impossible, because everything including the means of

knowledge, the object of knowledge, etc., refers to one that is possessed of Ignorance and the validity of the sacred text cannot be questioned because during the time of Ignorance there is no opposition to that validity. The second case is possible and we welcome it. This is mentioned in the following verse (P. 150).

(b). *VERSE II*

Neither castes, nor religious practices and duties of castes and stages of life, nor steady abstraction of mind, contemplation, yoga, and the rest belong to me, because the wrong supposition of I-ness and my-ness based upon the non-Atman is destroyed. Therefore, I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute.....2.

Explanation of the Verse.

The 'Castes' viz. that of Brahmins and others. The 'stages of life' viz. that of the life of a student and the rest. 'Religious practices' viz. bath, purification and the rest. 'Duties' viz. the vow of a student life, the attendance on one's teacher, etc. Here the compound *adharma*

should be dissolved thus:—take *varnas'ramah* as a *dvandva* compound and *acharadharmah* also as a similar one, and join both these compounds as a *genitive-tatpuruṣha*. Thus, the sense we get will be 'the religious practices and duties of the castes,' and 'the same of the stages of life'. 'Steady abstraction of mind' means the fixed concentration of mind on Brahman by abandoning external objects. 'Contemplation' means the thinking of the Supreme Spirit. 'Yoga' is the control over the functions of the inner organ. 'And the rest' implies the hearing of Brahman, reasoning on it etc, (P 151) What follows is the explanation why all these do not exist after knowledge is attained:—'because the wrong supposition of the I-ness and my-ness based upon the non-Atman is destroyed' i. e. because the foundation of the erroneous conceptions, viz. the I-ness and my-ness, which are 'based upon' i. e. are essentially due to 'non-Atman' i. e. the Ignorance which is opposed to Atman, 'is destroyed'; there are no dealings of the form of castes, stages of life etc., which are based upon that foundation.

(c) *Invalidity of Ritualistic Sacred Texts, in absence of Adhyasa, emphasised.*

In order to affirm the illusory nature of the worldly dealings based upon a caste, a stage of life, etc., by pointing out that these dealings are based only upon false Knowledge, the Acharya says that the absence of those dealings is invariably (accompanied) by the absence of false knowledge e. g. in the deep-sleep condition.

Deep-sleep condition emphasising invalidity of ritualistic sacred text (and of worldly dealings).

(d). VERSE III.

"Neither the mother, nor the father, nor the gods, nor the worlds, nor the Vedas, nor the sacrificial performances nor the sacred place (is real) " say the Ś'ruti texts. (Nor there is void) because the nature of complete void is denied in the deep-sleep condition, (because in the deep-sleep condition, the Jiva becomes (of the nature of Brahman which is) beyond hunger etc.. and the secondless). Therefore I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute." ... 3

Explanation of the Verse.

' The mother ' = the female parent. ' The father ' = the male parent. ' The gods ' = Indra and the rest, who are to be propitiated. ' The worlds ' = the heaven and other worlds which are the rewards of the propitiation of the gods, ' The Vedas ' = the authentic sentences and principal apothems which declare the means of happiness or misery in the next world, and Brahman. ' Sacrifices ' = *jyotishtoma* and other sacrifices which are the means of heaven etc. ' Sacred place ' = the countries like *Kurukshetra* and other places which are the localities for the performance of sacrifice. Thus, *Pari passu* the perpetration of sins is implied. All these have their source in the cognition of Atman that ' I have a body, ' but they are not naturally connected with Atman. So that, when that cognition disappears these also cease to exist (P. 152). To explain this, the following sacred text and such other authorities which refer to the deep-sleep condition, corroborate the cessation

of all evil when the egoistic idea is no more present :—‘ there a father becomes not a father; a mother not a mother; the worlds, not the worlds,* the gods, not the gods; the Vedās, not the Vedas; a thief, not a thief. There the destroyer of an embryo becomes not the destroyer of an embryo; a Chandala (the son of a S’udra father and a Brahman mother) is not a Chandala, a Paulkasa (the son of a S’udra father and a Kshatriya mother) is not a Paulkasa; a medicant, is not a medicant; an ascetic is not an ascetic. He is not followed by good, he is not followed by evil, for then he has passed beyond all sorrows of the heart ’ (Br. Up. 4. 3. 22).

(e) *No Possibility of Void in Deep-sleep Condition.*

If it be objected that when *all* dealings are non-existent, there would be a void or Nothing; the Ācharya replies in the negative :—‘Because the nature of a complete void is denied,’ i. e. whatever is, is such that the nature of complete void is thrown away from it. The expression निरस्तातिशून्यात्मकत्वं gives prominence to ‘the condition of being (a complete void)’ (in अतिशून्यात्मकत्वं). Also because if the deep-sleep condition were to result in the nature of void, then the fact, that one gets up again from that deep-sleep condition, cannot be accounted for. There are sacred texts like the following which point out that the consciousness is not reduced to a void

*The words, लोका अलोका found in the extant editions of the collections of *Upanishads* are not found in the text of सिद्धान्त-विन्दु (Kumbhakonam Ed.). On the contrary, यज्ञावयवाः of the text is not found in the extant collections.

in the deep-sleep condition :—“Imperishable, lo, verily, is this soul and of indestructible quality ” (Br. Up. 4. 5. 14.) “ Verily, while he does not there see (with the eyes), he is verily seeing, though he does not see; for there is no cessation of the seeing of a seer, because of his imperishability (as a seer). It is not, however, a second thing, other than himself and separate, that he may see.” (Br. Up. 4. 3. 23).

Although this nature of a void had already been refuted once, yet the denial is mentioned again according to the maxim of fixing in a post (स्थूणानिखननन्याय).

(f) *Jiva's Identity with Brahman in Deep-sleep Condition.*

Or there is another interpretation of निरस्तातिशून्यत्वकत्वात्, *nirastam*=that which is beyond hunger, etc. *atis'anyu*=the secondless. These epithets refer to Brahman. In the deep-sleep condition, the Jiva becomes Brahmatmaka i. e. of the nature of Brahman. And the following S'ruti refers to the same (P. 153):—“ When a person here sleeps (स्वपिति), as it is called, then, my dear, he has reached Being ” (Chh. Up. 6. 8. 1.); “ As a man, when in the embrace of a beloved wife, knows nothing within or without, so this person, when in embrace of the intelligent Soul, knows nothing within or without (Br. Up. 4. 3. 21). Thus Brahman and Jiva are one and the same. Brahman is itself complete bliss and knowledge, omnipotent, omniscient, and the cause of the world. Therefore Jiva also is not bound in the world. This fact is proved here.

VIII DETAILED DISCUSSION OF BRAHMAN.

(a) *VARIOUS THEORIES AS REGARDS BRAHMAN.*

Introduction :—

Thus in the first three verses, the meaning of the term, 'Thou' in 'that thou art,' is Sense of the term 'That', in the Apothems. once for all settled and at the same time the various theories of the different schools are refuted. Now the sense of the term 'That' is to be similarly established. With that aim, we mention the various theories which will have to be disproved.

Query :—The identity of the Jiva with Brahman which the Vedanta lays down in the principal apothem cannot be maintained. To explain the same, Brahman is the cause of world ; it is spoken of by the term 'Sat'-Being and is mentioned in sentences like, 'O gentle student, this (world) was, in the beginning, only Being' (Chh. Up. 6, 2, 1,). Now, (1) the Sankhayas say that

the cause of the world is Matter
View of Sankhyas. or Nature which is unconscious.

(2) The followers of Pas'upati say that the cause is

Pas'upati only, that he is conscious,
View of Pas'upatas. different from the Jiva, (who also

is conscious) and that he is only the object of the devotional meditation of the Jiva. (3) The Pancharatrikas believe that the revered Vasudeva, the lord is the cause

of the universe. From him is born the Jiva, Sankarshana by name; From Him, Pradyumana, the mind; and from this last, Aniruddha, the ego. Thus Jiva

View of Pancha-
-ratrikas.

is an *effect* of Brahman, and Brahman i. e. Vasudeva the cause is absolutely identical with Jiva, the effect. (4-5). The followers of Jina and the Tridandins hold that Is'wara is subject to change and (at the same time)

View of Jainas and
Tridandins (Ramanu-
-jiyas).

eternal, he is omniscient and both different from, and identical with the Jiva (P. 154). (6) The followers of the Mimansa (of Jaimini)

say that 'There is no Brahman possessing omniscience (as the Vedantins believe). The whole Veda (including the Upanishads) is aimed at giving out a ritualistic sense, and therefore, Brahman is not the purport of the

View of Mimansakas

Veda. But the atoms, the Unseen—अज्ञेय, or the Jiva either of which may be taken as the cause of the world, is to be worshipped being regarded as the omniscient, just as the sacred text points out the worship of the Speech regarded as a cow. (7) The Tarkikas believe that there is God who has got eternal knowledge, etc, who is omniscient. Its existence can be

View of Naiyayikas
and Vais'eshikas.

inferred from the middle term viz, the effect and the form of the creation etc ; and he is quite different from the Jiva. (8) He is transitory and omniscient. This

View of Bauddhas.

is the belief of the followers of Sugata. (9) The followers of Patanjali believed that *Is'vara* is eternal knowledge itself, unconnected with the five kinds of sufferings,

right and wrong actions, their result and the impressions on the mind, left by the past births. He is reflected in the Light constituent of Pradhana, and so he is omniscient. He is quite different from the world-bound Soul. (10) Those who base their theory

on the Upanishads, hold that Brahman is Supreme Bliss and is Secondless. He is the real Jīva and coming to be distinguished as 'the omniscient' etc. on account of *Maya*, the same becomes both the essential and efficient cause of the world. (P. 155).

(b) *VERSE IV.*

Thus the exact significance of the term 'That' owing to different opinions among Philosophers is a point at issue. Therefore with a view to give a precise interpretation and to demonstrate the irrefutability of the Vedant view, the revered Acharya says :

Neither the Sankhya, nor the Pas'upata, nor the Pancharatra, nor the Jaina nor even the Mimansa and other doctrines (can be maintained), as the (cause of the world) is of unsullied nature because such is the distinctive direct apprehension. Therefore I am one, the remainder, auspicious, and absolute.

(c) *REFUTATION OF THEORIES.*

'And other doctrines' implies those which are not mentioned in the verse.

(1) The Unconscious principle (of the Sankhyas)
cannot be the essential cause of the
Refutation of the world for the following reasons :—
view of Sankhyas.

(a) The following S'ruti mentions that the creation
was preceded by an ideation (on
S'ruti. the part of the Creator and the
Pradhana can have no ideation): 'It bethought itself, Would
that I were many, Let me procreate myself.' (Chh.
Up. 6, 2, 3.)

(b) Another S'ruti styles the Creator himself as
the Jiva Atman :—'That divinity (i. e. Being) bethought
itself : Come ! Let me enter these three divinities (i. e.
heat, water and food) with this living Soul (Jivatman),
and separate out name and form.' (Chh. Up. 6, 3, 2).

(c) A S'ruti text asserts that by knowing the *one*,
the essential cause of the Universe, *All* is known. Now
by knowing Pradhana it is not possible to have the
knowledge of the Purushas who are not the effect of
Pradhana (and who must be included in ' All ') :—
' Through understanding of what, pray, does all this
world become understood, Sir?' (Mundaka Up. 1. 1. 3.
or Br. Up. 2, 4, 5).

(d) In the following S'ruti, the identity of the
world and the Jiva with the essential cause of the uni-
verse, is preached nine times; 'this whole world has
that as its soul. That is Reality (तत्त्वम्). That is
Atman (Soul). That art thou, S'vetaketu !' (Chh.
Up. 6, 8, 6).'

(e) There is one more S'ruti which says that the essential cause is the Atman : From this soul (Atman) verily, space (Akas'a) arose: etc. (Tai. Up. 2, 1, 1).

(f) If something,unconscious were the cause of the Universe, the wonderful order that we find in the Universe cannot be explained. (g) And in short, the Matter, the Intellect, and the rest are not valid. Therefore the Sankhya view is not correct. (P. 156).

(2-4) Similarly the view of the followers of Pas'upati and Jina and of the Pancharatras are wrong because they are opposed to S'ruti and reasoning.

Refutation of the views of Pas'upatas Jainas, Pancharatrikas.
(5) Nor is the view of Mimansa correct. They believe that the Upanishads are a part of the ritualistic texts which lay down injunctions; and therefore they mention no Brahman (but they only praise the performer of the rites by stating that He is Brahman.) But according to our view, it cannot be proved that the Upanishads are subordinate to the Brahmanas. The method mentioned in the section called "*Arthavada*" ('recommending precept' or 'an explanatory statement coupled with legends and illustrations'), cannot prove this subordination, because there is a great difference between the sentences like 'The Wind indeed, is the swiftest deity' (S'abara's Bhashys on Jai. Su. 1, 2, 7) and the Vedanta sentences. The sentences of the former type do not convey any singnificance with an independent aim, yet

we have to suppose that their meaning has got some aim, otherwise the importance of the text laying down the study of one's own Veda, viz, 'one should study one's Veda', cannot be realised. And the Text 'the Wind etc,' praises the deity who is to receive the offerings and thereby completely brings out that part of the injunction which (injunction) is not fully grasped as regards the process *(इतिकर्तव्यता) which is one of the three parts of the apprehension of the words contained in the injunction.

Both these facts viz, the want of complete sense in the sentences like "The Wind...", and the deficiency of the preceptory sentence necessitate the supposition that both these sentences have got one consistent meaning (P. 157) in accordance with the maxim of the person whose horse had run away and of the other whose chariot was burnt. This is the decision arrived at in the section of *Arthavada*. But the knowledge resulting from the Vedanta texts independently brings about the principal object of human life in the form of the 'attainment of the Highest Bliss and the end of all misery'. Thus, the Vedanta texts are *inexpectant* independently deterministic and so there is no possibility of their subordination to any other texts. But on the contrary the ordaining texts bring about the purification of the mind and thereby become subordinate to the Vedanta ones. Thus

*Apprehension of a sentence is two fold—that of the sense and that of the word. The latter again is three fold (1) That of object (साध्य) (2) that of instrumentality (साधन) (3) and that of the process (इतिकर्तव्यता).

we explain the difference between the Vedanta text and those like "Wind, indeed, is the swiftest deity." To conclude, the Vedanta texts reveal something which itself fulfils an aim, which cannot be contradicted, and which is not known from any other source; and thus they have independent authenticity; therefore there is Brahman, and so the theory of the Mimansakas cannot be proved.

(6) The views of the Tarkikas and others are contradicted by the following S'ruti texts: "That thou art,"

Refutation of the view of Tarkikas and others. (Chh. Up. 6. 8. 7): whoever thus knows 'I am Brahman,' becomes this All', (Br. Up. 1. 4. 10);

"This Soul is Brahman, the all-perceiving," (Br. Up. 2, 5, 19); "He who knows Brahman as the real, as knowledge, as the infinite...(obtains all desires)", (Tai. Up. 2. 1. 1); "In the beginning this world was just Being (सत्) = Brahman, one only, without a second" (Chh. Up. 6. 2. 2.); "There is on earth no diversity; (Br. Up. 4. 4. 19).

(7-8). The opinion that "The Jiva and Is'vara

Refutation of the *Bhedabheda* view of the Jainas and the Tridandins and that of the view of momentariness (of the Bauddhas).

are (partially) similar and (partially) dissimilar to each other and the view that "everything is momentary" are opposed to the following S'ruti texts (P. 162):— "He is like ether (akas'a) omnipresent and

eternal," (Gau. karika 3'3).

In this (fourth) verse the false character of all the (hostile) views was declared to be proved, and the reason thereof

Conclusion.

is that 'That one is of unsullied nature,' i. e. "It is consciousness itself, Unconditioned and Secondless," The cause for this is: "Because there is a distinctive direct apprehension." 'Distinctive' means 'Unlike the conditioned perceptions.' It means the direct apprehension which is the result of the apothems like 'That thou art' etc, and which is impartite (अखण्ड).

Thus it is proved that Brahman is omnipresent secondless, and it is itself the Highest Bliss and Consciousness.

IX. OMNIPRESENCE OF BRAHMAN.

QUERY.—Brahman is not omnipresent because (1) there is a S'ruti text mentioning the atomic nature of Brahman :
 Omnipresence questioned. "That which is the finest essence," (Chh. Up. 6-8-6); "More minute than the minute" (Katha. Up, 2.20; S've. Up, 3-20), and because (2) the S'ruti lays down the non-distinction between Brahman and Jiva who is stated to be atomic in the S'ruti: "A person of the measure of a thumb....." (Katha Up. 4. 12; 4. 13; 6. 17); "The lower (self) appears of the size of the point of an awl, (S've. Up. 5. 8).

(a) VERSE V. AND ITS EXPLANATION.

Determination :—S'ankaracharya says that the S'ruti texts like "Brahman, indeed, is this immortal. Brahman before, Brahman behind, to right and to left. Stretched forth below and above, Brahman, indeed, is this whole world, this widest extent," (Mundaka Up. 2. 2. 11); "This Brahman is without an earlier and

without a later, without an inside and without an outside," (Br. Up. 2. 5. 19), prove only the Absolute Brahman, and thus the Acharya emphasises what has been stated already:

VERSE V.

Brahman has no upper or lower, no inner or outer, or no middle or slanting (part). It has no eastern or western direction. Its nature is one and unbroken, because it is ether-pervading. Therefore I am one, the remainder, auspicious and absolute (P.163)

Explanation of the Verse

'Ether-prevading' means () 'omnipresent like the ether,' according to the Vedic text 'Atman is omnipresent like ether and eternal' Gau. Ka. 3. 3), or (2) 'more pervading than the ether', according to the S'ruti: 'Atman is greater than

Omnipresence of the ether akas'a) and bigger than Brahman established. the big' (Katha. Up. 2. 20, and S'Ve Up. 3. 20). Jiva is 'great' because we perceive the consciousness as pervading the whole body inspite of this, he is said to be as small as the tip of a spoke, by falsely ascribing to the Jiva the nature of its adjunct (or limitation), viz. the inner organ, which is atomic. We say this because of the S'ruti text: "But with only the qualities of intellect and of self, the lower (self) appears of the size of the point of an awl," (S'Ve. Up. 5. 8).

And Brahman is said to be atomic because it is intended to point out the subtle nature of Brahman. The sense of the remaining words of the verse is clear.

**X. Bliss of Brahman,
Or
Brahman the Essential Cause of
the World**

QUERY :—(1) Brahman is the cause of the world,
(2) There is identity between an
essential cause and its effects. Thus,
Brahman must be of the same
nature as the wonderful world, and therefore Brahman
must be of the nature of misery.
And you assert the identity of Jiva
with 'Brahman, so the Jiva shall
never attain the Final Beatitude.

Impossibility of Bra-
hman being Bliss.

(Vedanta, supposed
to be the 'doctrine of
real modification'
=*parinama*.)

DETERMINATION :—(1) Brahman is self-lumin-
ous and it is itself the Highest
Bliss, (2) Brahman is falsely said
to be the cause of the world, be-
cause Brahman is the substratum of the illusion in the
form of the whole world; (3) Bra-
hman (the substratum) has got no
connection with the world the
superimposed. Therefore, in Brahmin
is to be found no particle of evil, The Acharya says:—

Brahman establis-
hed as Bliss.

(Vedanta, establis-
hed to be the doctrine
of 'unreal modifica-
tion' = *Vivrata*).

(A) *VERSE VI.*

It is neither white, nor black, nor red, nor yellow,
nor thin, nor thick, nor short, nor long And it is not
an object of thought, because it is of the form of Light.
Therefore, I am one, the remainder, auspicious and
absolute(6)

Explanation of the Verse.

(1) 'Thin' = 'atomic' 'Thick' = great. Thus, by denying the fourfold measurement (P. 164) viz. smallness, bigness, shortness and length, the nature of a substance is denied to Brahman. That which can be thought of is 'a form of thought, i. e. 'an object of knowledge'. Thus all those categories, viz. substance, quality, action etc., asserted by the various theorists, are denied (to be Brahman). And the following S'ruti texts demonstrate that, of the nature of *Paramatman* all evil is denied. "It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long, not glowing (like fire)," (Br. Up. 5. 8. 8.); "What is soundless, touchless, formless, imperishable, likewise tasteless, constant, odorless," , (Katha. Up. 5. 15). (2) In order to definitely fix with the help of reasoning, the interpretation given in the S'ruti, the Acharya gives the following ground :—"Because it is of the form of Light". It is not an object of knowledge, because it is itself self-luminous knowledge. If it were an object of knowledge, it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that Brahman is unconscious like a pot etc. The Acharya means to base his doctrine on the S'ruti text like " This is not an object of knowledge, it is eternal" (Br. Up. 4. 4. 20).

XI. Validity of Vedantic Sacred Texts

QUERY:—Who is stated by you to *become Brahman* ? It may be either Brahman or non-Brahman. (1) The second alternative is not possible, because non-Brahman is unconscious and unreal. (2) The first alternative is impossible, because in that case, your statement would be

futile, as Brahman has by itself got the nature of Brahman. (3) If it be said that 'The Jiva may be stated to *become Brahman* in as much as his veil of Ignorance is removed by knowledge, although Jiva is by itself Brahman,' we say that it cannot be so. For, the removal of the Ignorance can be either 'different from Atman' or 'identical with Atman.' In the first case you will have to admit that there is a *duality*, and this would incidentally disprove (your) Brahman. It is said in the Varttika. "A thing which is not distinguished from any other thing (i. e. which it is impossible to distinguish from any other thing because there is no other thing) and which is itself attributeless as well as free from any qualified things (वर्मि) is said to be Brahman. If there were a second (real) thing, no object called Brahman can be asserted in philosophy" (Br. Up. Bh. Va 2.4.14. (P. 165)). In the second case, we have already pointed out the uselessness of such a statement. (Thus in either case, there can be nothing like the cessation of Ignorance)

DETERMINATION:—Here we ask: " Do you intend to assert the inefficiency of our statement, from the standpoint of reality or from that of practical use ?" The Acharya welcomes the former view (viz: Brahman is stated to become Brahman) and thus closes the discussion.

(A) VERSE VII

Neither the preceptor, nor the sacred scripture, nor the pupil, nor the precept, nor you, nor I, nor even this

visible world (is real). The knowledge of one's own nature, does not admit of any doubt. Therefore I am one remainder, auspicious, and absolute.

Explanation of the Verse

'The preceptor' = the tutor who gives moral advice. 'The sacred scriptures' = the instrument of imparting moral advice. 'The pupil' = the person to whom the moral advice is imparted. 'The precept' = the action of advising. 'You' = the hearer. 'I' = the speaker. (1) The sense is that this visible world, (established by all the means of proof, the direct apprehension and the rest) viz, the body, the organs, etc., which is (the cause of) all evil has no real existence. The second view (that non-Brahman is stated to become Brahman) is thus refuted :—'The knowledge of one's own nature does not admit of any doubt.' The sense is as follows: Although when the doubt, 'whether the cessation, of Ignorance is different from or identical with Atman, is raised, it is not possible to come to a decisive conclusion, yet the knowledge of one's own nature, the result of all discussions is apprehended. Nor should anybody doubt as to how this happens. Because of the destruction of all quality, no uncertainty can be allowed. In a matter of perception, there is no impropriety (P. 166). (3) So also S'ruti texts like the following, point out the condition of Brahman (to be achieved) through knowledge, by Jiva who is even at first nothing else but Brahman. (P. 167), and rejects all visible world as unreal :—"There is no dissolution, no creation, none in bondage, no pupilage, none desirous of liberation, none liberated; this is the absolute truth," (Gau. Ka. 2. 32).

“Verily, in the beginning this world was Brahman. It knew only itself: ‘I am Brahman.’ Therefore it became the All” (Br. Up. 1. 4. 10) (P. 168).

XII. Brahman not subject to three conditions.

QUERY:—How would you explain the accepted classification of the three conditions of the Atman—the waking, the dreaming, and the deep--sleep ones, because Atman being self-luminous consciousness itself is ever shining? Nor can it be said that this division is merely due to an illusion, because if it were so, you will have to admit that every condition is a dream, but this you cannot.

DETERMINATION:—You are wrong. The character of a dream (or an illusion) belongs by nature to all the three conditions (in as much as all the three are effects of Ignorance) yet from the practical point of view (1) there is the possibility of a mutual distinction, among them, caused by Ignorance itself, and (2) all the three are distinguished by their being different from real and unreal. So the classification can be explained. However, from the standpoint of reality, there is no such classification. Therefore says the Acharya:—

(A) VERSE VIII.

I have neither the waking, nor the dreaming, nor even the deep--sleep condition. I am neither the Vis’va,

nor the Taijasa, nor the Prajna, because all the three are effects of Ignorance. I am the fourth. Therefore I am one, the remainder, auspicious, and absolute. ... (8)

Explanation of the Verse.

In the verse a condition is mentioned earlier or later according as the order of the disappearance (of itself or of a foregoing one). To explain, in this theory of Vedanta, there are two view-points, the Knower and the Knowable. All categories conjectured by the (other) theorists come under these two.

Two view-points of Vedanta, the Knower and the Knowable.

XIII. The Knower.

or

Pure Consciousness and its Three Forms.

Out of these two view-points, the first, the Knower is Pure Consciousness (the Atman) who is (transcendentally) real and one. (1) Although his nature is the same always, *he is phenomenally three-fold* on account of the difference in his adjuncts, viz. the cosmic Consciousness (the Is'vara), the individual consciousness (the Jiva) and the witnessing Consciousness (the Sakshin). (2) Out of these, the first has for his adjunct that Ignorance which is the cause of the world; the second has for his adjunct the Ignorance conditioned by the inner organ and its impressions of past

1. Names of these forms.

2. Adjuncts of these forms.

lives, This has already been explained in details. (3) (a)

3. Various views
as regards the witness-
ing Consciousness.

In the theory which explains the
Cosmic Consciousness (i. e. Is'vara)
as the reflection (of Pure Con-
sciousness) in Ignorance, the reflec-
ted consciousness is called the Witnessing Consciousness.

(b) In the view which regards the reflected conscious-
ness as Is'vara, the Consciousness which persists in the
Jiva and the Is'vara just as the form of the face which
permeates the images which form the reflection and the
original, and which (Consciousness) co-exists in both and
conjoins both is called the Witnessing Consciousness
(P. 169). (c) In the opinion of Sures'varacharya
the Is'vara himself is the Witnessing Consciousness;
therefore the Knower is two fold only, viz, the Jiva and
the Is'vara.

(a) THE COSMIC CONSCIOUSNESS.

Now, the Cosmic Consciousness is again three-fold

Three forms of this
Consciousness, Vis-
hnu, Brahma, Rudra.

because he has three forms known as
Vishnu, *Brahma*, and *Rudra*, due to
the difference between the three
modes of the Ignorance which forms
the adjunct of the Cosmic Consciousness. Thus as

connected with the Sattva stage (the mode of plasticity)

Three adjuncts.

of Ignorance in its causal condition
he is called *Vishnu*, the Protector.

As conditioned by the Rajas stage (the mode of activity)

Hiranyagarbha,
distinguished from
Brahma.

of that same Ignorance he is called
Brahma, the Creator. Hiranyagar-
bha is associated with the five subtle
elements (which are the effects of

Ignorance) and not with any stage of Ignorance in its causal condition. Therefore he is not *Brahma*. However as the creator of the gross elements, sometimes the appellation 'Brahma' is secondarily applied to him. As associated with the Tamas stage (*the mode of obstruction*) of the Causal Ignorance, the Cosmic Consciousness is called *Rudra*, the Destroyer. Thus, it should be under-

stood that the male forms called
 Male and female forms of each of these three. Chaturbhuja, Chaturmukha, Panch-

amuka, etc. and also the female
 ones called S'ri, Bharati, Bhavani, etc. belong to one and
 the same. And also the innumerable incarnations, the

Incarnations of the
 Cosmic Conscious-
 ness.

Fish (P. 170), the Tortoise, and
 the rest, of the One have their
 manifestation by way of only Lila
 (the Divine Amusement) for the
 sake of granting grace to the devotees, "Brahman, Pure
 Consciousness, Secondless, Impartite and Formless, is
 believed to have forms for the (fulfilment of the) purposes
 of His devotees," (Ramapurvatapini Upanishad 1. 7).

(b) THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

Jiva also is three-fold. He is called by three
 different names, Vis'va, Taijasa, and

Three forms of this
 Consciousness, Vis'va,
 Taijasa, Prajna.

Prajna, on account of the minor
 difference in his limitations Thus,
 as conditioned by Ignorance, the
 inner organ, and the gross body, and as one who thinks

Their limiting ad-
 juncts.

himself conscious of the waking con-
 dition, Jiva is called *Vis'va*. When
 that same Jiva is unconscious of the

gross body, and is limited by only two of his adjuncts (viz, the inner organ and the (individual) Ignorance) and is conscious of the dreaming condition, he is called *Taijasa*. Devoid of the two limitations, the body and the inner organ and conditioned only by the (individual) Ignorance characterised by the impressions of the inner organ, and regarding himself conscious of the deep-sleep condition, he is called *Prajna*. * *

In the case of the three forms of Jiva, there are no such mutually exclusive limitations, and therefore there is no possibility of exclusive distinction of each form; yet owing to the minor distinction of the limitations, we can, for practical purposes, speak of the minor difference of the three forms, although they are really one.

Difference between the basis of the three forms of the Cosmic Consciousness and that of the Individual Consciousness.

(c) *THE WITNESSING CONSCIOUSNESS.*

The Witnessing Consciousness conjoins all, is present in all (forms of Consciousness), is only of one type and is called the *Turiyā*. In his case, although there is a difference in the adjuncts, e. g. according to some, the Witnessing Consciousness, has got for his limitation reflectedness (i. e. विमल); according to others, the Witnessing Consciousness is not different from the Cosmic Consci-

One form only of this consciousness, the Turiya.

Uniform character of the adjunct of Sakshin.

** In the case of the three forms of the Cosmic Consciousness, the mutual distinction is based upon adjuncts each of which solely belongs to one of the forms.

ousness, etc.; there are never different forms of the Sakshin, because his adjunct, whatever it may be, is always uniform.

XIV. The Knowable.

(A) PROCESS OF CREATION.

The second view-point, the Knowable is the visible world, consisting of Ignorance, what is pervaded by it (viz, the connection of Ignorance with Consciousness), and its effect. Although it has no real existence yet its practical existence, is admitted, and inasmuch as it is useful in the matter of worship, meditation etc, and therefore its consideration is not useless as the interpretation of the objects of dream.

The second view-point; what it includes.

Practical existence of the Knowable.

This view-point is also three-fold (P, 178) because it has three different forms viz. the Unevolved, the Unembodied, the Embodied.

Three forms of this view-point, the Unevolved, the Unembodied, the Embodied.

1. The Unevolved.

Out of these, what is known as the *Unevolved* consists of Ignorance with the reflection (of Consciousness) in it, which (Ignorance) is the germinating power (बीजशक्ति) of the Unembodied and the Embodied forms along with (1) the connection of Ignorance with Consciousness, (2) the distinction between Jiva and Is'vara, and (3) the reflection of Consciousness—which three are pervaded by Ignorance inasmuch as although they are not

produced by ignorance, they disappear along with the disappearance of Ignorance. These three are included in the Unevolved, because they are beginningless like (the unevolved) Ignorance. The view-point called the Unevolved is the adjunct of Is'vara.

This form of the Knowable, the adjunct to Cosmic Consciousness.

2. *The Unembodied.*

And that unevolved, though itself unconsciousness is illuminated by the reflection of Consciousness, which (reflection) is conscious, propelled by the actions of Jivas, in the form of impressions, coming down from a series of past births, and produces the five *great elements called the ether, the wind, the fire, the water, and the earth, each of which is characterised by sound, touch, form, taste, and smell respectively. Therein, the Ignorance which has assumed the form of the preceding element is the cause of the succeeding one and therefore the properties of the preceding element persist in a succeeding one (P. 179).

Self-transformation of the Unevolved into the five subtle elements.

(*Darkness, Time and Space.*)

Darkness is a positive entity. It is of the nature of 'covering,' is opposed to optical perception, and is destroyed by light. It suddenly springs out from Ignorance and vanishes with the velocity

Darkness, a positive entity, a creation of the Unevolved.

* महाभूतानि great elements. सूक्ष्ममहाभूतानि subtle (great) elements. स्थूलमहाभूतानि gross (great) elements.

of a lightning flash. This is the Vedanta view of darkness. This cannot be objected to by pointing out that 'the production of darkness is not mentioned in S'ruti in the Section of Creation,' because Non-mention of its creation in S'ruti. darkness (is not mentioned as it) is not the essential cause of the body which is the cause of the worldly existence.

The S'ruti does not mention space (दिक्) and time, because they are not valid. Moreover Akasa serves the practical purpose fulfilled by 'Dik' and there is a S'ruti text viz. 'the quarters, becoming hearing, entered the ears' (Ait. Up. 2, 4). Identity of Time and Space (Dik) with Ignorance and Akasa (space). Time is nothing else than Ignorance, because Ignorance alone is the 'substratum of all,' (which is the definition of 'time' given by those who believe that 'time' is an entity by itself) (P. 180).

The Unembodied (continued.)

These five great elements are subtle and not (as yet) quintuple (पञ्चकृत), therefore they are called 'the unembodied.' Each of these elements has two powers—those of action and knowledge. Each of these five elements has three modes, the Sattva, the Rajas, and the Tamas, because each element must have the modes of its cause viz. Ignorance. All these five together give rise to one pellucid substance of a wonderful form (चित्ररूप)* indeed, in which Sattva particles of each element are predomi-

* चित्ररूप is specially mentioned to bring out the diverse aspect of the स्वच्छद्रव्य which like the चित्ररूप is constituted by various components.

nant and which is characterised by the two powers of knowledge and action. The portion of this substance

Creation of the inner organ (i. e. Buddhi—reason and Manas—mind) and of the vital air, due to the joint operation of five elements.

in which the power of knowledge is predominant is called the inner organ. That organ is given two appellations, Reason and Mind. That portion in which the power of action is predominant is called 'the

vital air of life'. It is five-fold :—the *Prana* (the vital air which has its seat in the lungs,) the *Apana* (that which goes downwards and out at the anus), the *Vyana* (the one which is diffused through the whole body), *Udana* (the one which rises up the throat and enters into the head), and the *Samana* (the one which has its seat in the cavity of the navel and is essential to digestion. In the same way (i. e. by the predominance of one of the two powers of knowledge and action), from each element taken singly, one pair of organs is

Creation of five pairs of organs, each consisting of one organ of knowledge and one of action, due to the several operations of each element.

produced. Thus, from the Ether, rise the ear and the organ of speech; from the Air, the skin and the hands; from the Fire, the eyes and the feet; from the Water, the tongue and the arms; and from the

Earth, the nose and the organ of generation. (Here some hold the view that

Creation of organ of speech and the feet from the Ether and the Fire, (not from the Fire and the Ether) respectively.

'the organ of speech arises from the Fire (and not from the Ether) because of the S'ruti text: 'the organ of speech is produced from the Fire' (Chh. Up. 6, 5, 4); and that the feet arise from the Ether (and not from the Fire)'. But our conjec-

ture seems to be correct, (1) because as the organs that manifest sound, the ear and the organ of speech should both be the effect of one and the same element viz. the Ether ; and (2) because we find that one gets rid of an optical disease by applying medicine to the feet (P. 181) The feet also. should be supposed to be produced from the Fire as is the eye. (3) The S'ruti which mentions the organ of speech as an effect of the fire, should be explained to mean that the organ of speech is helped by the fire (i. e. the organ of speech is improved by taking medical preparations of gold which is an effect of the fire). This interpretation of the S'ruti is not unusual. It has a parallel example in the interpretation of the S'ruti text (Chh. Up. 6, 5, 4,) which states Mind, the effect of the five elements, to be produced from the Earth only. Mind as the receiver of the properties of the five elements, must be inherently possessing those properties and therefore it must be formed of all the five elements. But all this discussion is only by the way).

The deities also that rule over these organs must possess both the powers of knowledge and action but in each of them one kind of powers is predominant. They are *Dik* and Fire, Wind and Indra, the Sun and Vishnu, Varuna and Mitra, the two As'wins and Prajapati. Herein the aggregate power of knowledge is the inner organ and that of action is the vital air. *

* i. e. the inner organ co-operates with all the organs of sense and the vital air, with all the organs of action, as the रत्नावलि explains.

The ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, and the

Organs of knowledge helped by the inner organ, those of action by the vital air. nose are the five organs of sense and have the power to perceive sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. The skin and

the eye perceive even the substance which is the

substratum of the qualities (touch and form) perceived by these organs. Functions of these organs.

The ear goes out (i. e. extends from the body) before perceiving the sound, just as the eye (goes out before perceiving the form). (P. 182). The organ of speech (*Vak*), the hands, the feet, the anus and the organ of generation are the five organs of action and they perform the functions of speech, grasp, gait, giving out and causing delight. All these

Creation of the (Microcosmic) subtle body-

body (in the macrocosm) is called Hiranyagarbha, when we specially speak of its power of knowledge, and Sutra

Macrocosmic subtle body.

The Unembodied and the Unevolved adjuncts to the Jiva and Is'vara, respectively.

forms, is the causal Ignorance).

seventeen (five organs of sense, five organs of action, five vital airs, Reason and Mind) collectively constitute 'the subtle body'. The subtle

when we refer to its power of action. This unembodied form of the second view-point, the Knowable, in the macrocosm or microcosm, forms the limiting

adjunct of the Jiva (and not of Is'vara) because it is an ' effect ' (while Is'vara with his adjuncts is the creator of the effect and as such his adjunct, in all his three

3 *The Embodied.*

These elements in that subtle condition cannot formulate in Jiva the experience of the fruit of his actions (in past births).
 Theory of quintuplication and Creation of the five gross elements. as long as the body which is the seat of experience and the objects of sense which are to be experienced are not produced. Therefore, being prompted by the actions of the Jiva, they become quintuple in order to attain grossness (and thus to produce the body and the objects). The process by which each element becomes fivefold is as follows (P. 183):—

Each of the five elements is first of all divided into two halves. One out of these two is again divided into four (i. e. each division is one-eighth and there are four such divisions). Each of these four one-eighths passes out from the element to which it naturally belongs and enters the one-half of each of the *other* four elements. Thus each gross element is a mixture, being five-fold, consisting of one half of itself and one-eighth of each of the other four elements. These (gross) elements are called the Ether, etc, because of the preponderance of that particular element in it, although it is not pure Ether etc.

(Theory of Triplication).

(Here, Vachaspati Mis'ra, and the author of Kal-pataru and others think that the
 its assertion. Ether and the Wind are independent
 pure elements, and the other three elements are each

tripartite i. e. each of them consists of one-half of itself and one-fourth of each of the other two. These theorists base their view on (1) the S'ruti text, 'Let me make each of these three elements three-fold' (Chh. Up. 6,3 3), (2) On the Vedanta Sutra II, 4,21. viz., 'Because of the mention of him making each (element) three-fold' and (3) on their conviction according to which only three elements are inter-mixed.

This theory is to be refuted by the method in the section of the Vedanta Aphorisms
 Its refutation. referring to (the production of) the

Ether (Br. Su. II. 3. 6). To explain the same—(1) because in Taittiriya Upanishad (2, 1, 1) we are told, 'from this soul (Atman), verily, space, (Akas'a) arose and from space, wind was produced, etc; and because in the Chh. Up. 6. 2. 3-4. we read of the production of only three elements, viz, the Fire, the Water and the Earth; we have to add to these latter, the other two viz. the Ether and the Wind. Why these two are added can be accounted for on the following grounds:—

(1) Those who hold the theory of *Trivritkarana* say that the Fire is the *first* element, according to the Chh. Up. (and that there are only three elements, Fire, Water and Earth) i. e. they give precedence to the attribute of 'being the first among elements,' residing in Fire according to the Chh. Up. Now 'being the first among elements,' is an attribute of an element,) while Ether and Wind (mentioned in the Taittiriya Upanishad, with the other three elements) are elements. The attribute of an element is less important than an ele-

ment. Therefore the fact that according to the Chh. Up. the Fire receives the attribute of being the first element is of less importance when we consider that the Ether and the Wind are elements.* (2) In the Chh. Up. 6. 1. 1, it is stated 'by knowing the *one* (Brahman) one knows *all*.' Therefore we must necessarily admit that the Ether and the Wind which are unconscious are the effects of Brahman. † (P. 184). (3) The statement of the Chh. Upanishad that each element was made tripartite can be explained in consistency with the theory of Panchikarana thus :—

Each (gross) element is a mixture of five elements, the statement in the Chh. Up. is an explanatory one of what is already mentioned elsewhere (i e. in the Taittiriaka Upanishad), explaining the thing by divisions of the thing. (4) The opinion that the theory of *only* the three-fold formation of the element is mentioned in the Chh. Up. requires two statements i. e. this opinion is subject to the fault called 'a double assertion' (वाक्यभेद) viz. (a) 'Let me make each element three-fold and (b) Let me make it five-fold.' (5) The aphorism viz. 'because of the mention of him making each element tripartite,' cannot set aside the fact that each element is five-

* which if admitted as elements would force us to give up the idea that the Fire has the attribute of 'being the first element,' because the Ether and the Wind being more subtle than the Fire etc, will have to be placed prior to the Fire while considering the order of the production of these elements from Avidya.

† Because by knowing the one we can know all, only if the '*one*' is the 'cause' and '*all*' the effect.

fold, which is based upon reasoning, because that aphorism is an explanatory statement, (6) The conviction that a gross element is a mixture (of all the five elements) is equally strong in the case of all elements, if we judge from the gross elements as we find them in the body etc. (P. 185). (7) And finally the commentator S'ri Shankaracharya has stated† that the five great elements are each five-fold. Therefore we should better give up the consideration of what is non-Atman. We have simply suggested the line of thought for refuting the *trivritkarana* theory.

3. The Embodied (contd.)

These five gross elements each of which is five-fold and which are called the embodied form of *Dris'ya*, having joined together, form the seat of the organs which is the abode of experience and which is their effect. This same is called the body. Now, the body in which *Sattva* (the mode of purity) is predominant is the body of a God.

The one, with *Rajas*, (the mode of passion) dominating, is the body of a human being. That in which *Tamas* (the mode of illusion) prevails over the other two, is the body for all beginning with lower animals and ending with the immovable (trees etc). This body may have, it is not impossible sometimes, the five elements in an unequal proportion, although it is formed of all of them. A parallel instance is furnished by विटल which constitutes one लव even when the constituent colours

Three types of gross bodies.

The one, with *Rajas*, (the mode of passion) dominating, is the body of a human being. That in which *Tamas* (the mode of illusion) prevails over the other two, is the body for all beginning with lower animals and ending with the immovable (trees etc). This body may have, it is not impossible sometimes, the five elements in an unequal proportion, although it is formed of all of them. A parallel instance is furnished by विटल which constitutes one लव even when the constituent colours

† In his 'Panchikarana.'

are mixed without proportion. Thus the विद्वयः viz. the regions also are produced from all the five elements and are called the fourteen worlds. According as the

Creation of the fourteen regions.

regions are the uppermost, the middle and the lowest, the modes of purity, passion, and illusion prevail

in them. All this is called 'the egg of Brahman' the

Virat, and the Embodied (P. 186).

Macrocosmic gross body.

This is the process of creation mentioned in the Upanishads.

(b) PROCESS OF REABSORPTION.

(1) *Dissolution of the Embodied.*

The destruction takes place in a reverse order.

The every-day reabsorption.

Thus, what is called the *Virat* including the five quintuple elements and their effects disappear in their

source, which is called *Hiranyagarbha*, the Unembodied, which consists of the five elements which are not five-fold. This dissolution takes place by the dissolution of each (gross) element, the Earth, etc singly. This merging is the one which occurs daily.

(2.) *Dissolution of the Unembodied.*

And the *Unembodied form gets immersed into its source, the Unevolved, which is the

The reabsorption into Prakriti.

adjunct of *Is'vara*. But this Unevolved is beginningless and has no

origin and therefore does not dissolve itself; because

* The Unembodied is both cause and effect, but the Unevolved is only a cause.

dissolution means that the dissolved is latent in a subtle form in its origin. This (dissolution of the Unembodied into the Unevolved) is called the reabsorption into Prakriti.

(3.) *Absolute Destruction.*

The absolute destruction resulting from the realization of Brahman is the pure annihilation; and this begins with the destruction of the cause, because the final destruction of the effect is posterior to the destruction of the cause (P. 187).

(c) *CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,
PHENOMENAL.*

All this, the creation, the destruction, etc. of the world (of the waking condition) is unreal like that of the dreaming world, but it enables us to carry on our practical dealings because its impression is very indelible on us. Therefore, though unreal, it is not non-existent. These things are clearly mentioned in the books (e. g. in the commentary of S'ankara) in the same way as here.

XV. Classification of Three Conditions:

Waking, Dreaming and Deep-Sleep.

Under such circumstances, we describe the divisions of the conditions, waking, etc.

(a) *WAKING CONDITION.*

The waking condition is the one in which the (direct) apprehension of the various objects is simultaneous with

the functioning of the organs. Therein the Embodied, called Virat, the object, to which a phenomenal existence belongs, because it can be dealt with, with the six means of proof, like that of direct perception and the rest, is experienced by the Jiva called *Vis'va*.

Vis'va, the Jiva conscious of that condition.

He is so called either because he has *entered* the body, organs, etc, or because he *pervades* the body, etc.

It is recorded (Dhatupatha (6) 1425 and (3) 1095) that the root '*vis*' means to enter or to pervade. (P. 188) Here although the *Vis'va* can have the knowledge of Unembodied and the Unevolved, by such means of proof as that of inference etc, yet all that has got practical existence, can be known by the *Vis'va* only. On account of this invariable condition, and also because the *Vis'va* is conscious of the gross body, his presence is not coeval with any other condition (than the waking one.)

The silver perceived in a pearl-shell has not got any practical existence, because its

Applicability of the definition of the waking condition to the perception of shell-silver.

knowledge is not epistemologically true. In spite of this, that knowledge can be explained as belonging to the waking condition of the Jiva,

because it co-exists with the operation of the organ (e. g. the eye used in seeing the mother-o-pearl without which there can be no knowledge of the seeming silver).

The process of the rise of knowledge (in the waking condition) is already described

Process of knowledge in this condition.

above,

(b) *DREAMING CONDITION.*

(I.) *General Remarks.*

Thus when the action (of the Jiva), which gave rise to the experience during the waking condition, ends, and the action which causes the experience in the dreaming one arises; when the idea that the gross body belongs to one's self is removed by the working of the Dark mode of mind called 'sleep,' and finally when all the organs retard inasmuch as they stop their working because of the absence of the support of their deities,

the *Vis'va* also is said to be 'absorbed'. Then begins the dreaming condition. There, in the dream, the knowledge of things is acquired without the functioning of the organs and is due to the previous impressions left on the mind.

(2.) *Essential Cause of Objects of Dream and means of their knowledge.*

1. *Statement of two Theories.*

Some believe that it is the mind itself, which is the essential cause of the illusory forms of elephant, horse, and other objects, and that the means of their knowledge is a modification of Ignorance.

Others hold that the objects of dream are the products of Ignorance itself just as the silver-in-the-shell, and the means of their knowledge is a *vritti* of Ignorance.

II. Demonstration of Theory II.

Which of the two views is the more correct one? (P. 189). Evidently the latter, because wherever there is an illusory object and illusory knowledge, their essential cause is always admitted to be Ignorance. And the fact that in some texts these (object and knowledge) are said to be the transformation of mind is due to the impressions left on mind which are taken to be the efficient cause.

QUERY:—If in a dream, mind is not admitted to be the essential cause of the objects, then it may possibly be the Atman and the perceiver (of these objects); and in that case, its self-luminous nature, which you assert, would be contradicted.

DETERMINATION:—It is not so. In a dream, mind is not the knower because of the absence, then, of the operation of the external organs, and it is an invariable rule that mind knows things only through their agency. (The knower) in a dream is not *Pramātri* though the inner organ is then present, because there is an invariable rule that Jiva becomes a *Pramatri* only when he is characterised by the inner organ when operating (सवृत्तिकान्तःकरणावच्छिन्न).

(3.) *Substratum of Objects of Dream.*

I. Statement of Two Theories.

What is the substratum of the illusory things of Theory I. Jiva. con- a dream ? Some say it is Jiva, conditioned by the mind. conditioned by the mind.

Others hold that it is Brahman limited by Primal Ignorance. Which is the more correct view ? ¶ Both are equally correct, because they are based upon different lines of argument.

Theory II. Brahman limited by Primal Ignorance.

II. Demonstration of Theory I.

(Cessation of Dream meaning its Destruction.)

The first view is explained and maintained thus :—

(1) The cessation of the illusion of a dream by the knowledge in the waking condition is admitted (by both these theorists), and an illusion ceases only by the knowledge of its substratum; (and the illusion of a dream terminates on the knowledge of its substratum, therefore the knowledge in the waking condition must be the knowledge of the substratum of the illusion of a dream). If this substratum is Brahman, it is impossible that one can have its knowledge during the worldly existence (which comprises within its range the waking condition), and if one can have the knowledge of Brahman, all duality must end and therefore there would be no scope for the cessation of a dream which cessation is brought about by the knowledge in the waking condition, (because the consciousness of the cessation of a dream by the knowledge in the waking condition is also a phase of duality).

(2) There is also a S'ruti text, mentioning the Possibility of Jiva being the substratum. *Kartritva* of Jiva of the dream-objects viz. "There are no tanks there, no lotus-pools, no streams.

¶ A third theory is mentioned on P. 193.

But he projects from himself tanks, lotus-pools, streams. For he is a creator." (Br. Up. 4. 3. 10). (P. 190).

(3) (If Brahman as conditioned by the primal Ignorance is the substratum of a dream),
 No possibility of then there would arise an undesirable occasion of all being subject to the illusion of a common dream, just as they are, to the Ether and the rest of the visible world (of which Brahman is the substratum).
 Therefore, Brahman as conditioned by Ignorance cannot be the substratum.

(4) *QUERY* :—Because Jiva as being uncovered (i. e. the existence of 'I' is never questioned by anybody) is always self-manifest, how can he become the substratum ?*

DETERMINATION :—It is not so. We believe that in the dreaming condition there exists a particular condition of Ignorance which is conducive to the illusion of a dream and preventive of the knowledge of the practically existing aggregate, and that in that condition the knowledge of another aggregate which is empirical props up its head—the knowledge of the form of " I am a man, etc," just as there arises the knowledge of another bed in that dream condition, expressed in the cognition of the dreaming man: " I am lying in a bed;" and the means of knowledge is equally absent in both the cognitions, (viz. " I am a man " and " I am lying in a bed"—both of the dreaming man).

* A thing, e. g. a rope can become the substratum of the illusory thing, e. g. a serpent, only when the thing presents its metamorphosis to the eye.

(5) *QUERY* :—You say that the knowledge of the practical aggregate viz. “I am a man etc,” removes the illusion of the dreaming state.” We reply it cannot do so, because that knowledge is not produced by any means of proof (e. g. the eye). If your supposition is resorted

to because of the impossibility of explaining otherwise the rise of the other condition (viz. the waking one), then we say that “you can as well suppose that the knowledge which puts an end to the dream exists in the deep-sleep condition which arises when there is no dreaming condition.” But this supposition is disagreeable to you (P. 191), because in that case the deep-sleep condition will be nothing else than the waking one, (as both the deep-sleep and the waking conditions fulfil the same function viz, that of putting an end to the dreaming condition).

Waking condition
(not the deep-sleep
one) destroying dre-
aming one.

as well suppose that the knowledge which puts an end to the dream exists in the deep-sleep condition which arises when there is no dreaming condition.” But this supposition is disagreeable to you (P. 191), because in that case the deep-sleep condition will be nothing else than the waking one, (as both the deep-sleep and the waking conditions fulfil the same function viz, that of putting an end to the dreaming condition).

DETERMINATION :—Well; but the undesirable conclusion arrived at by you is impossible because (1) the ignorance of the dreaming condition accompanied by the absorption of the inner organ is tantamount to the nature of the deep-sleep condition; (2) It is only in the waking condition that we have the direct perception viz. “falsely, indeed, the dream arose,” and (3) the knowledge, “I am a man,” consists of two cognitions, viz, “I” and “Being a man”, out of these, the cognition ‘I’ is true, although it is not produced by any means of proof (e. g. the eye) and the cognition referring to the body etc, which is based upon such a means of proof is also true; therefore the wholesale cognition, “I am a

man" is true: therefore the fact that the knowledge of the waking condition contradicts the ignorance of the dreaming one is established by direct perception. The specific * ignorance of the dream does not disappear without the *Vritti* of the inner organ caused by a means of the proof (e. g. the eye).

(6) That the *Sakshin* is not the cause of the cessation of the ignorance of the dreaming condition is proved by the fact that the *Sakshin* is one who testifies to Ignorance, as being an attribute of one who has Ignorance, in the statement "I am ignorant."

(7) Because we suppose that there are as many states of ignorance as there are states of knowledge, the repetition of the illusion of dream-condition is not inexplicable although once that state of Ignorance might have been destroyed by the knowledge of the waking condition, just as the error of shell-silver recurs although once it has been destroyed by the knowledge of the shell. In this way there is no inconsistency in the alternative theory, viz. the Jiva himself is the substratum (of the illusion of dream).

III. *Demonstration of Theory II.*

(Cessation of dream, meaning its Suppression).

Now let us consider the other theory according to which Brahman is that substratum. In this theory it is asserted that the ignorance of the dream condition

*The specific ignorance refers to the objects e. g. the serpent seen in the dream.

ends only after the knowledge of Brahman, the substratum of that illusion, is attained. (1) In the daily life, the illusion of dreaming condition is not destroyed, but is overpowered (and thus it continues to exist in a latent condition) by the illusion of the waking condition.

(2) And this can be illustrated by the example in which the rope is the substratum, first, of the illusory serpent, and then, of the seeming stick (because it is then seen that there is no movement in what was thought to be a serpent), and in

Parallel instance. which the first illusion is overpowered by the second although the (real) substratum i. e. the rope is not yet perceived.

When Brahman which corresponds to the rope is known, the illusion of the different conditions i. e. the Ignorance (which is only one in this theory) will be destroyed. Thus, this theory also is not defective.

(3) The fact that the nature of the illusion of dream is not the same with all dream is not the same with all Jivas (although the substratum is the same in the dreams of all Jivas) is due to the fact that the impressions left on the minds of the Jivas—which form the instrumental cause in the illusion of the dream—are not the same with all Jivas.

IV. Theory III.

There is a third view, which, though not very important, may be noted here. According to this view the Divine Consciousness (ब्रह्मचैतन्य) limited by the mind is the substratum of the

Divine Consciousness limited by mind: the substratum.

objects of the dream. Although this Consciousness limited by the mind is ever-shining, yet as we admit that a particular ignorance covers that Consciousness (and then it becomes the substratum of the objects of that dream), there is no flaw in this view also. It is simply due to this fact that the sacred scriptures sometimes make mention of this view. (P 193).

V. Elaborate Explanation of Theories I & II.

QUERIES : (1) Query (opposed to the first view :-

In the case of the theory which regards the Jiva limited by the mind, as the substratum, the elephant should be perceived as being in the same case-relation as the ego (the substratum), and should be expressed by the form 'I am an elephant,' just as the perception of

Further discussion of theory I. Possibility of Jiva being the substratum.	silver which is in the same case-relation as the shell (the substratum) and which has the form " this is silver." It cannot be expressed by the form " this is an elephant."
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(2) Query (opposed to the second view) :—

In the case of the view which regards Brahman as the substratum, the perception of

Further discussion of theory II—Possibility of Brahman being the substratum.	an elephant should be of the form "an elephant exists," and not "this is an elephant."
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In both the theories, the external object which is denoted by the demonstrative epithet "this" is equally absent.*

Because neither the ego which is expressed always by "I" can be expressed by "this" nor Brahman which is invisible be expressed by "This"

DETERMINATION.—The ego, just like the sheh,

is the determining characteristic of the substratum and therefore there is no room for the "supposed" form of the illusion viz. "I am an elephant" just as for the form, "the shell is silver." There are two reasons for this:—
 (1) The cognition "I am" is opposed to the illusion, just as the cognition "this is shell" and (2) we believe that only (one portion of the cognition) viz. the demonstrative epithet "this" which is not antagonistic to the illusion, persists in the form, "this is silver."

But in the case of the objects of dream, the cognition "this" arises by way of illusion just as does the cognition "elephant." When the knowledge which is made up of both these cognitions, viz. "this is an elephant" is contradicted by the waking condition and therefore disappears (i. e. is destroyed or overpowered), the Consciousness which forms the substratum (viz. the Jiva according to the first view and Brahman according to the second) remains uncontradicted. And thus there is no possibility for the occasion of the theory of void.

Or rather, we may believe that even the cognition "this," in "this is silver," which is perceived in the waking condition, is of seeming existence and is quite different from the cognition "this," in "this is a shell." It is said in the Sankshepas'ariraka (1.36) that "whatever appears in the illusion has seeming existence (or is super-imposed)."

Even if we stick to our first view expressed above viz, that the cognition "this" (in "this is silver"), which is manifest in the illusion, belongs to the shell, the real (or practical) existence of the (cognition) "this," is not an essential requisite of the illusion; but what is necessarily required is that the substratum (of silver) should be real. And the substratum in that case is the unknown 'Consciousness conditioned by the idea of shell.' Similarly here also the Witnessing Consciousness does exist as the substratum and this has been established above. Therefore there is no weak point in both these theories.

(I. General Remarks contd.)

Here the Jiva as the experiencer of the objects seen in the dreaming condition is called *Taijasa*, the Jiva conscious of this condition. *Taijasa* (the billious) because he has an excess of bile called *Pitta* (the Luminous) because he is radiant even in the absence of the light of the sun, etc.

(c) DEEP-SLEEP CONDITION.

1. General Remarks.

Thus, when the action which causes both the waking and the dreaming conditions is exhausted and when the inner organ distinguished by the power of knowledge, together with its impressions exists as the causal body (*कारण*) there appears the condition of deep-sleep, which is the resting place of the Jiva who is exhausted on account of his experience of both these conditions. *Sushupti* is the perception of only the causal body in its quiescence, in the from of " I know nothing. " In that

condition, the knowledge of the objects of experience of the other two conditions, does not exist, yet we believe that there are, then, three modifications of Ignorance (P. 194), one of the form of the Witnessing Soul, the other of the form of happiness, and the third of that of the Ignorance of that condition. There is no particularised* *Vritti*, because of the absence of ego and also because otherwise there would arise the undesirable consequence of the non-existence of deep-sleep condition.

Because in the *Sushupti* there are the modifications of Ignorance while they are absent in the condition of the Universal Destruction, both these conditions do not overlap each other (P. 195), while there is no reason for supposing that the modifications of Ignorance exists in the *Pralaya* condition, they must be supposed to exist in the *Sushupti* condition, because of the remembrance of one who has got up after having slept—the remembrance of the form of “I slept happily and knew nothing.” A remembrance cannot be explained in the absence of a previous experience, (and an experience of the *Sushupti* cannot be explained in the absence of the modifications of Ignorance in that condition).

2. “I slept happily and knew nothing”— a remembrance.

1. *QUERY*:—This knowledge is not a remembrance. There are two cognitions one of “happiness” (सुखम्) and the other of “Ignorance” (न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्).

Absence of particularisation in this remembrance.

* A particularised *Vritti* e.g. “I do not know a pot etc.”

But these cognitions do not mention their “demonstrative peculiarity” (i. e. we are not told what kind of happiness was experienced or what object was not known in the deep-sleep).

DETERMINATION:—No, because the absence of this *peculiarity* in the remembrance can be explained by the fact that this remembrance is not brought about by the experience arising at the time of the Jiva's contact with the mind.

2. Moreover, remembrance is not invariably accompanied by the re-production of the particular distinction of the object remembered even though the experience includes that particular distinction.*

3. “I slept etc” cannot be explained as an experience of the waking condition (P. 196); (because it is no experience at all).

4. It cannot be an inference because if the whole cognition. “I slept happily and knew nothing”, be put in a ‡ Sanskrit syllogistic form, there would be found two fallacies viz. (1) the want of ‘a middle term’

* A definite or determinate remembrance is possible if there is a similar experience- says the 'Ratnavali.

‡ e. g. सुषुप्तिकालस्य आत्मा ज्ञानाद्यभाववान् ।

ज्ञानादिसामग्रीरहितत्वात् । प्रलयकालस्थात्मवत् ।

Here ज्ञानादिसामग्रीरहितत्व is a middle term, as 'आत्मा' in *Sushupti* has got a *Vritti* of Ignorance, this middle term will not do, nor can any other middle term be possibly found to prove the condition. Again just as अरविन्दत्व cannot be found in गगनारविन्द, similarly ज्ञानादिसामग्रीरहितत्व can never be found in आत्मा, because it is impossible to have सुषुप्तिकालस्य आत्मा in the waking condition as it is to find गगनारविन्दम्.

and (2) the presence of a 'cause' the subject of which is devoid of the distinctive character of the supposed *paksha* (i. e. "presence of a non-existent subject").

5. The ego is experienced only at the time of rising from sleep, while he being absorbed at the time of the deep-sleep. Identity of the subject of experience and that of remembrance. condition is not experienced in that condition. Therefore the ego cannot be the subject of remembrance. But "I slept" can be a remembrance in the following way :—

When the mirror is the substratum of the reflection of the face (and also that of the red colour of the *Japa* flower), there arises a false perception viz. "the face is red", on account of the false attribution of the red colour to the face. In a like manner, the Witnessing Consciousness is the substratum of the *absorbed ego and also that of the remembrance. Thus because there is a common substratum, there arises a perception "I slept etc." This perception is not caused by the ego being the substratum of "Sound sleep" (because the ego is never such a substratum), unlike the perception in the waking condition "I am happy", where 'I' is the substratum of happiness.

The Witnessing Consciousness is invariably the substratum of remembrance, doubt, and false knowledge; while the ego is always the substratum of all knowledge caused by a means of proof (e. g. the eye, etc.). The Witnessing Consciousness, invariably the substratum of all knowledge except right experience.

* This absorbed ego may be compared with the reflection of the face and the ego in "I slept etc" i. e. the ego of the waking condition with the face.

distinguishing character of the operation of the ego is that it is right knowledge while all erroneous knowledge is distinguished by its origination from Ignorance (and Ignorance is the adjunct of the Witnessing Consciousness). (P. 197.) Because of this invariable rule, the scholars of the Vedanta philosophy opine that "indirect illusion"* caused by the words of an unreliable person, is only a modification of Ignorance and not that of the inner organ, because although the materials that cause the modification of the inner organ were possibly present here, in this case the inherent power of the inner organ has not acted as an impediment to the absence of rightness of knowledge, as it does if it at all acts.

‘ DIGRESSION-(1) ADHYASA REQUIRED
IN UPASANA, (2) TARKA, AND (3)
VIDHI IN VEDANTA: MENTAL
ACTIONS.)

(1) The S'ruti text: " One should meditate on *Nama* as Brahman " (Chh. Up. 7
Adhyasa of Brah- 1, 5.), requires the attribution of
man on *Nama*, etc. the idea of Brahman to *Nama*. (But
it cannot be argued that this attribution is a § false

* Indirect illusion (परोक्षभ्रम) i. e. the belief in the report of an unreliable person asking us to go and fetch the ten mangoes lying on the shore of a river, where we go and find no trace of these objects. The direct illusion (साक्षात्कारिभ्रम) is the illusion of shell-silver.

§ A false knowledge whereof Ignorance or Sakshin having Ignorance for its adjunct is not the substratum, but the *Īva* by the inner organ, and therefore the statement in 5 above is not invariably true.

knowledge like that of shell-silver) based upon a modification of the mind ", because it is no knowledge at all, but it is only an operation of the mind distinct from knowledge right or wrong, because it depends upon the will of the meditator, just like the desire of sensual enjoyment ; (while the false attribution taking place in the illusory perception of silver in the shell is independent of the will of the perceiver). It is said (S'a. Bh. on Br. Su. I, 1, 4.) :—" Hence, as the attribution of Brahman to *Nama* is made by scriptural injunction, it is a mental action, and no knowledge (the result of that action) ".

(2) The above discussion explains how a *reductio ad absurdum* is only a modification of the mind. A *Tarka* or false assumption which is the deduction as regards the existence of a comprehensive substance by the wrong hypothesis of a limited one, is dependent on our will and so, it is different from knowledge right or wrong.

(3) Because *Tarka* is a *Vritti* of the mind, in the careful perusal of the Vedant text, which requires "hearing" and which is accompanied by thinking and repeated meditation, the admission of the injunction viz. ' It should be heard, thought of, and contemplated upon ' (Br. Up. 2. 4. 5 or 4. 5. 6), is explicable (P. 198), because that injunction is nothing else than a *reductio ad absurdum* in the form of four-fold * non-existence of the

* Ratnavali explains अन्वय, as कल्पिततादात्म्य and व्यतिरेक as अभाव, and अन्वयव्यतिरेकः as अन्वयेनैवव्यतिरेकः, the non-existence of an object based upon the very fact that the object exists in a substratum by the connection of false identity with the substratum.

world based upon its connection of false identity (with its substratum. Brahman). The non-existence ‡ of the

Four main reductions to absurdity in Vedānta. pot, piece of cloth and other objects of perception, based upon their connection of false identity with (1) the

pereceiving* Consciousness (i. e. Jiva); The non-existence of the silver perceived in the shell and such other things that are known by (2) the Witnessing Consciousness, based upon their connection of false identity with the Witnessing Consciousness ; the non-existence of the world distinguished by being subject to creation and destruction, based upon its connection of false identity with (3) the Is'vara or Cosmic Consciousness who is devoid of that distinction ; the non-existence of the world that causes misery, based upon its connection of false identity with its substratum (4) the Pure Consciousness which is the seat of the Highest Bliss, these four non-existences are the topics of the four chapters of the Vedānta Sūtras, styled ' Mutual Connection, ' 'Removal of Inconsistencies,' ' Means, ' and 'the Goal ' and there is a fifth non-existence of the things of the world, which are mutually exclusive, based upon their connection of false identity with Brahman which is immanent in all things as their Being. Of all the reductions to absurdity, favourable to the Vedānta doctrine, mentioned in the Vedānta Sūtras of four chapters,

‡ The word used in the text is अन्वयव्यतिरेकः and not अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ; therefore the explanation of Ratnavali is supported.

* Consciousness is four-fold (चिच्चतुर्विधा). And as the words used here are दृक्, साक्षिन् etc, it seems that the consciousness in all its four aspects is established here in contra-distinction to the whole world here denied.

these five * are the typical ones. This is the view of the ancient Acharyas. (P. 199.) The detailed account of this should be found out from Vedantakalpalatika.

Therefore, in this way, in the *Sushupti*, there is an experience of Bliss, and its experiencer, who refers *Sushupti* to himself is called *Prajna* (the Ignorant, the Quiescent) because he is 'thoroughly ignorant (quiescent)' or (the Knower) because he is 'thoroughly knowing', on account of the absence of any limitation in the form of distinction (of his knowledge).

Appellation of Jiva in Deep-sleep condition.

In that condition though the inner organ is absorbed, the Jiva is limited by its impressions and therefore there is no possibility either of the non-existence of Jiva or of his becoming omniscient. (P. 200). And the § statement (in Br. Up. 4, 3, 21-32) that he becomes identical with Is'vara in *Sushupti* is due to his being devoid of the idea that the body, the organs, etc. belong to him, and is therefore figurative.

No omniscience of Jiva, in deep-sleep condition.

3. No Plurality of Sakshins.

The essential cause of the ¶ operations which have for their substratum the Witnessing Consciousness, does not include the impressions of the inner organ, but these impressions are the efficient

Ignorance, the adjunct of Sakshin, uniform.

* See Appendix 3 (c) for the Sanskrit expression of these five Tarkas.

§ Vide Page 61.

¶ These operations are 'remembrance, doubt etc.', and their essential cause is Ignorance.

causes of these operations. Therefore though there is a plurality of these impressions (based upon the plurality of inner organs), the Witnessing Consciousness is only *One* (because this essential cause i. e. ignorance which is the adjunct of the Witnessing Consciousness is one). In the waking condition, however § the essential cause of the operations, that have for their substratum the Perceiver, includes the inner organ. This inner organ is the limiting ad-

Inner organs the limiting adjuncts of Jivas, many.

junct of the Perceiver and as there are many such inner organs, there are many perceivers. And because the Perceiver is no other than the Wit-

nessing Consciousness possessed of more adjuncts,* the blending (of the experience and its remembrance as cause

Identity of Sakshin and Jiva.

and effect) is not unaccountable (even though the experiencer be the Jiva and the remembrancer be the Witness-

sing soul or *vice-versa*.) The author of the *Varttika*

Authority of *Varttika*.

(Br. Up. Va. 3. 4. 54-55) has stated that ' Although the Perceiver, and

the means of perception differ in each body, the Witnessing Consciousness is the same just as the external objects ; therefore that Witnessing Consciousness is called Atman. This Atman does not alter unlike the Perceiver, etc. which do alter ; because both the change (in the waking condition) and the absence (in the dream and deep-

§ This essential cause is the inner organ, and its operations are e. g. ' I perceive a pot etc. ' of the waking state.

* The perceiving consciousness has for its adjunct, Ignorance, the inner organ, and the impressions of the inner organ and the gross body. The adjuncts of the Witnessing Consciousness are ignorance and the impressions of the inner organ.

sleep conditions) of the Perceiver, etc., are witnessed by the Witnessing Consciousness. Thus, the revered author of the *Vurttika* denies a variety of the Witnessing Consciousness even in the phenomenal world, therefore the belief of some scholars, in a plurality of the Witnessing souls in *Sushupti* must be regarded as showing their bewilderment (P. 201).

4. Experience of Misery in Sushupti.

QUERY :—Some man sometimes remembers after getting up from deep-sleep that ‘ he Remembrance of this misery. was ‘unhappy in his sleep.’ Therefore we must admit the experience of misery also in the deep-sleep condition.

DETERMINATION :—No. There is no possibility of the experience of the misery then,
 (1) No possibility of the experience of misery in Sushupti. (1) on account of the absence of the materials of misery in *Sushupti*,
 (2) the happiness (of the deep-sleep condition) is imperishable because it is of the nature of Atman and (3) the conviction, ‘ I slept miserably ’ may be explained, by understanding ‘ misery ’ in a secondary sense i. e. misery due to the fact that the bed etc. was not properly arranged.

Or, the experience of misery in *Sushupti* may be accounted for by accepting the view
 (2) Possibility of that experience therein. that all the three conditions are each of three types. To explain, the right apprehension is waking-in-waking
 (P. 202), the error of shell-silver etc, is dream-in-waking, the condition of stupefaction caused by weariness is deep-sleep-in-waking. Similarly being initiated in an incantation

etc. in dream is waking-in-dream ; the cognition in dream viz. ' I saw a dream ' is dream-in-dream ; when something is experienced in dream which cannot be narrated after getting up from sleep, it is deep-sleep-in-dream. Similarly the modification of the *Sattva* mode of Ignorance in Sushupti is waking-in-deep-sleep, and when that modification disappears, there is a remembrance viz. ' I slept soundly ' ; in the same condition the modification of its *Rajas* mode is dream-in-deep-sleep and only as subsequent to it we can explain the remembrance. ' I had a painful sleep ' ; and the modification of the *Tamas* mode of Ignorance is called deep-sleep-in-deep-sleep and after it we have a remembrance ' I slept soundly as one who is stupefied. ' This is explained in Yoga Vashishta Varttikamrta etc, exactly in the same way as it really is.

XVI. UTILITY OF FOREGOING KNOWLEDGE, Or UPASANA OF THE PRANAVA.

Thus we have the following three groups :—* (1)

In microcosm—Vis'va, in macrocosm
Three groups. —Virat, in cosmos—Brahman, and

in microcosm—the waking condition, in cosmos—creation, pertaining to the mode of Causal Ignorance—the *Rajas* mode.

* (1). i.e. The Consciousness which is 'determined' by the gross bodies, when we look upon them individually, is termed *Vis'va* ; when they are regarded as a unity, it is called *Virat* or *Vais'vanara*, (Vide Gaudapadra's Karikas on Mandukya Upanishad Ch. I.) This phase of the individual gross body is called "waking," which is a condition experienced by Vis'va because only in it the forms of gross phenomenon are projected upon this Consciousness, as a waking man only can behold outer thing, conventionally speaking, in direct perception. The Consciousness which is characterised by the Causal Ignorance with the mode of *Rajas* predominating, is styled Brahman and his operation is called "Creation."

† (2). In microcosm—*Taijasa*, in macrocosm—*Hiranyagarbha*, in cosmos—*Vishnu*, and in microcosm—the dream-condition, in cosmos—growth, pertaining to the mode of Causal Ignorance—the *Sattva* mode.

§ (3). In microcosm—*Prajna*, in macrocosm—*Avyakrita*, in cosmos—*Rudra*, and in microcosm—the deep-sleep condition, in cosmos—destruction, pertaining to the mode of Causal Ignorance—the *Tamas* mode.

† (2) The Consciousness, which is severally determined by the subtle bodies regarded individually, is called *Taijas*. The subtle bodies regarded as a Cosmic aggregate determine the Consciousness into a form called variously *Sutratman*, *Hirnyagarbha* and *Prana*. This phase of the individual subtle body is called dream condition which is experienced by *Taijas*, because therein arise the subtle or elemental forms which are conjured up upon this Consciousness, as a dreaming man only can behold the Unembodied forms of the outer material world. The Consciousness which is distinguished by the Causal Ignorance with the mode of *Sattva* predominating, is termed *Vishnu* and his operation is called 'growth'!

§ (3) The Consciousness to which (Collective Ignorance or) Causal bodies taken as a unity act as a determinant is called *Is'vara* or *Avyakrita*. The Consciousness which the Causal bodies (or particular ignorances) severally determine is termed *Prajna*. This phase of the individual Causal body is styled 'deep-sleep' which is the condition experienced by *Prajna*, because in it the substance of Ignorance investing the Consciousness is almost wholly inactive, without creative self-transformation. The Consciousness characterised by the Causal Ignorance with the mode of *Tamas* predominating, is called *Rudra* and his operation is called 'destruction'.

These three groups are respectively expressed by the three parts of *Pranava*, therefore these groups are identical with their corresponding parts of *Pranava*. This identity should be first meditated upon. Thus there would be three identifications of *Vachya* (the group) and *vachaka* (the part of the *Pranava*). Then one should meditate on the identity of the first group, the effect with the second group, the cause, and then one should meditate on the identity of the second group, the effect with the third, its cause. Thus in the end there will be the meditation of the identity—which is a fact—of the Microcosm, the Macrocosm and the Cosmos. By the meditation of this identity (or unity), one attains the *Satyalo*ka, the world of *Hiranyagarbha* and then by the (complete) purification of the inner organ he attains to absolution by stages (i. e. he is liberated along with *Hiranyagarbha* who rules over that world). But by throwing off all those limitations and by the knowledge of only the Witnessing Consciousness one immediately obtains *Moksha*.

Identity of three parts of *Pranava* with those groups.

Successive identity of the groups.

Moksha by stages.

Immediate Moksha.

Thus all the three, *Vis'va*, *Taijasa*, and *Prajna*, along with their conditions, are objects of perception because they share the nature of Ignorance and as such they are unreal. Because of this " I am the Witness, absolute and unique, called the Fourth. "

Thus as all systematic orders can be explained from the standpoint of the phenomenal world and as no such

order exists from the transcendental standpoint there is no inconsistency in the Vedanta doctrine. This has been explained in details by us in the Vedantakalpalatika, so we finish.

XVII. WITNESSING CONSCIOUSNESS : THE ONLY REALITY.

QUERY :—As all the three conditions—the waking, dreaming, and deep-sleep ones—and also those three who are conscious of those conditions, are unreal, even the one who witnesses those conditions must be unreal because the Witnessing One can not be distinguished from the three.

DETERMINATION :—The Witnessing Consciousness is real because his distinction can be emphasised from the three, thus (P. 204) :—

(a) VERSE IX.

“ The whole world, which is (by its nature) other than that (Witnessing Consciousness), is illusory, because He is also unlimited, because the word ‘ Bonum ’ is applied to Him, because His essence is self-proved, and because He has no substratum but Himself. Therefore, I am one, the remainder, auspicious, and absolute. ”

There is a S'ruti text which begins with a description of the Witnessing Consciousness: viz. “ You can not see the seer of seeing ” (Br. Up. 3.4.2) and states that ‘ All else than this (Witnessing soul) is wretched ’, (Br. Up. 3.4.2.). Therefore

Impossibility of denial of Witnessing Consciousness.

whatever is other than the Witnessing Soul, whatever is the object to be witnessed i. e. the phenomenal world, is unreal, but not so the Sakshin. For, this latter is beyond all contradiction or denial (as he persists after all else is contradicted or disproved, (he cannot be contradicted because what is known can be contradicted, while) the Witnessing Soul as the substratum of illusion is unknown, (even if we suppose that the Witnessing Soul can be contradicted, it cannot be proved that he is contradicted, because there is no one who can testify to the denial of the *Sakshin*. All this which is not mentioned in the verse is intended to be conveyed by the verse by the word 'also'. There is a S'ruti text: "Whatever is Ex-

iguity is mortal." (Chh. Up. 2, 4 1.); and therefore limitation and unreality are co-extensive, and so by denying limitation, the unreality would also be denied. With this intention, the Acharya says 'because He is unlimited' The Atman is not limited by space, time, (and thing-in-general) because the S'ruti "Verily, this whole world is Brahman", (Chh. Up. 3, 14, 1), states that Brahman is the essence of all. The *akas'a*, etc., are indeed limited by space, time, etc. yet they are figuratively called 'unlimited', on account of their comparatively wide extensiveness (P. 205).

XVIII. NATURE OF ABSOLUTION.

(a) ABSOLUTION, ATMAN ITSELF: ATMAN, SUPREME BLISS.

QUERY :—(The goal of every man is to attain

Inconsistency of ordinary idea of happiness, with the nature of Atman.

happiness accompanied by negation of all misery). Atman as being omnipresent is eternal and he is also of the nature of existence, (i. e. Atman

is eternal existence); therefore, Atman is neither negation of misery (because existence cannot be negation of anything), nor happiness, because all happiness (e. g. the happiness produced by the organs), is by its very nature, perishable, and so happiness cannot be the nature of the eternal Atman. Consequently the absolution which is the realization of the nature of Atman cannot be the goal of any man.

DETERMINATION :—The Acharya says ; ‘ Because the word ‘ Bonum ’ is applied to him ’. ‘ Bonum ’ means the principal aim of human life because he is said to be the Highest Bliss in the following S'ruti texts ; “ That self is this Atman, is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than all else, since this self is nearer ”, (Br. Up. 1, 4, 8). “ Verily a plenum is the same as pleasure ”. (Chh. Up. 7, 23, 1), “ This truly is the highest bliss ”. (Br. Up. 4, 3, 33). “ Brahman is knowledge, is Bliss ”. (Br. Up. 3, 9, 28). Although He is eternal His production and destruction of the empirical world should be understood

Figurative sense of ordinary idea of happiness.

in a secondary sense inasmuch as He is manifested (not produced) by the various *Sattva* modifications, of the inner organ brought about by the religious merit

(b) *SIGNIFICANCE OF ATTAINMENT OF ABSOLUTION.*

QUERY —If the eternal Atman is the goal, it is not necessary for any body to try to attain to it, as He is the self of all and as such He is already obtained.

DETERMINATION :—Atman is, as it were, to be obtained, inasmuch as He is enveloped by Ignorance and when the Ignorance disappears by the acquisition of knowledge only, (that envelopement is destroyed and) He is, as it were, obtained. Thus the efforts of the sages striving after final emancipation with the aim of obtaining Him, can be explained.

The visible world which is supposed to exist is of the nature of misery and Brahman is the substratum of that world, (and as a substratum does not participate of the nature of the Superimposed) Brahman is the negation of misery. Thus Brahman can be explained as the aim and object of human life if that aim and object be defined as “ absence of misery. ”

(c) *SUPREME BLISS, NO OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE, BEING SELF-LUMINOUS KNOWLEDGE.*

QUERY :—Is the happiness in final liberation known by the liberated or not ? It can not be known. A thing can be known either by the help of the means like the body, organs etc., or without their help. The happiness cannot be known because in the state of absolution these means of knowledge do not exist. And if it be asserted that the

Supreme Bliss neither known nor not-known.

happiness is known even without the presence of those instruments, then this assertion would necessitate the knowledge of that Supreme happiness even in the worldly existence, (2) nor can it be not-known, because such a final beatitude in which the happiness is unknown, will not be accepted as the goal of human life by any body. If that happiness be known (and experienced), then only it can be the aim of human life. For this very reason, those who think themselves to be the devotees of Vishnu say that the happiness of final emancipation is known and yet cannot be described just as the taste of sugar can be known by one who eats it but it cannot be described by him (P. 206).

DETERMINATION—"Because His essence is self-proved," i. e. because Atman is Supreme Bliss, self-luminous. self-luminous Knowledge. Although during the worldly existence, the nature of Atman is covered by Ignorance and therefore He does not then shine in His form of Supreme Bliss: however when that Ignorance ceases to exist on account of the knowledge of reality, He shines by Himself as the Highest Bliss because He is Self-luminous. Therefore, at that time, no instrument which would manifest the Bliss is requisitioned.

(d) KNOWLEDGE, NATURE OF SUPREME BLISS AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE.

QUERY :—Even if the Highest Bliss is Self-luminous Knowledge, it cannot be Atman Knowledge an attribute of Atman. (but it can be an attribute of Atman)
(1) because the nature of Knowledge is identical with the significance of the forms of the

root “ *Jna* ” and as such it is an action, and as an action, it must have a substratum, and (2) because our perception assumes the form “ I know ” (i. e. I am the substratum of Knowledge) and not “ I am Knowledge, ” (and (3) because as an action, Knowledge has both production and destruction, while Atman is eternal). Under such circumstances how can you assert your doctrine of the Absolute Brahman (because there are two things—one, the eternal Atman and the other, the perishable Self-luminous Knowledge) ?

DETERMINATION :—“ Because Atman has got no substratum (but himself), ” because of the S'ruti texts like (1) Knowledge, Atman itself.

“ Explain to me him who is the Brahman present and not beyond our Ken ” (Br. Up. 3. 4. 1); “ He is your soul (Atman), which is in all things ” (Br. Up. 3. 4. 1); “ He who knows Brahman as the real, as knowledge, as the infinite..... ” (Tai. Up. 2. 2. 1); “ Brahman is Knowledge, is Bliss. ” (Br. Up. 3. 9. 28); Atman is self-luminous Knowledge and Bliss. And because the modification of the inner organ is falsely supposed to be Knowledge ¶—

Distinction between Jnana and Jnapti this false supposition being due to the fact that the inner organ, the limiting adjunct of Atman, is falsely supposed to be Atman—there arises the cognition “ I know ” where ‘ I ’ the Atman is the substratum of Knowledge. And the modification of the inner organ is the sense of the root

¶ This knowledge which is Atman is called *ज्ञप्ति*. The modification of the inner organ which manifests that knowledge is called *ज्ञान* or *वृत्तिज्ञान*.

“*Jna*” to know i. e. ज्ञान), and has got production and destruction. (P. 207). Thus the radical knowledge which is knowledge pure and simple (i. e. ज्ञप्ति) has no other substratum than itself as it is the substratum of all, there is no occasion for duality.

CONCLUSION :—Therefore, it is proved that the Atman who is Knowledge and Bliss is the only reality and that the whole world which is other than Atman is unreal.

XIX. NEGATION OF WORLD.

MAIN QUERY —(1) If the whole world is a nonentity like the horn of a hare, it cannot be denied (i. e. the denial of a nonentity is meaningless), and if the world cannot be denied, you cannot establish the reality viz. Atman (because this demonstration depends upon the denial of the world). (2) If the world is somewhere proved, it may be negated elsewhere because what is proved somewhere, may be negated elsewhere, e. g. a pot which is proved to be in the market is negated in our room). So an all-pervasive negation of the world which you assert is inexplicable; therefore the world is not entirely non-existent.

(a) *VERSE X.*

Brahman is not one (first). How, then, can it be second? It is neither alone, nor not-alone. It is neither void, nor non-void. All this—because it is devoid of duality. How can I describe it? It is demonstrated by all the Vedanta texts.

One ' means the Ordinal number ' first '. "Second" means the ordinal number "second" which comes into being in contrast with " first. " Then if it is not first, how can it be second? " Second " implies " third ", etc.

(1) *QUERY* :—The S'ruti—" in the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being, one only, without a second (Chh. Up. 6, 2, 1)"—establishes that Brahman is one.

DETERMINATION :—No. " It is neither alone". " Being alone " means " being one ". (Brahman is not one) because " Oneness " is due to Ignorance.

(2) *QUERY* :—If S'ruti does not lay down that Atman is one, then, in accordance with the means of proof, like the direct perception, etc. Brahman will be many.

DETERMINATION :—" Nor not-alone ". " Being not-alone means " Being many ". There are the following S'rutis on this point (P. 208)—" There is on earth no diversity ". (Br. Up. 4, 4, 19) ; " In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being, one only, without a second ". (Chh. Up. 6, 2, 1) ; " hence, now, there is the teaching, " not this ! not this ! " (Br. Up. 2, 3, 6).

(3) *QUERY* :—Then, if you deny everything of Brahman, it is a vacuum.

DETERMINATION :—No. " It is neither void ", because Atman is the substratum of all illusion, and

survives the negation of all else, and also the following S'rutis establish that Atman is real. "Non-existent himself does one become, if he knows that Brahman is non-existent. If one knows that Brahman exists, people thereby know such a one as existent", (Tai. Up. 2, 6, 1); "He who knows Brahman as the real, as knowledge, as the infinite....." (Tai. Up. 2, 2, 1)"; In the beginning my dear, this world was just Being" (Chh. Up. 6, 2, 1. "This world has, That as its soul; That is reality, That is Atman. That art thou, S'vetaketu," (Chh Up. 6, 8, 7).

(4) *QUERY*.—Then, Atman may be as well said to have the characteristics of being real, being knowledge, etc.

DETERMINATION.—"Nor non-void". Although the two words, "one" and "secondless" (in the S'ruti—Brahman is one only, and secondless—) deny all distinction in Atman (arising from the supposed existence of things like and unlike Atman), yet the word 'only', is used to negative such distinction as is due to the relation of an attribute and the possessor of that attribute between two things (e. g. here Atman and knowledge etc).

The Acharya mentions the ground of all the statements in the verse :—"because it is devoid of duality". What is divided into two is "dual", the state of being dual is duality. It is stated in the Varttika (Br. Up. Bh. Va. 4, 3, 1807), that "they say that what is divided into two is "dual" and the abstract noun from it is said to be "Duality" That, in which there exists no duality i. e. division, is "devoid of duality" This is the literal sense. There is a S'ruti :—"An ocean, a seer, alone without duality, becomes he whose world is Brahman" (Br. Up. 4. 3. 32) (P. 209).

1. (Negation of world continued)

DETERMINATION OF THE MAIN QUERY:—

Possibility of nega- The latter part of the main query
tion of world. does not stand, because only the
knowledge† of the counter entity
of a negation is the essential cause of understanding
the notion of the negation or denial of a thing as this
supposition has the advantage of Simplicity.

The first part of this query does not stand (i. e. the world or duality is not non-existent like the horn of a hare) because it is admitted to be “indescribable” and therefore capable of being known by such means of proof as the direct perception, etc. Thus the negation of duality can be satisfactorily explained.

(5) *QUERY:—*Then let such an Atman be demonstrated by pointing it out with the finger.

*DETERMINATION:—*No. “How can I describe it?” “How” implies the impossibility of its description,

† वदामाव or सर्पामाव is the negation of वद or सर्प Its counter entity (प्रतियोगी) is वद or सर्प. In order to realise the notion of वदामाव or सर्पामाव, the actual existence (माव) of the वद or सर्प (somewhere else than the place where वदामाव or सर्पामाव is found) is necessary according to the Naiyayaikas. The Vedantins hold that only the false perception of वद or सर्प is necessary to understand the negation of वद or सर्प, and the actual existence of वद or सर्प is not necessary; thus a man who perceives a serpent in a rope is able to understand also the negation of the serpent in the rope. So the understanding of the absence of a thing essentially requires the illusory perception of that thing, not its existence.

because Atman being void of duality is not an object of speech. There are the following S'ruti texts. "He explained without uttering a single word". (Nr. Uta. Up. 7); "wherefrom words turn back, together with the mind, not having attained (Him)" (Tai. Up. 2. 4. 1); "You cannot understand the understander of understanding" (Br. Up. 3. 4. 2).

(6) *QUERY*:—If Atman is not an object of speech, how will the Vedanta texts be regarded as authority for the existence of Atman?

DETERMINATION:—No. Although Atman is not an object of speech, Vedanta texts expel only the Ignorance about Atman by a modification (of the inner organ) of the form of the pure Atman.*

For this reason, the Acharya says :—"It is demonstrated by all the Vedanta texts." The following

* While explaining the systematization of the perceiver, the object of perception, etc, it was stated that the pot which is Consciousness limited by the object pot is *Prameya* as long as it is unknown but when it is known or perceived, it is called *phala*. The Ratnavali states that the Vedanta texts are an authority (प्रमाण) for the realization of Atman inasmuch as they are the instrument of right apprehension which has the form of Atman, but they are not an instrument of the *phala* encompassing Atman. तथाच तत्र प्रामाण्यं तदाकारप्रमा-करणत्वम् । ननु तदविषयकफलकरणत्वम् । The Ratnavali quotes a verse which means that the Vritti of Brahman is invariably required for expelling the Ignorance of Brahman. What the S'astrakaras invariably deny (by stating that Brahman is not an object of knowledge) is that Brahman is a *phala*". (ब्रह्मण्यज्ञाननिराकरण-वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वमिष्यते । फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शास्त्रद्विर्विराकृतम् ।

S'ruti texts show that Atman is not an object (P. 210):—
 “It is conceived of by him by whom it is not conceived of. He by whom It is conceived of, knows it not” (Kena Up. 11) :—“that which one thinks not with thought (lit. mind), that with which they say, thought (lit. mind) is thought, that indeed know as Brahman, not this that people worship as this” (Kena. Up. 5).

Thus we have proved that when the Ignorance is destroyed by the modification (of the inner organ) which is accomplished by the Vedanta apothemus and the form of which is uninterrupted, all misery supposed through Ignorance to exist is destroyed. Then, the Jiva realizing his own nature of Supreme Bliss, has his aim achieved.

CONCLUSION OF SIDDHANTABINDU.

I praise not that Vyasa who could not well put together (बन्ध lit. bind) the complete sense of the Vedanta even with all the aphorisms (सूत्राणि lit. strings). I bow to S'ri S'ankaracharya and S'ri Sure'varacharya who collected the whole meaning of the Vedantas even without the help of the aphorisms (Lit. strings). (1).

This composition, like a desire-yielding gem, is pregnant with meaning (also, “giving abundant wealth”) though pithy (also, small in size). It has been prepared by Madhusudan Muni for the diversion of the meritorious. (2)

Whatever excellence is found in this composition belongs to my Preceptor, not to me indeed. What-

ever is not exquisite here is mine only, not of my
Preceptor indeed. (P. 211). (3).

I composed this short dissertation for Balabhadra
being often requested by him. Let the magnanimous
erudite persons discriminate between what is faulty and
what is free from defects herein (P. 212). (4)



APPENDIX I.

(a) Books and Authors referred to in the Siddhantabindu.

NAMES OF BOOKS	PAGE NO.
Aitareya Upanishad.	
II. 4	180
III. 12	95
Brihad aranyaka Upanishad.	
I. 4-7	85
4-8	206
4-10	11, 162, 167
5-3	64
II. 3-6	87, 208
4-5	156, 198
5-19	163, 82, 92, 93, 162
III. 4-1	207
4-2	14, 77, 87, 205, 210
4-7	14
5-1	92, 93, 207
7-33	77
8-8	165
9-28	92, 95, 206, 207
IV. 3-7	92, 93
3-10	190
3-15	100
3-18	12-14
3-21	153
3-22	153
3-32	209
3-33	206
4-20	165
5-6	198
5-14	153

NAMES OF BOOKS.	PAGE NO.
Brhadaranyaka Upanishad Bhashya Vartika:	
1-4-402	129
(with प्रक्रियेहस्यात् instead of प्रक्रिया ज्ञेया)	
1-4-1031	104
(with आत्माप्रियतमस्ततः instead of प्राणादात्मा परःप्रियः)	
2-4-14	165
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं वस्तु ब्रह्मत्वमश्नुते । एतच्चदुर्लभं तस्य द्वितीये सति लक्षणम् ॥	
instead of	
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं वस्तु ब्रह्मेति भण्यते । ब्रह्मार्थो दुर्लभोऽत्र स्याद्वितीये सति वस्तुनि ॥	
3-4-54-55	201
4-3-1807	209
Brahmabindu Upanishad.	
12	85
(This is quoted as a Smṛti.)	
Chhandogya Upanishad	
III. 14-1	205
VI. 1-1	184
2-1	87, 154, 208, 209
2-2	162
2-3	156, 184
2-4	184
3-2	156
3-3	184
5-4	181, 182
8-1	153
8-7	156, 162, 163, 209
VII. 1-3	87
1-5	198
23-1	206
24-1	205
VIII. 1-5	92, 93
3-2	100

NAMES OF BOOKS.	PAGE NO
IX. 8-7	9
Dhatupatha.	
(3) 1095	188
(6) 1425	188
Gaudapada Karika.	
2-32 (quoted as a S'ruti).	167
3-3	162, 164
Jaimini Sutra Bhashya.	
1-2-7	157
Kathopnishad.	
II. 20	164-165
III. 15	165
IV. 12	163
IV. 13	163
V. 9-10	82
15	77
VI. 10	18
17	163
Kenopanishad :	
5	211
11	210
20	163
Mundaka Upanishad :	
1-1-5	156
2-2-8	88
2-2-10	77
2-2-11	163
Nrisinha-uttaratapini Upanishad.	
7	210
9	85
Panchadas'l.	
7-45-46	148
Panchikarana (by Sri S'ankara)	
	186
Ramapurvatapini Upanishad.	

NAMES OF BOOKS.	PAGE NO.
1-7	178
S'vetas'vatara Upanishad.	
1-3	100
1-10	100
3-20	163
4-9	85
4-10	100
5-8	163-4
6-14	77
6-15	86
Sankshepa S ariraka.	
1-36	194
i-169	115
S'abara Bhashya	
IV. 4-19	119
Taitriiya Upanishad.	
2-1-1	92, 156, 184, 209
2-2-1	207
2-6-1	85, 209
3-1-1	12
Vedanta Sutra.	
2-3-6	184
2-3-50	85
2-4-21	184-5
3-2-18	85
Vedanta Sutra S'ankara Bhasha.	
Introduction.	111
1-1 4	198

Quotations not traced:—

(a) तदुक्तं वार्तिककारपादैः—अयमेव हि नोऽनर्थो यत्संसार्यात्मदर्शनम् । 113

(b) तदुक्तम्—अन्यथाऽनुपपत्तिश्चेदस्ति वस्तुप्रसाधिका ।

पिण्डयदृष्टिवैमत्यं सैव सर्वबलाधिका ॥

(b) Important Readings in Siddhantabindu.

Kumbhakonam Text. Reading	Reading in Brahmananda's Commentary (on Siddhantabindu), published along with (1).	Reading in the Benares Text.
PAGE NO.		
17 ° शब्दप्रवृत्तेः		शब्दप्रवृत्तेः
23 वाच्यार्थभेदत्वसानाम् पौनरुक्त्यम्		वाच्यार्थस्य च भेदाव- भासान् पौनरुक्त्यम्
56 ° विषयतया		° विषयस्य
56 देहाकारेण		देहाद्याकारेण
82 चाक्षुषबिम्बमेवरूप- सापेक्षम्	चाक्षुषप्रतिबिम्बमेव रूप- सापेक्षम्	
92 भेदाग्रहः। अपूर्वत्वाच्च	भेदाग्रहपूर्वकत्वात्	
106 समूहालम्बनमवत्		समूहालम्बनभ्रमवत्
146 स्वविषयविषय- प्रमात्वेन		स्वविषयप्रमात्वेनैव
146 अदृष्टिवैमत्यम्		अदृष्टवैमत्यम्
147 ज्ञानस्यान्तःकरण- मात्राश्रयत्वात्		अन्तःकरणमात्राश्रयत्वात्
148 विषयव्यापारजन्य- त्वेन विषयान्तः- करणो भयजन्यत्वेन तदुभयनिष्ठत्वात्		विषयेन्द्रियसंनिर्गमव्यापार- जन्यत्वेन विषयान्तः करणोभयनिष्ठत्वात्
165 अविद्यानिवृत्तेरात्म- रूपत्वे द्वैतापत्तेः		अविद्यानिवृत्तेरात्मभिन्नत्वे द्वैतापत्तेः
182 तत्त्वनिश्चयात्	तद्वत्त्वनिश्चयात्	
194 अधिष्ठानानवच्छेद- कत्वात्		अधिष्ठानावच्छेदकत्वात्
203 मंत्रादिप्राप्ति		मित्रादिप्राप्ति

203 Kumbhakonam Text of Siddhantabindu. Kumbhakonam Text of Brahmananda's Com.

अध्यात्म	अधिभूत	अधिदैव	अध्यात्म	अधिभूत	अधिदैव
{ विश्वः	विराट्	विष्णुः	{ विश्वः	विराट्	ब्रह्मा
{ जाग्रत्	सत्त्वगुणः	पालनम्	{ जाग्रत्	रजोगुणः	सृष्टिः
{ तैजसः	हिरण्यगर्भः	ब्रह्मा	{ तैजसः	हिरण्यगर्भः	विष्णुः
{ स्वप्न	रजोगुणः	सृष्टिः	{ स्वप्न	सत्त्वगुणः	पालनम्

N. B. The third group is the same according to both the readings. 'The reading in the commentary seems to be the correct one because 'जाग्रत्' is the climax of physical activity and therefore it corresponds to ब्रह्मा and रजोगुण and because 'creation, growth and destruction' is the invariable order of the stages of evolution.

211. समप्रसूत्रैः

सम्यङ् न सूत्रैः

(c) "Superimposition" of Atman on non-Atman.

अनात्मनि आत्माध्यासः (∴ The अधिष्ठान must preexist the
| अध्यास)
अनात्मनः सिद्धिः (∴ अनात्मा is illusory.)
|
आत्मनि अध्यासद्वारा (∴ अध्यास requires अधिष्ठानत्व of आत्मा)
|
आत्मनः अधिष्ठानत्वम् (∴ अधिष्ठानत्व presupposes दोषवत्त्व)
|
आत्मनः दोषवत्त्वम् (∴ दोषवत्त्व of आत्मा presupposes
| अनात्माध्यास in आत्मा)
आत्मनि अनात्माध्यासः

(d) Mutual False Superimposition of Atman and non-Atman.

1. आत्मन्यनात्माध्यासः (स्वरूपेण) ।

प्रतीतिः

अध्यासः

- (1) आत्मानं न जानामि (इति साक्षिप्रतीतिः) = अद्वितीयात्मनि अज्ञानमध्यस्तम् ।
(2) अज्ञोऽहम् = आत्माज्ञानवत्साक्षी अहं = अज्ञानाध्यासविशिष्टे आत्मनि
(अत्र अहमिति अन्तःकरणभागः) अन्तःकरणं अध्यस्तम् ।

- (3) अहं सुखी, अहं दुःखीत्यादि } = अन्तःकरणाध्यासविशिष्टे आत्मनि
अहं काणः, अहं बधिर इत्यादि } अहंकारधर्माः इन्द्रियधर्माश्च अध्यस्ताः।
- (4) अहं मनुष्यः = अहंकारेन्द्रियधर्मविशिष्टे आत्मनि
स्थूलदेहः अध्यस्तः
- (5) अहं स्थूलः, अहं कृशः इत्यादि = स्थूलदेहविशिष्टे आत्मनि देहधर्माः
अध्यस्ताः
- (6) पुत्रादौ पूजिते पूजितोऽहं (इति = देहधर्मविशिष्टे आत्मनि बाह्यपुत्र-
प्रतीतिः) भार्यादिधर्माः अध्यस्ताः।

2. अनात्मनि आत्माध्यासः (संसर्गेण)।

- (1) अहं अज्ञः = अहंकारे (or अन्तःकरणे) अज्ञान-
विशिष्टः आत्मा अध्यस्तः।
- (2) सुखी अहं, काणोऽहं (इत्यादि) = अहंकारधर्मेषु इन्द्रियधर्मेषु च
अहंकारविशिष्टः आत्मा अध्यस्तः।
- (3) मनुष्योऽहम् = स्थूलदेहे अहंकारेन्द्रियधर्मविशिष्टः
आत्मा अध्यस्तः।

(e) Five-fold Reductio ad Absurdum of Vedanta.

- (1) स्वप्रकाशदृशः अन्वयेन सिद्धं धटपटादि दृश्यं यदि सत्यं स्यात्;
तर्हि स्वप्रकाशदृशः अत्यन्तविलक्षणं=जडं न स्यात्।
- (2) निर्विकरसाक्षिणः अन्वयेन सिद्धं शुक्तिरजत-स्वप्रकालिक जगदादि यदि
सत्यं स्यात् तर्हि निर्विकरसाक्षिणः अत्यन्तविलक्षणं=विकारि न स्यात्।
- (3) आगमापायशून्येश्वरस्य अन्वयेन सिद्धं जगत् यदि सत्यं स्यात्, तर्हि
तादृगीश्वरात् अत्यन्तविलक्षणं=आगमापयि न स्यात्।
- (4) परमप्रेमास्पदस्य ब्रह्मणः अन्वयेन सिद्धं जगत् यदि सत्यं स्यात् तर्हि
परमप्रेमास्पदब्रह्मणः अत्यन्तविलक्षणं=दुःखसाधनं न स्यात्।
- (5) सद्रूपेण सर्वत्र अनुवृत्ते ब्रह्माणि तादात्म्येन सिद्धानि जगद्वस्तूनि यदि
रुत्यानि स्युः तदा अनुवृत्तब्रह्मणः अत्यन्तविलक्षणानि=परस्परं व्यावृ-
त्तानि न स्युः।

APPENDIX II.

Bhaktimarga as conceived by Madhusudana.

I. Devotion—the principal object of Human Life.

In order to establish that Bhakti is the principal aim of human life, one must first decide upon the nature of this aim. Madhusudana says "the chief object of a man is no other than Bliss unmixed with misery".

Naiyayikas add a rider to this view and say that it is
Theory of "Bliss accompanied by absence of misery."
'Bliss and absence of misery both'. This opinion is controverted because the knowledge that 'a thing will bring happiness', and not the knowledge that 'a thing will give happiness or absence of misery', generates a desire for the thing itself. Moreover, when there is bliss, there is always absence of misery, but the non-existence of misery does not always insure the existence of bliss, as in the deep-sleep condition and in the universal destruction. Thus, absence of misery being invariably co-existent with bliss and not vice versa, we may say that absence of misery is less extensive than bliss and therefore it is implied in bliss. Therefore, the definition that 'bliss only is the principal aim of human life' is the proper definition.

This bliss is not 'bliss mixed with misery', and therefore Madhusudana becomes more explicit by saying that 'Bliss unmixed with misery' is the *Purushartha*.

The well-known idea that 'discharge of duty, acquisition of wealth, gratification of desire, and final emancipation are the four principal objects of human life' must be understood in a secondary sense just as the sentence 'the plough-share is life'. Dharma, Artha, and Kama are means to Moksha.

Popular idea of four Purusharthas, and Devotion.

Thus Bliss-Moksha alone is the *Purushartha*. Or, to those who have blind faith in the popular notion about Purusharthas it may be pointed out that the Bliss of Devotion is generated by the devotional duties and therefore it can be included under 'discharge of duties' and that because devotees have to be released from transmigration, bliss of Bhakti may also be classified as Moksha. Thus either as one of the four Purusharthas or as an independent object of human life, Bhakti is the aim of man, inasmuch as Bhakti is also the highest bliss.

There are many sacred texts in the Bhagavata Purana and the Bhagvad Gita which assert
 Testimony of word. Devotion as the object of human pursuit. (It is significant that Madhusudana quotes no passage from the Upanishads in this respect, nor does he seem to hold that the doctrine of Bhakti is non-Vedic because he has given only a single quotation from the Bhagvad Gita.) "That by assiduous application to devotion one should surrender his mind unto me.—This alone is the orientation of Final Beatitude of man in this world", (Bha. Pu. III. 25, 44). And also, 'And among all Yogis, he who, full of faith, with his mind fixed on me, adores me, is considered to be the most completely possessed of Yoga (B. G. VI 47).

Bhakti is two-fold, that which is a cause or an instrument and that which is an effect or a usufruct. Thus in the Bhagavata Purana
 Instrumental and usufructory Devotion. it is stated that 'the devotees themselves recounting and reminding one another of Hari who removes mass of sins, bear a body horripilated on account of Bhakti generated by Bhakti', (Bha. Pu. XI. 3. 31.) Thus Bhakti is a means to Religious acts, to Knowledge and also to Bhakti. It is therefore, that Bhakti is described in the intermediate six chapters of Bhagavad Gita and the Path of Actions and that of Knowledge in the first and last six ones respectively (vide Intro. to Gudha.) Thus it will be incorrect to refer to

B. G. XVIII. 55. viz: ' By devotion he knows me in essence, who and what I am', and thereby to assert that Bhakti is always a means and never the aim.

'Devotion to God' must be distinguished from the 'Knowledge of Brahma.' There is no doubt that both are described in the scriptures as necessarily preceded by the performance of all religious acts such as the study of the Veda, sacrifice, donation, penance, etc; yet there are four points of difference between them, viz: their nature, their means, their goal and the persons entitled to both. Bhakti is of the nature of a conditional modification of the liquefied mind, experiencing beatification. Brahma-Vidya is of the nature of a conditionless modification of the inflexible mind illumined by the secondless Atman. The means of Bhakti is the hearing of books which record the merits of the Worshipful, while that of Brahman-Knowledge is the principal Apothem like 'That thou art' etc. Their fruits are respectively intense love for God and the disappearance of Ignorance the Prime Cause of all evil. All beings (including even birds and beasts) are entitled to Bhakti, but only Sannyasins having the four preliminaries are fit for Brahma-Vidya. If there were identity all through the above mentioned points, then only the two paths will be identical, but not if only a fragment of the means is common to both. The Book of Brahma-Vidya is the Vedanta-Sutras and the same book is to be used by the Bhakta for knowing the nature of Brahma the object of his love.

Devotion and Heaven. Nor is it to be supposed that because Bhakti is not the same as *Brahma-Vidya*, it may be the same as or similar to *Swarga* which is not the most excellent aim of man. *Swarga* is to be enjoyed in a particular place, at particular time and by a particular body but the bliss of Bhakti, like Brahma-Vidya is enjoyable in all places, at all times and by all bodies. *Swarga* is subject to decay and is controlled by Indra and so it is after all not

unmixed with misery, but the Bliss of Bhakti is not of this type and is therefore unsurpassed.

It must be noted that Madhusudana here differs from the Acharyas of other schools than that of S'ankara Vedanta who believe that *Vraja* or *Gokula* or *Vaikuntha* is the place for devotees and that it cannot be attained but by the giving up of the body.

Madhusudana quotes a verse from the Bhagavata-Purana, viz, " Even sages who enjoy the Bliss of Atman and who are free from all bonds spontaneously dedicate themselves to Vishnu, without having any purpose in view. Such is the excellence of Hari (Bha. Pu. 1.7.10.)" This verse is quoted by Madhusudana, both in his *Bhaktirasayana* and *Gudharthadipika*. He says that even *Jivanmuktas* are said to have been loving God and therefore also Bhakti is the highest goal of human life.

II. Intrinsic Form of Mind: Homogenous with God.

The Upanishads say that Brahman which is Bliss is the cause of the Universe. " Having Performed austerity, he understood that Brahman is Bliss. For truly, indeed, beings here are born from Bliss, when born they live by Bliss, on deceasing they enter into Bliss (Tai.III. 7.)" The Vedanta Sutras, viz, ' that from which this (visible world) has its origin etc', (Br.Su. I.1.2) and ' the world is identical with Brahman because of the Chhandogya S'ruti, ' the effect has its beginning in name only', (Br.Su. II.1.15,) also assert that the world is identical with Brahman which is its essential cause. The omnipresent God, who is the substratum of the superimposed Ignorance called Maya the essential cause of the subtle element, which are themselves the cause of the gross world, which (Maya) has various wonderful Powers is the Inner Ruler of all and as such He is immanent in all.

Brahma—Bliss—material
cause of the mind

Therefore it is immanent in the mind also. Thus the mind can be said to be of the form of the **Brahma-Bliss**, the **Venerable One**.

This innate God-form of the mind is (the substratum of the objectification of the mind and is therefore) substantiating the latter and is co-existing with it; so this innate form is not incompatible with the mind's assuming the form of objects. It is therefore that the God-form of the mind is concealed as it were and not perceived in our daily life.

This innate form compatible with mind's objectification.

III. Adventitious Form of Mind: that of Objects.

The theory of perception is explained in detail by **Madhusudana** in his *Siddhantabindu*, which forms a commentary on the *Das'as'loki* of *S'ankara* (vide pp. 130-133 of the *Kumbhakonam Edition of Siddhantabindu*). A few lines of that explanation, pertaining to the subject under discussion are translated here.

Explanation of Theory of Perception.

“ The inner organ stands in the middle of the body and pervades the whole body. It is pellucid (so that it can catch the reflection of a thing) like a mirror. When the cognizable things like a pot etc., are to be cognized, this inner organ comes out of the body through an outer organ like the eye and pervading the whole of the object assumes the form of that particular object, just as the molten copper does. (The extending to the object (the efferent current) and the assumption of the forms of the various objects, on the part of the inner organ are possible because) it is like the light of the sun, capable of immediate contraction and extension. Because the aureal trans-

formation of Ignorance is composed of parts, it extends at the time of assuming the form of the object of perception, from the interior of the body to the external object and stands undivided between the body and the external object like the eye itself. ”

Accidental nature of
causes of Objectification
of mind.

This assumption of the form of the objects on the part of the mind is said to have no beginning in time (although it has an end), but it is at the same time accidental because in the waking state it is due to (the contact of the mind with the gross objects through) the connection of an organ of sense with its object; in the dreaming state the mind assumes the form of the subtle objects on account of the subconscious impressions remaining in the mind from past actions; while in the deep-sleep condition the mind is metaphorically said to have been dissolved because it is then devoid of (or separated from) any object gross or subtle. Thus in a condition the object-transformation of the mind is due to some external causes.

Illusory nature of
objects.

The object-form of the mind is accidental also because the objects themselves are superimposed on Brahman-Being with which they are really identical as the pot is with clay and as such they are invalidated or obliterated (at the time of Moksha) just as the objects of a dream are during the waking condition. This illusory nature of the objects lends *a fortiori* an illusory existence to the object-form of the mind. Therefore, the object-form of the mind is adventitious.

IV. Re-transformation of mind into its Intrinsic Form: Path of Devotion.

As has already been stated above the esoteric aim of all scriptures is only to bring about the estopal of the object-

form of the mind and then to re-establish its God-form. Various Sacred Books endeavour to accomplish this aim only by different methods.

The theory of the process of perception proves that the mind is rendered fluid and then it assumes the form of the object of perception (see Supra. p. 158).

Liquefaction of Mind during Process of Perception.

This brings us to the consideration of the three states of the mind. (a) By its nature the mind is a rigid substance, like lac and its rigidity like that of the lac, cannot be

Three States of Mind and their causes.

removed without the application to it of heating agents of the nature of fire (Bhakti. I. 5). Thus if the mind which is purified by actions dedicated to God is hard and inflexible,

Natural Inflexibility of Mind.

the aspirer of emancipation is advised to take himself to the Path of Knowledge. He will achieve his aim by the uninterrupted intuitive perception of Brahma through an uninterrupted modification of the purified though rigid mind, but such a modification is not useful to the Devotee. (b) If the agents are not intensely inflaming, the mind

Relaxation of mind by slight-heating causes.

will be only flaccid or lax like the lac when it comes into contact with the heat of the sun. This happens when the mind comes into quick or precipitate touch with the object only. Although the component parts of the mind are loosened, the mind receives no ever-lasting impression of the object because then the impression, if it is received at all, endures till the mind perceives another object. The so-called impressions of the mind due to its perception of the objects, a jar, a piece of cloth, etc. are of this type

(c) There is a third condition of the mind when it is liquefied. This state also is illustrated by its comparison with lac, by Madhus-dana both in his *Bhaktirasayana* (I. 8) and in his commentary on the Bhagavad Gita (XII. 2). Just as the lac is rendered liquid by the application of fire, so does the mind also by its contact with the conflagratory agents (*tapakas*). These agents are (excessive) Longing, Anger, Fear, Love, Joy, Sorrow, Compassion etc. When these heaters cease working, the mind again becomes stiff as does the lac also.

This liquefaction of the mind is particularly useful because the form of an object, impressed on the liquefied mind is ever lasting (Bhakti. 1, 6.), as the mind cannot erase the indelible stamp of this impression even when it perceives another object, just as the lac in its melted condition, having received the vermilion colour and then cooling down, exhibits the same colour over again when it is heated a second time and is applied to wooden things, so the liquid mind being once a receptacle of the form of God, can never lose the sight of that form and despite the perception of other mundane objects, the devotee will mentally realise the immanent presence of the Worshipful One, so it is said in the Bhagvata Purana:-

“ He who perceives the God-transformation of his mind in all beings and also all beings in the God-transformed mind, is the most advanced of all devotees of the Venerable. ”
(Bha. Pu.).

When the mind liquefied by devotional acts, assumes an uninterrupted form of the *Bhagavat*, that state of the mind is called Bhakti (Bhati. I. 3.). Thus Bhakti is neither the uninterrupted modification of the

Liquefaction of mind by
Intense-heating causes.

Characteristic Feature
of Liquefied Mind.

Bhakti=Uninterrupted
Realisation of Bhagavat
by Liquefied mind.

unliquefied mind (which helps the *Jnanin*) nor is it the temporary modification of the flaccid mind (which enables one to perceive the objects of the world). The attainment of this Bhakti accomplishes the purpose of the Scriptures. So Madhusudana says:—" When the melted mind grasps the Venerable One who is omnipresent and eternal, and who is a Plenum of Knowledge and Bliss, naturally nothing remains further to be achieved. " (Bhakti. I.).

V. Sentiment in Devotion and Sentiments in Rhetorics.

According to Bharata, the author of *Natyas'astra*, Sentiment is (the permanent mood) brought out into manifestation by the union of an Excitant, an Ensuant and an Accessory. The Excitants are two-fold; those called the essential and others called the enhancer.

In *Bhaktirasa*, the essential excitant is the Worshipful One, the enhancer-excitant, leaves of the Basil plant (*L. Ocimum Sanctum*), sandal paste etc. The ensuants are the gestures of the eyes etc. The accessory moods are disgust with the world etc. The permanent mood subsequently developed by the co-operant forces mentioned above is identical with a state specially designated as ' Bhakti-sentiment ' and this is the form of God manifesting itself and is of the nature of the intuitional perception of the Highest Bliss (= Beatification). This very mood itself is the Bhakti-Yoga, and true devotees give it the name of ' the *Summum Bonum* of human life '. Thus Devotion is a sentiment because it fulfils the conditions of a sentiment laid down by rhetoricians.

There are two forms of an object, the physical and the psychological. The physical form is unvarying, but the psychological forms are different. Thus the single woman has got many forms as residing in the minds of

Sentiment of Devotion:
a literally Permanent
Mood of Mind.

men, viz: she is the wife, the daughter-in-law, the husband's sister (sister-in-law), the husband's brother's wife and the mother. Similarly the same man is mentally understood to be the son-in-law, the father-in-law, the son, the father, etc. by various persons. In all these cases, the physical or objective form of the person may disappear, yet the mental or subjective form survives. It is more durable than the physical form. Therefore that only is called 'the permanent mood' in rhetorics.

It has been stated above that Bhakti is the uninterrupted (i. e. eternal) modification of the liquefied mind, of the form of God. Thus the Holy One, the Supreme Bliss, by nature, being present (as reflection) in the mind, Himself becomes the sentiment in its highest plenitude, so that *Bhakti-rasa* is nothing but Supreme Bliss (Bhakti I. 10). Therefore, the term ' permanent mood ' can be applied to Bhakti in its literal sense and not in its technical sense of rhetoric. Thus *Bhakti-rasa* is superior to the sentiment of rhetoricians.

It has been already stated that the essential Excitant of Bhakti-sentiment is the Worshipful One and also that the manifested permanent mood is the Holy One. Thus the essential excitant and the permanent mood of the Sentiment of Devotion seem to be identical, which is not the case in the sentiments of the *alankarikas*, but Madhusudana explains that they are not identical, because they can be distinguished inasmuch as the permanent mood is the image of God-Bliss reflected in mind and the essential excitant is God-Bliss, the origin of the image.

The God-Bliss-form of the mind is the permanent mood of the sentiment of Devotion and the same is also the case with the sentiments of rhetoricians, but there is a reason why in these latter the permanent moods are not manifested as God-Bliss, (Bhakti.

Explanation of Identity of Permanent Mood and Essential Excitant.

Distinction of both these sentiments: the one, perfect, the other, imperfect, manifestation of Bhagavat.

I. 11). In the sentiments of rhetoricians, the object of love etc. or the essential excitants are the beloved and others. These latter are the effects of God-Bliss veiled in Ignorance, i. e. in the Vedanta phraseology *Parmanandavishayavacchinnachaitanya* is the *alambanavibhava* in the rhetorical sentiments, while *Parmanandarupa Ohaitanya* itself is the *alambana vibhava* of the sentiment of Devotion. The enjoyment produced by the sentiments of Love and others is not so perfect as the Bliss of *Bhakti-rasa* because in the former the God-Bliss is limited by the objects, while in the latter the God-Bliss is unlimited. In the former, the Object-Bliss is at first the essential excitant and then its reflection in the mind is the permanent mood which finally becomes manifest as the sentiments S'ringara, etc. In the latter God-Bliss or Subject-Bliss is the sole source of all these processes. Subject-Bliss is unconditioned, but Object-Bliss is conditioned. Subject-Bliss is not mixed with Ignorance. Object-Bliss is mixed with Ignorance (I. 13). This limitation through or association with Ignorance is the cause of the deficiency of bliss in the sentiments of rhetoricians. This also proves the superiority of *Bhakti-Rasa* over the sentiments of rhetorics.

VI. Eleven-fold Path of Devotion.

The Bhagavata Purana describes the stories of many Bhagavatas or devotees. These stories have been collated and classified by Madhusudana in the order of growth of devotion in the Devotee, so as to offer a description of the various stages the devotee has to pass through before he reaches God-Bliss. Below is given a description of these with necessary notes:—

The first four steps of Bhakti are purely instrumental, the last eight being consequent. The intermediate three steps are to be reached by the self-exertion of the Devotee while

The main classification.

the last four are automatically reached by him. Thus, the first four, the intermediate three and the last four steps are described as बीज or केवलसाधन, अङ्कुर or फलसाधनोभयरूप and केवलफल respectively.

(i) *Service of the Great.* This may be 'Service of the Devotee of the Holy One, followed by its result, the service of the Holy One' or 'service or Love for the Holy One Himself.' An example of the former is Narada who served the Great (Bha. Pu. I. 5. 23-39). The latter is illustrated by the service of Vibhishana, Hanuman, the Elephant, the Gopis, (Bha. Pu. XI. 12. 1-6).

(ii) *Fitness for the Mercy of the Great.* This fitness is attained by those only who possess the virtues, compassion, endurance, impartiality, freedom from passion, desirelessness, moderateness in eating etc. (enumerated in Bha. Pu. XI. 11. 29-31). To such the Great or God may show Mercy of their or His own accord or out of regard for the efforts of the Devotee. God Siva showed mercy to His devotees the princes of His own accord (Bha. Pu. IV. 24-25-32). Narada and Dhruva had to toil hard before they could win the favour of the Great and God respectively (Bha. Pu. I. 5. 24 and Bha. Pu. IV. 8. 35-42).

(iii) *Faith in Devotional Acts:* 'Faith' means the particular inclination or liking for the devotional acts, expressed in the words: 'I shall have achieved my aim by the performance of these acts'. Such a kind of Faith is described by Brahma in his prayer to Lord Krishna in Bha. Pu. X. 14. 30.

(iv) *Performance of Devotional Acts:* These acts are nine in number: (1) the hearing of the achievements of God, (2) celebrating those achievements, (3) remembering them (4) 'foot-salutation', i. e. showing respect to Vishnu by touching

His feet, (5) worship of Vishnu, (6) bowing to Vishnu, (7) acting as a servant of God, (8) thinking God as the intimate friend of oneself, (9) self-surrender. (Bha. Pu. VII. 5. 23-24).

(v) *Budding Forth of Love for Bhagavat*: ' Love (= Rati for Bhagavat) means ' a particular impression of the mind, which is the permanent mood of the sentiment of Bhakti and which has the form of God (impressed on the liquefied mind). This step is the very soul of Bhakti. The six succeeding steps are but the result of the development of this step only. Bha. Pu. III. 23,25 & X. 51, 53. describe the above four steps as necessarily preceding this stage of Rati for God.

(vi) *Self-realization*: This realization means ' the intuitional perception of the *Inner Soul* as different from the gross and subtle bodies, and it is followed by complete indifference to the world.) All the passages of the *Bhagavata Puran* (e. g. III. 26, 6-7, VII, 7, 19-20; X. 14-55) emphasising the knowledge of Atman are to be understood in this connection.

(vii) *Growth of Love for Bhagavat*: This is a necessary consequence of the previous stages.

(viii). *Consciousness of Bhagavat, dawning*: This is the intuitional perception of the Worshipful, the object of the Love of the Devotee. The Bha. Pu. (VII. 4, 37-48, III. 25-34) state that devotees of Bhagavat do not wish to be identified with or immersed into Bhagavat.

(ix). *Performance of Devotional Acts, becoming habitual*: It must be noted that the fourth step is not identical with this ninth step. In the former the performance of these acts is accomplished by thoughtful efforts on the part of the Devotee; in the latter, it is the very nature of the Devotee. The descri-

ption of Bharata in the *Vishnupurana* and *Ambarisha* in the *Bhagavata-Purana* belong to this stage of Bhakti (Bha Pu. VI 24. 18-21).

(x). *Appearance of the qualities of Bhagavata in the Devotees*: The *Bhagavata Purana* states that " If they wish to have my prowess (Vibhuti), my power (Maya), my divine glory (Bhagavati S'ri), and the eight-fold Lordship (Ais' varya), they obtain all these in this very life from me, the Supreme (Bha. Pu. III. 25-37).

(xi). *Inability to endure separation from Bhagavat, even to the point of death*: An illustration of this stage of Bhakti is supplied by the story of the Gopis in Bha. Pu. X. 31. 15.

APPENDIX. III.

Madhusudana and S'ankara

ON

Bhaktimarga in Gita,

Till the time of Madhusûdana, the followers of S'ankara

S'ankara and his followers prior to Madhusudana believed in the Path of Jnana.

Vedanta continued in some way or other to uphold the main tenet of S'ankara, viz. " Knowledge and knowledge alone is the Path to Salvation."

S'ankara himself did not emphasise the importance of Devotion (=Bhakti) as a means to Moksha. If we examine the interpretations of S'ankara and Madhusudana of the word ' Bhakti ' in the *Bhagavad Gita*, we can clearly appreciate the significance of the contribution of the latter to the S'ankara Vedanta.

S'ankara's interpretation of Bhakti examined.

The Word ' Bhakti ' occurs about thirteen times * in the Bhagavad Gita. In † eight of these places, S'ankara does not try to interpret ' Bhakti, ' whereas in all these cases Madhusudana finds it convenient to explain the word as " the most ardent love for God (*Parames'varè parah premā*)." We feel that the silence of S'ankara here lends ample scope to Madhusudana for thorough exposition of the term " Bhakti ". But in ¶ four other cases S'ankara explains ' Bhakti ' as ' Jñāna '. In £ two of these places Madhusudana does not adhere to this interpretation and understands the word in the sense of ' Love for God', while in the remaining two places Madhusudana had to accept S'ankara's interpretation. In the § thirteenth place, S'ankara and Madhusudana both understand the word ' Bhakti ' as ' service of God. '

In order to show the glaring difference between S'ankara's and Madhusudana's interpretations of Bhakti, we might note their explanation of certain verses of the Bhagavad Gita. In 26th verse of Adh. IX S'rī Krishna says to Arjuna: " He who offers to me with devotion a leaf, a flower, a fruit, water, that I eat of him with the purified mind as he offers it with devotion." This verse is passed over by S'ankara without noticing the great importance it has in the development of the doctrine of Bhakti. But this silence of S'ankara has offered Madhusudana an opportunity to freely explain his view of the

* B. G. Adh. VIII. 10, 22; IX. 14, 26, 29; XI. 54; XIII. 10; XVIII. 54, 55, 68; XII. 17, 19; XIV. 26.

† ' Bhajanam-Bhaktih ' is the only interpretation in B. G. Adh. VIII. 10; IX. 14, 26, 29; XI. 54; XII. 17, 19; and XIV. 26.

¶ Adh. VIII. 22; XIII. 10; XVIII. 54, 55.

£ Adh. VIII. 22 and XIII. 10.

§ Adh. XVIII. 68.

verse. According to Madhusudana, (1) 'devotion' means 'love for God implying the knowledge that' there is nothing higher than Vasudeva' (*na Vāsudevāt param asti kinchit*), (2) 'offers' means 'offers a leaf etc. as a servant offers the master's own things to his master', (3) 'I eat' may be understood not only in the implied sense of 'I accept,' supported by the S'ruti that 'Gods neither eat nor drink but they are satisfied only by seeing whatever is offered to them', but even literal sense of 'I eat' is not objected to by Madhusudana, so that it also means 'I eat' personally a leaf, a flower etc. offered to me by my devotee and I do not mind the rule of injunction and prohibition of eating, just as I ate the grains of rice brought to me by the Brahmin S'ridāman. (4) The repetition of the word 'devotion' in the latter half of the verse, is explained as suggesting that neither the birth as a Brahmin nor the performance of severe penance is the cause of my acceptance of the offerings made to Me, but devotion and devotion alone can attract Me. (5) The words 'a leaf', 'a flower' etc. point out that 'devotion alone satisfies Me and not the rich and plenteous offerings presented with great pomp and pageantry, as is the case with other deities.

Another verse shedding a greater light on the dissension

*Their explanation of
Bhagavad Gita XVIII.
66.*

undertaken is: — " Abandoning all dharmas surrender thyself unto Me. Be not sorry, I will liberate thee from all sins. " (B. G. XVIII. 66). S'rī S'ankara

has written a very long commentary on this verse, a summary whereof here would be out of place. Suffice it to say that he makes much of the word 'abandoning', neglects the importance of 'surrender thyself' and draws the conclusion that " the Path of Knowledge accompanied by the abandonment of all actions, " is the purport of this verse and that of the whole of the Bhagavad Gita, (*sarvadharmān parityajya=sannyasya*

sarvakarmānityetat.....). Madhusudana explains 'surrender thyself' as 'think of Me with ardent love uninterruptedly'. He says "This verse does not lay stress upon the abandonment of actions but on the self-surrender unto God with indifference to the fruit of works (which may be even continued), by all the four Aśramas the student, the householder, the forest anchorite and the religious mendicant in general." According to Madhusudana the highest aim of all Scriptures is to teach the self-surrender unto God and therefore God Krishna concluded the Gīta S'āstra with the same, because without self-surrender even abandonment of actions will not bring about the result which it is expected to do. Madhusudana says that the teaching of *sannyāsa* could not be imparted to Arjuna and therefore *sannyāsa* as S'ankara understands it cannot be the sense of the verse because if it were so, the pronouns 'thyself' and 'thee' will not be applicable to Arjuna whom they are meant to refer to. 'In this Gīta S'āstra three Paths inter-related as means and aims have been taught. The Path of Action reaching the abandonment of all actions is summed up in "..... by worshipping Him in his own actions a man wins Perfection," (Adh. XVIII. 46.). The Path of Knowledge, accompanied by the three processes of 'hearing' etc. completely operated upon and preceded by abandonment of actions, is wound up in "..... having thus known Me in essence he forthwith enters into the Supreme" (Adh. XVIII. 55). The third Path, the Path of Devotion to God is the means to and also the end of the Path of Actions and the Path of Knowledge and is finally described in 'Abandoning all dharma surrender thyself unto Me.....' (Adh. XVIII. 66.).

While writing his Gudharthadīpika Madhusudana had always before him S'ankara's commentary and therefore he has noted the irreconcilable difference between his own interpretation of this verse and that of S'ankara, by writing:—

" But S'ankara in his commentary on this verse says that the verse XVIII. 66. reiterates the abandonment of all actions in 'abandoning all dharmas' and sums up the Path of Jñāna in 'surrender thyself "unto Me alone, "' where he (Madhusudana) significantly remarks, "What insignificant and worthless creatures are we to expatiate upon the exact purport of the Lord! "

One occasion in the Gudharthadīpika makes it quite evident that Madhusudana differed largely from S'ankara's interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita. In the introductory verses to his commentary on

Madhusudana's differing interpretation on verse B. G. XII. 13

the B. G., Madhusudana says that with the Jīvanmukta, the Love for God is spontaneous. This Love for Hari is the very nature of the Jīvanmukta-devotee as much as 'absence of ill will' etc. (described in B. G. XII. 13) are his intrinsic virtues. In B. G. Adh. XII. 13, the Loving Devotee (*prema-bhaktāḥ*) is described, because it is stated in B. G. VII. 17 that 'Of these, the wise constantly absorbed in meditation and devoted to the One is the best.' (Vide verses 37 and 39. Madhusudana's introduction to his comm: on the B. G.) But in the commentary on this verse in the very body of the book Madhusudana tells us that (1) the verse refers to the *akṣharopāsaka* i. e. the Jñānī and not to the Bhakta, (2) that the verse is to be interpreted in consideration of the verse VII. 18 of B. G.

Noble are all these, but I hold the wise as verily Myself.' So the verse does not describe the Vishnubhakta (Vide verse 28 in the introduction to the *Gudharthadīpika*). The reason of this evident self-contradiction is also patent. We have only to open S'ankara's explanation of B. G. XII. 13. Because S'ankara takes the verse to refer to Jñanī, in his commentray on the verse, Madhusudana had to explain the verse in the same way.

The strong leanings to the Path of Devotion, that Madhusudana had, become manifest (a) in His leanings to the Path of Devotion. the references he makes to certain devotees, in order to illustrate the meaning of certain verses of the Gīta, (b) in his verses expressive of his fervent love for God and lastly (c) in certain views which are particularly (mentioned and) emphasised by Madhusudana only among all the followers of Sankara:— all these we find scattered all over his commentary on the Gīta. The names of S'rīdaman (IX. 26), Ajāmila (IX. 30 and 31), Prahlāda (IX. 31, XVIII. 66), Dhruva, Gajendra (IX. 31,) Ambarīsha and also Gopīs (XVIII. 66) are noted by way of illustrations in his commentary on the Gīta. Similarly his own verses incorporated in his interpretation of verses XIII. 1, XV. 19-20, XVIII. 78, may be referred to. In XIII. 1. he says: ' If the yogins, with their mind subdued by constant meditation are able to see some so-called Highest Lustre devoid of all attributes and activities, let them see it. But may that Lustre alone, which, cerulean and indescribable runs, on the sandy banks of the Kalindī be for ever for the admiration and feasting of our eyes. ' In XV. 20 we find, " Those silly persons who cannot endure the wonderful greatness of S'rī Krishna, established by various proofs of evidence, go indeed to the hell, ' and again ' I know no Reality superior to S'rī Krishna with the splendour of a fresh cloud, with His hands adorned with the Lute, with His yellow garment, with His lower lip like the reddish Bimba-fruit, with His face beautiful like the full moon, with His eyes like the lotus'. Madhusudana believed (1) that God even personally partakes of whatever humble food the devotee lovingly and sincerely offers to Him (IX. 26 of B. G), as He did in the case of the rice-grains offered by S'rīdaman and (2) God assumes

human body at His own will and for the sole purpose of conferring boons upon His devotees.

Conclusion. Thus although Madhusudana was a disciple of S'ankara, he differed widely from S'ankara and his followers. As distinguished from the latter, Madhusudana reestablished the exact meaning of certain verses of the Bhagavad Gita, inspite of the fact that he was bound down by S'ankara's interpretation which he always kept before him when he wrote his own commentary on the Gita, that according to S'ankara there are only two Paths mentioned in the B. G. but Madhusudana emphatically stated that there are three Paths to absolution discussed in the B. G. and that in his opinion the Path of Devotion was as good as that of Knowledge and as such he himself followed that Path, though he did not adversely criticise the *Jñānamārga*. -

APPENDIX IV.

Subhashitas from Madhusudana.

(1) *At the end of Hariṣaṅkhyā*:—

(a) लक्ष्म्या सुवर्णलतया वपुषि प्रसन्धे
स्निग्धस्तनस्तवकनिर्मितया नितान्तम् ।
सञ्छायकः शितिरविफलितस्तमाल-
स्तापं न्यपोह्य भवान्निभवं हरिर्नः ॥

(2) *In Madhusudana's tika on the Samkshepa-S'āriraka*:—

(a) सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमद्वयसुखं यद्ब्रह्म गत्वा गुरुं
मत्वालम्बसमाधिभिर्गुणैर्वरेमोक्षाय साक्षात्कृतम् ॥
जातं नन्दतपोबलतदाखिलनन्दाय हृन्दावने
वेणुं वादयदिन्दुसुन्दरमुखं वन्देऽरविन्देक्षणम् ॥

(3) *From Bhaktirasayana*—(First Ullasas):—

(a) पद्मनरवनिविष्टमूर्तिरेकादशरूपतामिवावहान्निष्ठम् ।
यं समुपास्ते गिरिशस्तं वन्दे नन्दमन्दिरे कञ्चित् ॥

(4) *Is'varapratipattiprakas'a*:—

- (a) अन्तर्यामी सभस्तेशो वादिविप्रतिपत्तिभिः ।
यः क्रीडति परानन्दस्तं वन्दे नन्दनन्दनम् ॥

(5) *Mahimnastotratika*:—

भूतिभूषितदेहाय द्विजराजेन राजते ।
एकस्मिन्ने नमो नित्यं हरये च हराय च ॥

(6) *Gudharthadipikā*:—

- (a) यद्भक्तिं न विनामुक्तिर्यः सेव्यः सर्वयोगिनाम् ।
तं वन्दे परमानन्दं धनं श्रीं नन्दं नन्दनम् ॥

At the beginning of 7th Adh.

- (b) श्री गोविन्दद्वाराविन्दमकरन्दास्वादशुद्धाशयाः
संसाराम्बाधिमुत्तरन्ति सहसा पश्यन्ति पूर्णं महः ।
वेदान्तैरवधारयन्ति परमं श्रेयस्त्यजन्ति भ्रमं
द्वैतं स्वप्नसमं विदन्ति विमलं बिन्दन्ति चानन्दताम् ॥

(At the end of Bh. G. IX.)

- (c) कुर्वन्ति केऽपि कृतिनः क्वचिदप्यनन्ते
स्वान्तं विधाय विषयान्तरशास्तिमेव ॥
त्वत्पादपथविगलन्मकरन्दविन्दु-
मास्वाद्य माद्यति मुहुर्भुङ्गुमिन्मनोमे ॥

(at the end of Bh. G. Adh. X.)

- (d) ध्यानाभ्यासवशीकृतेन मनसा तन्निर्गुणं निष्कियं
ज्योतिः किञ्चन योगिनो यदि परं पश्यन्ति पश्यन्तु ते ।
अस्माकं तु तदेव लोचनचमत्काराय भूयाच्चिरं
कालिन्दीपुल्लिनेषु यत्किमपि तन्नीलं महो धावति ॥

(Beginning of Gita on Bh. Gi. XIII.)

- (e) पराकृतनमद्वन्द्वे परं ब्रह्म नराकृति ।
सौन्दर्यसारसर्वस्वं यन्दे नन्दात्मजं महः ॥

(End of Gita on Bh. Gi. XIV.)

(f-g) कारुण्यतो नरवदाचरतः परार्थान्
 पार्थाय बोधितवतो निजमीश्वरत्वम् ।
 सञ्चित्सुखैकबुधः पुरुषोत्तमस्य
 नारायणस्य महिमा न हि मानमेति ॥
 केचिन्निगूह्य करणानि विस्मज्य भोग-
 मास्थाय योगममलत्मधियो यतन्ते ।
 नारायणस्य महिमानमनन्तपार-
 मास्वादयन्नमृतसारमहं तु मुक्तः ॥

(End of Gñ. Bh. Gñ. XV. 18.)

(h) चिदानन्दाकारं जलदरुचिसारं श्रुतिगिरां
 ब्रजस्त्रीणां हारं भवनलधिपारं कृताधियाम् ॥
 विद्वन्तुं भूमारं विदधवतारं मुहुरहो
 महो वारं वारं भजत कुशलारम्भकृतिनः ॥

(End of Gñ. Bh. Gñ. XV. 19.)

(i) वंशीविभूषितकराश्रवनीरदाभ्यात्-
 पीताम्बरादरुणबिम्बफलाघरोष्ठात् ॥
 पूर्णन्दुसुन्दरमुखादराविन्दनेत्रा-
 कृष्णात्परं किमपि तत्त्वमहं न जाने ॥

(j) प्रमाणतोऽपि निर्णीतं कृष्णमाहात्म्यमद्भुतम् ।
 नशक्नुवन्ति ये श्रोतुं ते मूढाः निरयं गताः ॥

(End Gñ. on Bh. Gñ. XV.)

This verse is again repeated at the end of Gñ. n Bh.
 Gñ. XVIII.

(7) Advaitasiddhi:—

(a) मायाकल्पितमातृतामुखमृषाद्वैतप्रपञ्चाश्रयः
 सत्यज्ञानसुखात्मकः श्रुतिशिखोत्थाखण्डवीगोचरः ।
 मिथ्याबन्धविधूनेन परमानन्दैकतानात्मकं
 मोक्षं प्राप्त इति स्वयं विनयते विष्णुर्विकल्पोज्झितः ॥

Beginning of Advaitasiddhi.

(b) बंशीविमूषितकरामवनीरदाभात् etc.

(Advaitasiddhi—Paricheheda IL P. 750)

(c) यो लक्ष्म्या निखिलानुपेक्ष्य विबुधानेको वृत्तः स्वच्छया

यः सर्वान्स्मृतमात्र एष सततं सर्वात्मना रक्षति ।

यश्चक्रेण निवृत्त्य नमस्करोन्मुक्तं महाकुञ्जरं

द्वेषेणापि ददाति यो निजपदं तस्मै नमो विष्णवे ॥

(End of Advaitasiddhi).

APPENDIX V

Books and Authors referred to by Madhusudana
in his works.



N. B. Those marked with* seem to have been lost for ever.

- | | |
|---|------------------------------------|
| (१) अक्षपाद | (१४) उपनिषद्ऽ |
| (२) अङ्गिरमुत्पत्ति | (१५) उपपुराणऽ |
| (३) अमर | (१६) उशनोषधर्मशास्त्र |
| (४) अर्थशास्त्र | (१७) कणादवैशेषिकसूत्र |
| * (५) अलगव (or आलभध on
ज्योतिष) | (१८) कपिलसांख्यशास्त्र |
| This is referred to by
Madhusudana in his com-
mentary on महिम्नस्तोत्र
verse 7. | (१९) कल्पतरु |
| (६) अश्वशास्त्र (?) | (२०) कात्यायन |
| (७) आरमतत्त्वविवेक | (२१) कात्यायनगृह्यसूत्र |
| (८) आमन्दबोधार्थ | (२२) कात्यायनवार्तिक |
| (९) आपस्तम्बकल्पसूत्र | (Grammar) |
| १०) आपस्तम्बधर्मसूत्र | (२३) कामशास्त्र |
| (११) आश्वलायनवल्पसूत्र | (२४) काव्यादर्श |
| (१२) इष्टसिद्धि | (२५) काशिकादिवृत्ति |
| This is referred to in the
closing verse of the अद्वैतसिद्धि
-परिच्छेद IV Again, in
अद्वैतरत्नरक्षण, Madhusūdana
gives a quotation from
इष्टसिद्धि:—यावन्ति ज्ञानानि ताव-
न्त्यज्ञानानीति इष्टसिद्धि-कारवचनात्। | (२६) कुमारसंभव |
| (१३) उदयनाचार्य | (२७) कैश्यट |
| | (२८) कोश of धरणि |
| | (२९) कौमारव्याकरण |
| | (३०) कौषीतकी ब्राह्मण |
| | (३१) खण्डनकार (i. e. श्रीहर्ष) |
| | (३१a) खण्डनखण्डखाद्य |
| | (३२) गणशास्त्र (?) |
| | (३३) गर्ग (on ज्योतिष) |
| | (३४) गीता |
| | (३५) गुणकिरणावलि (Nyaya) |

- (३६) गौडपाद (माण्डूक्यकारिका) * (५८) द्रविडाचार्य
 (३७) गौडपाद (on योग) See footnote on (९६)
 This reference occurs in * (५९) धनुर्वेदशास्त्र by विश्वामित्र
 the Gudharthadipika on This reference to a work
 Bhagavad Gita-Adhyayas on the Military science
 V and VI. which we find in the
 प्रस्थानभेद, the commentary
 by Madhusudana on verse
 7 of the महिम्नस्तोत्र, is noticed
 by Prof. Winternitz (p.
 532 of History of Sanskrit
 Literature). It is also no-
 ticed by Weber in his
 Indian Literature.
- (३८) गौतमन्यायसूत्र
 (३९) गौतमस्मृति
 (३९A) चतुःषष्टिकलाशास्त्र (?)
 (४०) चरक
 (४१) चित्मुखाचार्य
 (४२) छन्दोविचिन्ति (in 8
 Adhyayas of
 पिङ्गलनाम) (५९A) घाणिकेश
 (४३) छान्दोग्य (६०) धातुपाठ
 (४४) जीवन्मुक्तिविवेक (६१) नाट्यशास्त्र
 (४५) जैमिनि (देवताकाण्ड) (६२) नारदपञ्चरात्रम्
 (४६) जैमिनिसूत्रऽ (६३) नारदस्मृति
 (४७) जैमिनिसूत्रमाध्य (६४) निघण्टु
 (४८) (किरणावली) टीकाप्रथम (६५) निरुक्त
 श्लोकन्यास्या (by उदय- (६५A) नीतिशास्त्र (?)
 नाचार्य) (?) (६६) नृसिंहोत्तरतापन्युपनिषद्
 (४९) टुप्टीका (६७) नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धि
 This is referred to in (६८) न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि
 अद्वैतासिद्धि परिच्छेद I. (६९) न्यायचिन्तामणि
 (५०) तत्त्वकौमुदी (७०) न्यायदीपावली
 (५१) तत्त्वदीपिका Or (७०A) न्यायनिबन्धन (?)
 (५१A) तत्त्वप्रदीपिका (७१) न्यायवार्तिक
 (५२) तत्त्वशुद्धि (७१A) न्यायसूत्रम्
 (५३) तैत्तिरीयवार्तिक (७२) न्यायावतार
 (५४) त्रिदण्डिनः (७३) न्याय (on काशिकावृत्ति)
 ५५ - दक्षस्मृति Grammar,
 (५६) देवताकाण्ड by जैमिनि (७४) पञ्चदशी
 (५७) देवलस्मृति (७५) पञ्चपादाचार्य

- (७५a) पञ्चपादिका to in Madhusudana's Comm
(७६) पञ्चीकरण on संक्षेपशारीरक.
(७७) पद्मपादान्वय (९०) प्रातिशाख्य
(७८) परमहंसप्रिया (a comm. on (९१) प्राभाकराः
the Bhagavata (९२) बादरायणसूत्रs
Purana (९३) बार्हस्पत्यसूत्र
(९४) बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्य-
वातिक
(९४a) बृहस्पतिधर्मशास्त्र
(९५) बोधायनकल्पसूत्र
(९६) ब्रह्मनन्दि (in संक्षेपशारीरक)
In III. 221 of the संक्षेपशारीरक,
a "भाष्यकार" is referred to
by the author सर्वज्ञमुनि Ma-
dhudana says that it is
द्रविडाचार्य, who wrote a co-
mentary on the aphoristic
sentences written by
ब्रह्मनन्दिन्. These "aphoristic
sentences" were a
commentary on the छान्दोग्य
उपनिषद्. This is noticed by
Aufrecht (Catalogus
Catalogorum Vol. I. p. 248)
(९७) ब्रह्मविन्दूपनिषद्
(९८) ब्रह्मसिद्धि (by मण्डनमित्र)
This work is referred to
in the अद्वैतसिद्धि-परिच्छेद I
and also at the close of
परिच्छेद IV of the same
work. In अद्वैतरत्नरक्षण it is
quoted:—ब्रह्मविद्धो (उक्तं) षण्डन
मित्रैः "सर्वप्रत्ययवेषे वा ब्रह्मरूपे
व्यवस्थिते । प्रपञ्चस्य प्रविलयः
शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते ।" इति.
(९८a) ब्रह्मसूत्रs

- (९९) भट्टपाद (कुमारिल भट्ट ?) निरुक्त & निघण्टु)
 (९९a) भट्टवार्तिक (११८) योगभाष्य
 (१००) भट्टाचार्य (गदाधर ?) (११९) रामपूर्वतापिन्युपनिषद्
 (१०१) भरत (गान्धर्ववेदशास्त्र) (१२०) रामायण
 (१०१a) भरत (नाट्यशास्त्र) (१२१) लाट्यायन (कल्पसूत्र)
 (१०२) भर्तृप्रपञ्च on ब्रह्मसूत्रs (१२२) लिखितस्मृति
 While commenting on संक्षेपशारीरक I. 7, Madhusu- (१२३) वसिष्ठ (on योग)
 dana tells us that भर्तृप्रपञ्च (१२४) वसिष्ठवार्तिकामृतसार
 and others wrote a co- (१२५) वसिष्ठस्मृति
 mmentary on the ब्रह्मसूत्रs. (३२०a) वाक्यकार (ब्रह्मनाम्दि)
 (१०३) भर्तृहरि (वाक्यपदीय) (१२६) वाग्भट (on medicine)
 (१०४) भविष्यपुराण (१२६ a) वाचस्पतिमिश्र
 (१०५) भागवत (१२६ b) वात्स्यायन (कर्मसूत्र)
 (१०६) सामती (१२६ e) वामागम-दिशास्त्र (?)
 (१०७) भाष्यकार (i. e. (१२७) वार्तिक
 शंकराचार्य) (१२७a) वार्तिककार (सुरेश्वर)
 (१०७ a) मणि (न्यायचिन्तामणि ?) (१२८) वार्तिक-मृत (?)
 (१०७ b) मणिहार (१२९) विद्यासा २
 (१०८) मण्डनमिश्र (author of) (१२९a) विवरण (on पञ्चतादिका)
 ब्रह्मसिद्धि) (१२९b) विवरणकृत
 (१०८ a) मण्डनाचार्य * (१३०) विश्ववेद
 (१०९) मनु विश्ववेद's Comm. on संक्षे-
 (१०९ a) मस्करिणः (= एकदण्डिनः) पशारीरक. This is referred
 to in Madhusudana's Comm.
 on संक्षेपशारीरक.
 (११०) महाभारत (१३०a) विश्वा मित्रप्रणीतधनुर्वेदशास्त्र
 (१११) महम्मस्तोत्र (१३०b) विष्णुधर्मोत्तरस्मृति
 (११२) माघ (शिशुपाञ्चवध) (१३१) विष्णुपुराण
 (११३) मुक्ताफल (by बोधदेव) (१३२) विष्णुसहस्रनाम
 (११३ a) मोक्षधर्म (१३३) विष्णुस्मृति
 (११५) यमस्मृति (१३४) वेदसंहिताs
 (११६) याज्ञवल्क्यमिताक्षरा (१३४a) वेदान्तसूत्र
 (११७) याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति (१३४b) वैशेषिकसूत्र
 (११७a) यास्क (author of

- (१३४०) वैष्णवाः (वल्लभ ?)
 (१३५) व्यासस्मृति
 (१३६) ग्रीष्मायण (कल्पसूत्र)
 (१३७) शङ्खस्मृति
 (१३८) शतपथश्रुति
 (१३९) शबरस्वामी
 (१४०) शाकुन्तल
 (१४१) शांकरमाध्य on गीता
 „ on ब्र० सू०
 (१४२) शातातपस्मृति
 (१४२a) शान्तिपर्व
 (१४३) शास्त्रदीपिका
 (१४३a) शिक्षा (पाणिनि)
 (१४३a) शिल्पशास्त्र
 (१४४) शिवतन्त्र
 (१४४a) शैवागम
 (१४५) श्रीधर (on गीता and
 भागवत)
 (१४५a) श्रुति
 (१४६) संवर्तस्मृति
 (१४७) संकर्षण काण्ड by जैमिनि
 संकर्षणसूत्र (referred to
 in अद्वैतसिद्धि)
 In this Com. on महिम्नस्तोत्र
 Madhusudana says that

संकर्षणकाण्ड was written by
 जैमिनि and that it is the
 well-known देवताकाण्ड. This
 is perhaps the same book
 as संकर्षणसूत्र to which Ma-
 dhhusudana refers in the
 second Paricheheda of the
 अद्वैतसिद्धि.

- (१४८) संक्षेपशारीरक
 (१४९) संक्षेपशारीरकव्याख्या
 (१४९a) सर्वज्ञात्ममुनि (author of
 संक्षेपशारीरक)
 (१५०) सांख्यनकल्पसूत्र
 (१५१) सांख्यकारिका
 (१५२) साहित्यदर्पण
 * (१५३) सिद्धिचपेटिका

This is referred to in
 अद्वैतसिद्धि-परिच्छेद I.

- (१५३a) सुरेश्वरवार्तिक
 (१५४) सुश्रुत
 (१५४a) सूफकारशास्त्र
 (१५५) सूर्यस्तुति (by मयूर ?)
 (१५६) सूर्यस्तुतिटीका (by श्रीधर ?)
 (१५६a) हंसगीता (from भागवत)
 (१५७) हारीतस्मृति
 (१५८) हेमचन्द्र (शब्दकोश)